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This dissertation comprises of four chapters. The first chapter reviews the literature on 
the relationship between differences of opinion and stock returns, with special attention to the 
use dispersion of analysts’ earnings per share forecasts in asset pricing. As reviewed, the 
literature is split on the relationship between forecast dispersion and stock returns both in 
terms of the direction of the relationship and in terms of the role of forecast dispersion. 
Therefore, to understand the causes of the dispersion-return relationship, I conduct detail 
analyses of the dispersion anomaly. 
The second chapter sheds a new light on the empirical relationship between forecast 
dispersion and stock returns by examining whether the relationship is robust to different 
dispersion measures and whether the dispersion-return relationship is related to other well-
known financial anomalies. My results strongly suggest that contemporaneous dispersion is 
negatively correlated with future stock returns. Moreover, the dispersion-return relationship is 
most pronounced in smallest market capitalization stocks and is robust across different 
measures of forecast dispersion. Notably, my results show that the dispersion anomaly is not 
explained by previously documented phenomena such as accruals quality, asset growth, 
capital investment underperformance, and equity issue anomalies. 
To understand more about the dispersion-return relationship, it is necessary to 
understand the causes of forecast dispersion. The third chapter fills this gap by conducting a 
thorough analysis on the determinants of forecast dispersion such as firm risk, information 
asymmetries, forecasting difficulties, analyst conflicts of interest, herding. Evidence shows 
that forecast dispersion has several dimensions including information asymmetries and 
differences of opinion. On one hand, a group of analysts can have superior information. On 
the other hand, even when having the same information set, for example after earnings 
announcements, analysts revise their forecasts not necessarily in the same direction. 
  
Regression analysis shows that forecast dispersion is a function of firm’s risk, past 
performance, analysts’ differing information set, forecasting difficulty, and analyst conflicts 
of interest and herding. In other words, forecast dispersion is a complex concept and different 
factors simultaneously explain why analysts disagree in their forecasts. Overall, my analysis 
importantly suggests that we should be cautious when using forecast dispersion as a measure 
of firm riskiness or firm information environment.  
The fourth chapter investigates whether incorporating determinants of forecast 
dispersion as conditioning information in asset-pricing models helps capture the impact of the 
dispersion effect on raw and risk-adjusted returns of individual stocks (and not portfolios). I 
use four different specifications of the two-pass time-series regression models with time-
varying betas, where betas vary with firm’s market value of equity, book-to-market ratio, and 
the corporate spread. Regardless of the method used for risk-adjustment, there is a strong 
negative relation between average returns and forecast dispersion. Moreover, my results show 
that accounting for the determinants of forecast dispersion reduces but does not eliminate the 
predictive power of forecast dispersion on stock returns. Remarkably, the determinants of 
forecast dispersion account for half of the profitability of dispersion strategy, thus 
substantiating the importance of the determinants of forecast dispersion in understanding the 
dispersion anomaly. 
 
Key words: differences of opinion; analyst forecast dispersion; stock returns; determinants of 




 “Differences of opinion is one crime that kings never forgive” 
 
Ralph Waldo Emerson, 1803-1882 








For capital markets, financial analysts are important participants and play an integral 
part of Wall Street profit centers. Through media, analysts reach millions of individual 
investors. At the same time, analysts are also influential among institutional investors such as 
mutual fund managers that manage most of the capital under management. More importantly, 
banks rely on analysts to get investment-banking deals. To summarize, analysts can generate 
hefty trading commissions for their brokerage houses. 
While analysts perform many tasks, among the most important is generating earnings 
forecasts. One reason is because investors care about whether the firm will meet its earnings 
forecasts. Another is that analysts can more finely signal their views on stocks with earnings 
forecasts than with stock recommendations; see Nocera and Kover (1997). Based on survey 
analysis, Block (1999) presents evidence that investors regard earnings forecasts rather than 
recommendations as a highly important input into their valuation models. Analysts process a 
substantial amount of information, so their forecasts are superior to those derived from simple 
time-series models; see Brown and Rozeff (1978) and Brown, Griffin, Hagerman, and 
Zmijewski (1987). When firms report earnings that exceed analyst forecasts, their stock prices 
increase. By contrast, when firms report earnings that fall short of analyst forecasts, their 
stock prices decrease. The simple fact is that news creates surprises, and surprises create 
volatility and trading opportunity. 
The relation between the dispersion of analysts’ earnings per share (EPS) forecasts 
and stock returns is one of the long-standing and fundamental issues in finance. Because 
earnings forecasts of sell-side analysts are public, in my thesis analyst by default refers to sell-
side analyst and, unless otherwise stated, forecast is the EPS forecast. Throughout the thesis, I 
also interchangeably use “forecast dispersion” and “dispersion” to refer to the dispersion of 
analysts’ EPS forecasts. According to Barron, Stanford, and Yu (2009), from 1990 to 2004 
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this dispersion measure has been used in more than ten finance papers and more than forty 
accounting papers in top journals; see Appendix 1 in their paper for more details. 
A Google Scholar search in November 2010 for “analyst forecast dispersion and stock 
returns” produced about 17,000 hits. While, many papers document that forecast dispersion 
should be priced in the cross-section of stock returns, the sign of the relation is not clear. A 
growing number of studies suggest that tests of forecast dispersion that employ stock returns 
face challenges. On the one hand, several studies show that firms with higher forecast 
dispersion have lower future returns. In these studies, dispersion is not a priced risk factor but 
affects returns through its combination with short sale constraints; see Diether, Malloy, and 
Scherbina (2002), or its effect on idiosyncratic risk in levered firms; see Johnson (2004). On 
the other, Anderson, Ghysels, and Juergens (2005) and Qu, Starks, and Yan (2004), among 
others, suggest that high forecast dispersion implies high expected returns. In particular, they 
show that the dispersion factor (portfolio long in high-dispersion stocks and short in low-
dispersion stocks) is positively related to stock returns. Anderson, Ghysels, and Juergens 
(2009) also study the relationship between stock returns and forecast dispersion, but using 
corporate profit forecasts as opposed to earnings forecasts of individual firms. They show that 
forecast dispersion is a risk factor that is positively priced in the cross-section of stock returns 
and further argue that forecast dispersion is an important determinant of stock returns.  
How to explain the evidence that investors can earn excess returns by trading on the 
dispersion of earnings forecasts? What are the causes of analyst disagreement that induces 
forecast dispersion? How analyst disagreement affects stock prices. In my thesis, I take a 
further step to answer these questions and conduct a detailed examination of the determinants 
of forecast dispersion and the implication of forecast dispersion on stock prices.  
This dissertation consists of four chapters. Chapter 1 presents a thorough review of the 
literature where investors’ differences of opinion is measured by forecast dispersion. Next, I 
examine whether the method of measuring forecast dispersion is important in predicting stock 
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returns. I further examine whether the relationship between average returns and forecast 
dispersion is due to the direct influence of dispersion, or whether dispersion is merely a proxy 
for other driving factors of expected stock returns. 
Chapter 2 starts by shedding new light on the empirical relation between forecast 
dispersion and stock returns. It presents evidence that contemporaneous forecast dispersion 
negatively correlates with future stock returns by extending the analysis of previous studies to 
a longer sample period. The dispersion-return relationship is most pronounced in smallest 
market capitalization stocks and is robust across different measures of dispersion. This effect 
is not explained by previously documented phenomena such as accruals quality, asset growth, 
capital investment underperformance, and equity issue anomalies. 
Most of the studies in the literature concentrate on interpreting the dispersion-return 
relationship without questioning the causes of the forecast dispersion. To understand more 
about the dispersion-return relationship, it is necessary to understand the causes of forecast 
dispersion. Chapter 3 analyses the determinants of forecast dispersion. Regression analysis 
shows that forecast dispersion is a function of firm’s risk, past performance, analysts’ 
differing information set, forecasting difficulty, and analyst conflicts of interest and herding. 
In other words, forecast dispersion is a complex concept and many factors simultaneously 
explain why analysts disagree in their forecasts. Overall, my results suggest that we should be 
cautious when using forecast dispersion as a measure of firm riskiness or firm information 
environment. These results are important for further understanding the observed negative 
relationship between forecast dispersion and stock returns. 
Chapter 4 investigates whether forecast dispersion is priced in the cross-section of 
individual stock returns (and not portfolios). I use two-pass time-series regression models 
with time-varying betas, where betas vary with firm’s market value of equity, book-to-market 
ratio, and the corporate spread; see Brennan, Chordia, and Subrahmanyam (1998) and 
Avramov and Chordia (2006). Results show that forecast dispersion stays negatively 
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correlated with future stock return. Accounting for the determinants of forecast dispersion 




Chapter 1: Differences of Opinion and Stock Returns: A Literature Review 
 
1.1 Introduction 
The capital asset pricing model, (CAPM) of Sharpe (1964), Lintner (1965), and 
Mossin (1966) states that the expected return of a stock is linearly related to its non-
diversifiable risk. One key assumption of CAPM is that everyone shares homogeneous 
expectations. Lintner (1969) relaxes the assumption of homogeneous expectations and shows 
that the major implications of the CAPM are unaffected. For example, Lintner concludes that 
the same combination of stocks is optimal for every investor, and that the amounts invested in 
each stock is equivalent to the ratio of that stock's market value to the total value of all stocks. 
Assuming that investors have difference degrees of risk aversion, Lintner also shows that a 
single scalar measure of risk aversion still determines stock prices. In other words, stock 
prices are determined assuming a representative investor has a coefficient of risk aversion 
equal to the weighted average of all risk aversions. Although there are many other studies 
discussing how to aggregate heterogeneous expectations, what causes investors’ heterogeneity 
is still an open question. Is it the economic uncertainty, information asymmetries, or 
differences in interpreting public information? 
Harris and Raviv (1993), Kandel and Pearson (1995), and Bamber, Barron, and Stober 
(1999) document a positive relationship between price changes and trading volume. They 
show even higher volume around earnings announcements than during other periods with 
similar price changes and no earnings news. Thus, the price change is not the only 
determinant of trading volume. The assumption of different interpretation of information also 
helps explaining the relationship between price changes and trading volume. In order to 
rationalize trade among investors, we have to modify the assumption that investors hold the 
same expectations and same interpretation; see also Karpoff (1986) and Varian (1985a).  
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Investor expectations are intrinsically unobservable, thus measuring their 
heterogeneity poses challenging methodological problems. Because investors use financial 
analyst expectations in forming their own expectations, we can use analyst expectations to 
proxy for investor expectations. Unfortunately, financial analysts normally issue only their 
point forecasts. Aggregating these individual forecasts offers some indication of the degree of 
consensus among analysts, but it does not provide information regarding the confidence that 
each analyst attaches to his/her point forecast. Three widely used sources of analyst forecasts 
are the Institutional Brokers’ Estimate System (I/B/E/S), the Livingston survey, and the 
Survey of Professional Forecasters (SPF).
1
 While I/B/E/S collects earnings forecasts for 
individual firms, Livingston survey and the SPF provide forecasts for macroeconomic 
variables. In addition, I/B/E/S and Livingston survey distribute only point forecasts but the 
SPF provides both point forecasts and the histogram of forecasts for GDP, unemployment, 
inflation, and other major macroeconomic variables. Thus, the SPF is useful in addressing the 
question of whether heterogeneous expectations represent uncertainty, measured by analyst’s 
confidence in her forecast.  
The use of forecast dispersion to proxy for uncertainty is controversial. As Bomberger 
and Frazer (1981) emphasize “the standard deviation among individual forecasts of inflation 
is, strictly speaking, a measure of the dispersion of opinion rather than a measure of the 
confidence in which those opinions are held”. Consensus among analysts need not imply a 
high degree of confidence in their point forecasts. Assuming that uncertainty is related to 
forecast error, Bomberger and Frazer (1981) find high correlation (0.77) between forecast 
dispersion and uncertainty. They use inflation forecasts from Livingston survey. Lambros and 
Zarnowitz (1987) also point to the important distinction between forecast dispersion and 
uncertainty, but argue that Bomberger and Frazer’s result is inconclusive because past 
forecast errors represent only past uncertainty, thus ignoring future uncertainty that includes 
                                                 
1
 Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia provides both the Livingston survey and the SPF. 
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latest news, prospective shifts in economic policies, and changes in external factors that affect 
business and finance. Using the SPF, Lambros and Zarnowitz (1987) show a positive 
correlation between forecast dispersion and uncertainty, where uncertainty is proxied by the 
spread of the probability distribution of point forecasts. Although they support the use of 
forecast dispersion as a measure for uncertainty, Lambros and Zarnowitz (1987) show that 
forecast dispersion understates uncertainty; see also Engle (1983), D’Amico and Orphanides 
(2008). 
There may be periods where analysts agree on future high uncertainty, and hence 
forecast dispersion will be low even though uncertainty is high. The opposite relation arises 
when analysts strongly disagree on their point forecasts but are confident about their 
individual predictions. This situation arises when analysts disagree on their models and 
scenarios. Thus, lacking any theoretical basis, the strength and the stability of the relationship 
between forecast dispersion and uncertainty becomes an empirical issue. Lahiri and Sheng 
(2010) find that the relationship depends on both the sample period and the length of the 
forecasting horizon. Decomposing forecast errors into common and idiosyncratic 
components, they show that uncertainty equals forecast dispersion plus the variance of future 
aggregate shocks that accumulate over horizons. This finding has important implications. It 
suggests that the robustness of the proxy depends on the variance of aggregate shocks over 
time and across horizons. Forecast dispersion is a reliable measure for uncertainty in stable 
periods. In periods with large volatility of aggregate shocks, however, dispersion becomes a 
less reliable proxy. As for the horizon effect, they find the longer the forecast horizon, the 
larger is the difference between dispersion and uncertainty.  
Using the I/B/E/S earnings forecasts data, many researchers parallel studied whether 
forecast dispersion is a proxy for risk or uncertainty. Theory suggests that forecast dispersion 
reflects both risk and uncertainty; see Abarbanell, Lanen, and Verrecchia (1995), Barron, 
Kim, Lim, and Stevens (1998), among others. Anderson et al. (2009) note that risk and 
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uncertainty are different concept, and describe “an event risky if its outcome is unknown but 
the distribution of its outcomes is known, and an event is uncertain if its outcome is unknown 
and the distribution of its outcomes is also unknown”. Barry and Brown (1985) demonstrate 
that, as the amount of public information increases, analysts’ forecasts converge. Thus, they 
suggest forecast dispersion as a proxy for parameter uncertainty. By uncertainty, they mean 
the estimation risk of the parameters of an asset-pricing model. However, a few years later, 
Barry and Jennings (1992) suggest that the adequacy of forecast dispersion as a proxy for 
parameter uncertainty depends on the relative amount of public versus private information. 
When there is more public than private information, additional private information can lead 
toward high forecast dispersion.  
Barron and Stuerke (1998) bring two further evidence supporting forecast dispersion 
as a proxy for future uncertainty. First, soon after earnings announcements, they show 
positive association between forecast dispersion and the proportion of analysts who revise 
their forecasts at least twice during the same quarter. This confirms Abarbanell et al. (1995) 
hypothesis that as forecast dispersion increases after earnings announcements, investors are 
less informed, thus demand for more information. Second, forecast dispersion is positively 
associated with stock price changes around the next quarterly earnings announcements. This 
suggests that forecast dispersion reflects uncertainty that affects stock prices. 
The literature on how to proxy investor heterogeneity is vast and still growing. Bid-ask 
spread is a widely used proxy for differences of opinion. The idea that investors have different 
opinions that creates a spread, motivates the use of bid-ask spread; see Handa, Schwartz, and 
Tiwari (2003), Houge, Loughran, Suchanek, and Yan (2001). Another closely related measure 
is the probability of information-based trading (PIN) advanced by Easley, Hvidkjaer, and 
O'Hara (2002). Given a history of trades, they develop a microstructure model to estimate the 
probability that the next trade is from an informed trader. When information about the payoff 
of a stock is private rather than public and uninformed investors cannot perfectly infer such 
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private information from prices, they require a greater expected excess return. Easley et al. 
(2002) interpret PIN as a measure of information risk and show evidence that is does predict 
stock prices. Numerous papers treat high trading volume as an indicator of inventors’ 
differences of opinion. Bamber (1987) and Bamber, Barron, and Stober (1997) find that total 
trading volume is higher around earnings announcements and suggest that it is investors’ 
differences of opinion driving trading volume. Trading volume may in addition proxy for 
differences of interpretation; see Kandel and Pearson (1995). Garfinkel and Sokobin (2006) 
compute the abnormal trading volume (by previous volume) around earnings announcement 
and show that it is positively associated with future stock returns. Because trading volume is 
measured on the basis of executed trades, a recent paper of Garfinkel (2009) argues that it is 
not an appropriate proxy for investors’ differences of opinion. If an investor’s order is not 
executed, it is because he was unwilling to accept the market price. Thus, execution prices do 
not accurately reflect investors’ private valuations. Garfinkel proposes a new proxy of 
differences of opinion from order data, and shows that it positively correlates with other 
extensively used proxies such as bid-ask spread and analyst forecast dispersion. 
Despite the numerous studies discussing whether heterogeneous expectations represent 
economic uncertainty or information risk, the impact of heterogeneity on equilibrium stock 
prices is yet to be fully understood. This article reviews the literature on the relationship 
between differences of opinion and stock returns, with special attention to the use forecast 
dispersion in empirical asset pricing tests. An important distinction between forecast 
dispersion and the above-mentioned proxies of differences of opinion is that forecast 
dispersion is a forward-looking measure. There is at least one reason why analyst 
disagreement is important for asset pricing - to know if we can achieve abnormal returns 
based on public information. Many authors have incorporated differences of opinion into 
asset pricing models. Although I will not be able to review all papers in this literature, I try to 
cover the largest possible range of studies.  
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I review the theoretical literature in Section 1.2, and present the empirical literature in 
Section 1.3. Section 1.4 discusses potential driving forces behind the currently known stylized 
facts. Section 1.5 concludes. 
 
1.2 Theory 
1.2.1 Positive differences of opinion-return relationship  
One strand in differences of opinion literature suggests that high differences of opinion 
stocks should have lower current prices than low differences of opinion stocks. Williams 
(1977) examines the differences of opinion-return relationship within a CAPM framework. 
When investors disagree on stock returns, they demand higher rates of return. Varian (1985b) 
and Mayshar (1983) extend CAPM assuming 1) no restrictions on short selling, and 2) that 
investors have identical preferences except for differing opinions about expected stock 
returns. If risk aversion does not decline too rapidly, then differences of opinion decreases 
current prices and increases expected returns. Cho (1992), Abel (1989), and Kazemi (1991) 
draw similar conclusion that risk-averse investors decrease current stock prices because high 
differences of opinion makes stock’s future payoffs riskier. 
Fama and French (2007) show that when some investors do not hold the tangency 
portfolio from the minimum-variance frontier (for reasons of information asymmetry, 
transaction costs, asset tastes, or the like), other investors will also deviate from the tangency 
portfolio, in order to clear the market. This makes the market portfolio different from the 
tangency portfolio, thus moving stock prices away from the CAPM pricing. Uppal and Wang 
(2003) also show that the ambiguity joint distribution of stock returns results in undiversified 
portfolios. In the same spirit, Levy (1978) and Merton (1987) assume that it is costly for 
investors to keep track of all stocks in the market - thus investors only hold stocks with which 
they are familiar. Söderlind (2009) also contends that differences of opinion affects stock 
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prices through little diversification. However, if investors are risk-averse, they diversify so the 
effect of differences of opinion vanishes. 
Detemple and Murthy (1994) find that stock prices in the differences of opinion 
economy are equal to the weighted average of prices that would prevail in the corresponding 
economies with homogeneous beliefs. The proportion of the total wealth held determines the 
weights. Decomposing stock returns into risk and uncertainty components, Kogan and Wang 
(2003) and Anderson et al. (2009)  show that both risk and uncertainty carry risk premium. In 
particular, they show theoretically that expected excess return of a stock depends on a 
measure of risk aversion times the amount of risk plus a measure of uncertainty aversion 
times the amount of uncertainty. Anderson et al. (2009) define risk as the market volatility 
and measure uncertainty by the dispersion of corporate profit forecasts from the SPF (rather 
than earning forecasts of individual firms). They observe that the uncertainty-return 
relationship is stronger than the risk-return relationship. The correlation between market 
excess return and uncertainty is 0.28 whereas the correlation with risk is only 0.15. 
 
1.2.2 Negative differences of opinion-return relationship 
Theory changes when short-sale costs are introduced. As set forth by Miller (1977), 
high short-sale costs prevent pessimistic views to reflect in stock prices. The intuition behind 
this result is simple. With high short-sale costs, pessimistic investors are forced to sit on the 
side lines while optimistic investors buy the stocks. Thus, the marginal investor who sets the 
price is the optimistic one. Basak (2005) shows that risk transfers from pessimists to 
optimists. Pessimists simply do not trade as opposed to selling short, which is what they do in 
an unconstrained setting. The greater the differences of opinion between optimists and 
pessimists, the higher the current stock price, hence the lower the expected returns. Jarrow 
(1980), however, demonstrates that short-sale costs are not enough to generate subsequent 
low returns. In principle, the price of high differences of opinion stocks could rise or fall 
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depending on how investors disagree about the covariance matrix of the next period’s prices. 
If they agree upon the covariance matrix, relative stock prices will rise. Jarrow appears to be 
at odds with Miller but this is not the case: Miller examines the effects of relaxing only one 
stock’s short-sale cost, while Jarrow models the impact of simultaneously eliminating all 
short-sale costs.  
Differences of opinion and short-sale costs are not enough to rationalize overpricing. 
High short-sale costs explain why arbitrageurs fail to short overpriced stocks, but not why 
some investors (presumably the optimists) are willing to hold these stocks. Overpricing only 
occurs if there is reason to hold the overpriced stocks. Harrison and Kreps (1978) develop a 
dynamic model where investors choose to hold overpriced stocks because of the possibility of 
reselling to more optimistic investors in the future. Since an investor knows that in the future 
other investors may value the asset more than he does, he is rationally willing to pay more for 
the stock than he would pay if he is forced to hold it forever; see also Morris (1996), Duffie, 
Gârleanu, and Pedersen (2002), and Scheinkman and Xiong (2003). 
 
1.2.3 No differences of opinion-return relationship 
Difference of opinion does not necessary lead to overpricing. Diamond and Verrecchia 
(1987) assume that investors glean information from trading activity and that short-selling is 
costly. They differentiate between informed investors who posses private information and 
uninformed investors who observe only public information (e.g., all trades that take place). 
Because high short-sale costs may prevent informed investors from trading, uninformed 
investors infer that “no trade is bad news”. Therefore, uninformed investors do not trade 
either. As a result, despite the short-sale costs and differences of opinion, stocks do not 
become overpriced. Hong and Stein (2003) also achieve unbiased prices by introducing 
competitive, risk-neutral, and perfectly rational arbitrageurs who do not face short-sale costs. 
The arbitrageurs recognize that the true value of a stock is lower than the optimistic investors’ 
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value, short-sell the stock and push its price back to true value. In summary, some papers 
predict no relation between differences of opinion and subsequent returns, but rely on 
perfectly rational arbitrageurs that can eliminate mispricing. However, as Shleifer and Vishny 
(1997) note, arbitrageurs may be unable to close arbitrage opportunities when facing the risk 
that mispricing gets worse before it vanishes.  
 
1.3 Evidence 
The empirical literature also produces contradictory results. I start with the discussion 
of the choice of forecast dispersion as a proxy of differences of opinion. Then I review the 
empirical literature on the opinion-return relationship. Table 1.1 lists the selected papers along 
with their methods and brief conclusions. 
 
1.3.1 Forecast dispersion as a measure of differences of opinion 
As a proxy for the differences of opinion, I employ the earnings forecast dispersion. 
I/B/E/S provides analyst point forecasts of annual earnings. The use of forecast dispersion as 
a measure of differences of opinion explicitly assumes that analyst estimates are surrogates 
for investor estimates. Several papers emphasize that the use of analyst forecast dispersion as 
a proxy for investor differences of opinion has some flaws. For example, Abarbanell et al. 
(1995) show analytically that forecast dispersion does not fully capture investor differences of 
opinion, because other forecast attributes also affect forecast precision. Specifically, the 
precision of information common to all analysts and the number of analysts forecasting 
earnings also affect forecast dispersion. Thus, forecast dispersion alone is not a sufficient 
statistics to measure investor differences of opinion. Barron (1995) shows empirically that 
even with no change in forecast dispersion, trading may occur when analysts change their 
relative positions from one forecast period to the next, referred to as “belief jumbling”. 
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Although some papers criticize the use of analyst forecast dispersion as a proxy for 
investor  differences of opinion, much evidence shows that analyst forecasts is a key variable 
in the price formation process. Elton, Gruber, and Gultekin (1981) ask whether investors can 
earn excess returns based on analyst growth forecasts. They find no such evidence. This 
suggests that stock prices incorporate the information contained in analyst forecasts. Another 
strain of literature finds a positive relationship between forecast dispersion and trading 
volume; see Comiskey, Walkling, and Weeks (1987), Ajinkya, Atiase, and Gift (1991), 
among others. In addition, Ajinkya and Gift (1985) find a positive correlation between 
forecast dispersion and the implied standard deviation of stock returns from option prices. In 
summary, analyst forecast dispersion has incremental information in price formation process. 
Analysts spend considerable time and effort in forecasting future earnings of firms and 
make their forecasts public. Since investors consult analysts in forming their own 
expectations, investor expectations may be influenced by - and so reflect - analyst 
expectations. Analyst expectations are not however limited to public information. Analysts 
also visit firms they follow and discuss prospects with executives. To prevent selective 
disclosure, on August 10, 2000 the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission introduced a 
set of “fair disclosure regulations”, generally referred to as “Reg FD”. Although the rules 
require a firm to reveal any material information to analysts and investors simultaneously, 
analysts still obtain useful information during conference calls. Bowen, Davis, and 
Matsumoto (2002) show that prior to Reg FD, conference calls increase analyst forecast 
accuracy. After the Reg FD, forecast dispersion has decreased suggesting that information 
asymmetries has decreased after Reg FD; see also Agrawal, Chadha, and Chen (2006), Kwag 
and Small (2007), and Irani and Karamanou (2003). However, as argued by Byard and Shaw 
(2003), firms with a reputation of higher quality disclosures reflect greater precision in 
analysts' both common and private information. This suggests that analysts rely more heavily 
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on public information rather than communications with firms’ executives. Overall, it is 
reasonable to assume that analyst forecasts are acceptable proxies for investor expectations.  
In the absence of direct measures of future uncertainty, researchers have widely used 
the dispersion of point estimates of earnings to refer to future uncertainty. When we employ 
forecast dispersion to indicate uncertainty, the assumption is that this measure is a proxy for 
the diffuseness of the corresponding forecasts’ probability distributions. While there is no 
theoretical relationship between forecast dispersion and future uncertainty, there is some 
empirical support for viewing forecast dispersion as a proxy for future uncertainty. Using the 
SPF gross national product forecasts, Lambros and Zarnowitz (1987) find a significant 
positive relationship between the average of standard deviation of probability distributions 
and the standard deviation of point estimates. Bomberger (1996) shows that the variance of 
subsequent forecast errors is proportional to the variance of forecasts. These findings suggest 
that the assumption of using forecast dispersion as a measure of uncertainty is on solid 
grounds; see also Rich and Butler (1998) and Bomberger (1999). Using longer period, a 
recent paper by Giordani and Söderlind (2003) confirms the use of forecast dispersion a 
measure of uncertainty. 
Forecast dispersion is also an appealing proxy for differences of opinion because 
unlike other measures, such as short-interest or breadth of ownership, it is available for a large 
number of firms. Nevertheless, this measure also has drawbacks. For example, the calculation 
of forecast dispersion requires at least two forecasts. Thus, there is an unavoidable issue of 
data deletion when using the I/B/E/S datasets, since I/B/E/S does not cover many listed firms. 
This sample bias seems to be negligible because La Porta (1996) presents evidence that 
portfolio performance of equal-weighted stocks in I/B/E/S is almost identical to stocks in 




Forecast dispersion is usually defined as the standard deviation of analysts’ forecast 
normalized by the absolute value of the average forecast. The reason for normalizing the 
standard deviation by the absolute value of the average forecast is to exclude the size effect 
and that the standard deviation of forecasts increases with the average forecast. I/B/E/S 
provides earnings forecast data on a split-adjusted basis, rounded to the nearest cent (i.e., at 
two decimal places). Because not all forecasts divide precisely to a cent, adjusting for stock-
splits and rounding to the nearest cent cause a loss of information. For example, if a stock has 
split 10-fold, EPS forecasts of 10 and 12 cents would be reported as 1 cent per share in the 
I/B/E/S split-adjusted datasets. In reality, they are 1 and 1.2 cents per share, respectively. 
I/B/E/S split-adjusted summary dataset thus records a zero standard deviation of forecasts, 
when in fact it is 0.14 cent and forecast dispersion is 0.14/1.1 = 0.13. The rounding procedure 
in I/B/E/S underestimates forecast dispersion for firms that split their stocks. Diether et al. 
(2002), Payne and Thomas (2003), and Baber and Kang (2002) show that this split-
adjustment procedure can lead to wrong conclusions. The unadjusted summary dataset is now 
available for individual firms and it contains summary statistics on split-unadjusted forecasts. 
 
1.3.2 Negative dispersion-return relationship 
A number of empirical studies find that forecast dispersion is negatively associated 
with subsequent returns. Several explanations are suggested in the literature: 1) short-selling, 
2) analyst guidance, and 3) analyst conflicts of interest.  
 
1.3.2.1 Short-Selling 
Using the I/B/E/S unadjusted summary dataset, Diether et al. (2002) find that in U.S. 
markets, during the period of 1983 to 2000, high-dispersion stocks underperform low-
dispersion stocks by 9.48% yearly. Surprisingly, they also find a positive correlation between 
forecast dispersion and commonly used measures of risk such as the beta, standard deviation 
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of returns, and the standard deviation of earnings. Thus, they argue that the relation between 
forecast dispersion and subsequent stock returns is hard to reconcile within a risk-based 
explanation. This cross-sectional dispersion-return relation is unexplained by standard asset 
pricing models including the Fama and French (1993) model or extension of this model 
augmented by Carhart (1997) momentum factor. Diether et al. (2002) suggest that forecast 
dispersion is a proxy for difference of opinion rather than risk. Specifically, as set forth by 
Miller (1977), higher dispersion introduces a larger optimistic bias into stock prices as 
optimistic investors bid prices up, while short-sale costs prevent pessimistic views from being 
reflected in stock prices, thus causing high dispersion stocks to become overpriced. Although 
Diether et al. (2002) do not directly consider short-sale costs, Kot (2006) does provide 
empirical support for a positive relationship between short-interest and forecast dispersion. 
Boehme, Danielsen, and Sorescu (2006) also find that when short-sale costs are high, forecast 
dispersion is negatively correlated with future stock returns but when short-sale costs are 
absent, the correlation becomes positive. 
Diether et al. (2002) report that the dispersion effect is significant for all size groups 
during 1983-1991. However, for 1992-2000 it is significant only for the smallest size group. 
A reduction in obstacles to short selling may be the cause. In a contemporaneous study, Baik 
and Park (2003) also obtain the negative dispersion-return relationship that continues to hold 
up to three years.
2
 They find the dispersion effect to be concentrated among highly illiquid 
stocks, so they contend that high arbitrage costs deter investors from exploiting the dispersion 
effect. By contrast, Johnson (2004) argues that forecast dispersion is a proxy for information 
risk rather than differences of opinion. Assuming that dispersion increases firm’s total risk, 
                                                 
2
 Diether et al. (2002) and Baik and Park (2003) differ in two aspects. First, while Diether et al. (2002) form 
portfolios monthly, Baik and Park (2003) perform yearly portfolio formation based on the dispersion at the end 
of December. Second, they distinctly treat firms with different fiscal year ends. In their sample, Diether et al. 
(2002) include all firms with different forecast-year-ends. However, forecast dispersions across firms can be 
different not only because analysts’ disagreements differ across firms but also because forecast horizons differ. 
Although both papers measure forecast dispersion as the coefficient of variation, Baik and Park (2003) 
differentiate between firms having different fiscal year ends. 
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high-dispersion stocks may be fairly priced. If a firm is levered and equity is a call option on 
the firm's assets with an exercise price of the firm's debt, then forecast dispersion increases 
the value of the call option. Johnson’s evidence supports this hypothesis.  
It is not clear yet whether short-sale costs drive the dispersion effect. For example, 
Scherbina (2001) and Park (2005) find dispersion effect even for S&P 500 stocks that are 
easy to short. Scherbina argues that “…while the costs of short-selling the S&P 500 stocks are 
low, they are not negligible”. Clearly, some evidence on the cost of shorting is desirable in 
tests explaining dispersion-return relationship. If stocks with high short-sale costs earn low 
returns, then we have direct confirmation of Miller’s theory. Some recent papers have sought 
to detect direct short-sale costs and study how differences of opinion impacts stock price 
when shorting is difficulty. For example, using a unique dataset of short-sale costs for 1926-
1933 period, Jones and Lamont (2002) show that stocks that are expensive to short have low 
subsequent returns. Mohanaraman (2003) draws similar conclusion that more short-
constrained stocks earn lower subsequent returns.  
Two conditions for Miller’s overvaluation theory to hold are 1) that a stock is subject 
to short-sale costs, and 2) that investors disagree about firm value. Stocks differ both in the 
degree of differences of opinion and in their short-sale costs. Boehme, Danielsen, Kumar, and 
Sorescu (2009) study the interaction between the two conditions, with U.S. stocks for 1988-
2002. Their measure of short-sale costs is the relative short interest, i.e., the monthly short 
interest divided by the number of outstanding shares. When short-sale costs are absent, 
forecast dispersion is positively correlated with subsequent returns. However, when present, 
the correlation is negative. Overvaluation exists only when both differences of opinion and 






1.3.2.2 Analyst guidance 
Understanding the forecast dispersion anomaly matters not only because it links a 
measure of stock fundamentals to stock prices, but also because analyst disagreement is 
potentially under the control of firms. Managerial incentives can affect forecast dispersion. 
When analysts make earnings forecasts, they combine information provided by the firm with 
information they produce on their own. Another major reason for analyst disagreement is that 
some analysts may know things that other analysts do not. Thus, the two sources of 
information could give rise to differences of interpretation or differences of opinions among 
analysts; see Kandel and Pearson (1995), Harris and Raviv (1993). 
Managers use quarterly earnings announcements to release information into the 
market. Normally, firms organize conference calls where managers discuss quarterly results 
and take questions from analysts. Therefore, much uncertainty is resolved around the time of 
quarterly earnings announcements. If the dispersion effect reflects investors’ behavioral 
biases, we should expect more reaction from investors around quarterly earnings 
announcements. Expanding on this idea, Scherbina (2001) shows that about 20% of the return 
differential between low-and high-dispersion stocks falls in a three-day window around 
quarterly earnings announcement dates. Berkman, Dimitrov, Jain, Koch, and Tice (2009) also 
document that high-dispersion stocks earn lower returns around quarterly earnings 
announcements. The three-day hedge returns (returns on low- minus high- dispersion stocks) 
are about three times larger than the hedge returns reported by Diether et al. (2002). Thus, 
there are substantial benefits to focusing the analysis on quarterly earnings announcements. 
Concentrating on a subsample of stocks that are difficult to sell short magnifies the 
profitability of dispersion strategy, showing that a significant part of the dispersion effect is 
due to short-sale costs. 
When firms provide unambiguous earnings guidance, analysts rely less on their private 
sources of information, thus lowering forecast dispersion. Indeed, Ali, Liu, Xu, and Yao 
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(2009) provide evidence that forecast dispersion is endogenously determined by the firm’s 
earning guidance strategies. Firms with good earnings prospects provide unbiased and 
accurate earnings relative to firms with poor earnings prospects. Ali et al. (2009) attribute the 
underperformance of high-dispersion firms to the quality of future earnings and suggest that 
the delay in disclosing bad news about future earnings temporarily increases stock prices. 
They show evidence that high-dispersion firms report poor earnings in subsequent quarters. 
Interestingly, after controlling for future earnings surprises, high forecast dispersion actually 
leads to high subsequent returns (consistent with risk interpretation of dispersion).  
Because firms with good news provide high quality reporting, they have low forecast 
dispersion. Byard and Shaw (2003) document that analyst forecast distributions for firms with 
a reputation for providing higher quality disclosures reflect a greater precision of analysts' 
both common and private information. A related argument is made by Lang and Lundholm 
(1996) who examine the relation between disclosure practices of firms, number of analysts, 
and properties of the analyst earnings forecasts. Firms with more informative disclosure 
policies have larger analyst following, more accurate analyst earnings forecast, less dispersion 
among individual analyst forecasts and less volatility in forecast revisions. In a similar vein, 
Ang and Ciccone (2001) claim that the forecast dispersion, measured as the standard 
deviation of all individual forecasts, is a proxy for firm transparency. Transparent firms that 
have low forecast dispersion outperform opaque firms. A hedge portfolio earns an average 
return of about 13% per year.  
 
1.3.2.3 Analyst conflicts of interest 
Analysts provide their research to the public with the aim to generate securities 
trading.
3
 However, employed by brokers acting also as investment bankers, analysts face 
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conflicts of interest with the firms they follow. In particular, these analysts are late in 
incorporating bad news in their forecast revisions. This creates high forecast dispersion for 
firms with bad news. Avramov, Chordia, Jostova, and Philipov (2009) provide evidence that 
the dispersion effect concentrates among the worst rated stocks and exists only during periods 
of credit rating downgrades, exactly when the worst rated stocks experience large price drops. 
The dispersion effect also becomes insignificant after controlling for credit rating. Analyst 
conflicts of interest could be an explanation for their finding because credit risk analysts in 
rating agencies do not face the same incentives as analyst in brokerage houses. Therefore, 
credit analyst opinion is a more accurate proxy of firm’s quality. In other words, financial 
distress is bad news that coupled with analyst conflicts of interest causes delays in analysts 
downward revising their forecast. This in turn increases forecast dispersion and explains 
Avramov et al. (2009) result that dispersion effect is a manifestation of credit risk. 
Credit analysts have information advantage over financial analysts, especially after 
Reg FD. This is because under 17 CFR 243.100(b)(2)(iii) rule,
4
 credit analysts have 
permission to access firm confidential information, so that investors following them can 
receive high quality credit rating. Ederington and Goh (1998) show significant negative 
earnings forecast revisions following credit rating downgrades, and find little change in 
earnings forecast around credit rating upgrades. Jung, Sivaramakrishnan, and Soderstrom 
(2007) confirm this result and further show that, after Reg FD, credit rating downgrades have 
even more impact on earnings forecast revisions. This implies that financial analysts view 
rating downgrades as an important source of new information about future earnings prospects, 
especially after Reg FD in order to compensate for the decline in public information. 
Managers may want to release good news and to hide bad news. Hong, Lim, and Stein 
(2000) provide empirical support to this idea. Because stock linked compensation, the threat 
                                                 
4
 This is because the rule states that Reg FD shall not apply to a disclosure made “to an entity whose primary 
business is the issuance of credit ratings, provided the information is disclosed solely for the purpose of 
developing a credit rating and the entity's ratings are publicly available”. 
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of takeovers, and the like, management prefers high stock prices. Thus, in order to draw 
market attention, managers are keen to announce good news, but negative stories are often 
delayed or eliminated.
5
 Moreover, because of conflicts of interest, analysts are reluctant to 
make bad news public. Scherbina (2008) shows that future stock underperformance can be 
predicted by measures of withheld negative information such as a decrease in analyst 
coverage. Analysts with private poor earnings forecast simply prefer to stop coverage rather 
than disseminate bad news.  
Erturk (2006) also suggests that the negative dispersion-return relationship may be 
attributable to the sluggish response of analysts to negative information. When some analysts 
are more reluctant than others to respond to bad news, it creates non-synchronous response to 
bad news and, as a result it generates more dispersed forecasts. In a similar spirit, Hwang and 
Li (2008) contend that there is no causality between forecast dispersion and return. Instead, 
the negative dispersion-return relationship comes from analyst incentives. After controlling 
for incentive-induced upward bias in the reported consensus forecast, the dispersion effect 
disappears. Even more, the dispersion effect only exists among firms with poor future 
earnings. Analysts face a difficult decision to revise their forecasts downward when there is 
bad news about the firm, but no such dilemma presents itself for good news. Probably, this is 
why the dispersion effect is present only for firms with bad news.  
Ackert and Athanassakos (1997) also attribute the negative dispersion-return 
relationship to analyst incentives. Analyst optimism declines with forecast horizon. When 
much uncertainty surrounds a firm, analysts act on their incentives and release optimistic 
forecasts. However, when uncertainty is low, little or no optimism remains. Unfortunately, 
they use a sample of only 167 firms. With a larger sample of 980 firms for 1977-1989 period, 
Brennan et al. (1998) confirm the statistically significant inverse relationship between the 
                                                 
5
 On the other hand, short-sellers, once they have established a position, have an incentive to publicize the bad 
news. Nevertheless, because they are so few, their impact is limited. 
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forecast dispersion and subsequent returns. The dispersion effect is strong only during 1979-
1983 period. Han and Manry (2000) also show that forecast dispersion and subsequent stock 
returns are negatively correlated. A hedge portfolio (long on low- and short on high- 
dispersion stocks) earns two-year statistically significant cumulative excess returns of 13.5%. 
In their view, the dispersion effect is because the market does not entirely assimilate the 
information contained in forecast dispersion and responds in a delayed manner. 
 
1.3.3 Positive dispersion-return relationship 
Although much of the literature narrowly focuses on the negative dispersion-return 
relationship, some studies show a positive relationship. For 178 firms, Cragg and Malkiel 
(1982) collect earnings growth estimates (for the following five years) for 1961-1968 period. 
To explain the variations in expected returns, they use beta and various risk factors suggested 
by the arbitrage pricing theory. When the variance of growth rates is added, it is highly 
positively significant. Additional tests show that price-earnings ratios are negatively 
correlated with forecast dispersion. Cragg and Malkiel (1982) conclude that forecast 
dispersion represents the most effective risk proxy variable. Similarly, Malkiel (1982) and 
Farrelly and Reichenstein (1984) show that forecast dispersion appears to be a better risk 
proxy than beta. Carvell and Strebel (1984) and Harris (1986) also find that high-dispersion 
stocks have higher subsequent returns. Using data from 1976 to 1985, Barry and Gultekin 
(1992) find that forecast dispersion, measured as the coefficient of variation divided by the 
square root of the number of analysts, produces positive returns in January and negative 
returns in other months. This evidence, coupled with Tinic and West (1984)’s finding that 
high beta stocks earn high returns only in January, may indicate that, for January, forecast 
dispersion proxies for risk. Avramov et al. (2009), however, find that dispersion profitability 
is statistically significant only in non-January months. 
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Subsequent works have covered larger sample of stocks. For instance, Qu et al. 
(2004), examining 1983-2001 period, find significant positive correlation between forecast 
dispersion and expected returns, where expected returns are computed based on portfolio 
holdings of mutual funds. They compute expected returns in the mean-variance framework 
based on mutual funds portfolio weights. Portfolios with higher levels of dispersion have 
progressively more exposure to Fama and French (1993) factors, which confirms that forecast 
dispersion embodies a measure of risk. For 1991-1997 period, Anderson et al. (2005) examine 
the dispersion-return relationship for S&P500 firms, using two different measures of forecast 
dispersion: standard deviation of one-year forecasts and standard deviation of growth 
forecasts. They find a negative relation between stocks returns and dispersion of one-year 
forecasts, but a positive relation for the dispersion of growth forecasts. They content that the 
standard deviation of growth forecasts embodies a measure of risk, while the standard 
deviation of one-year forecasts does not. However, both returns of dispersion factor are 
positively related to the S&P 500 stock returns, where the dispersion factor portfolio is long in 
high-dispersion stocks and short in low-dispersion stocks. In addition, not only does forecast 
dispersion predict return variance for the next year, but also the model using it alone provides 
better prediction of variance than other models. 
Researchers have tried to identify the components of forecast dispersion. Barron et al. 
(1998) provide a model where they relate analyst earnings forecasts to public and private 
information. They decompose forecast dispersion into two components: uncertainty and lack 
of consensus. More precisely, forecast dispersion is expressed as (1 ),V   where V is the 
uncertainty and (1 )  is the lack of consensus among analysts. Using the Barron et al. (1998) 
decomposition, Doukas, Kim, and Pantzalis (2006b) show that, after controlling for 
uncertainty, stocks that have high forecast dispersion or high lack of consensus earn high 
future returns. Thus, they support forecast dispersion being a proxy for risk. Barron et al. 
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(2009) also use this decomposition and find that forecast dispersion and changes in forecast 
dispersion, both quarterly and annually, are separate matters with separate implications. The 
level of forecast dispersion reflects uncertainty, but changes in forecast dispersion reflect 
changes in information asymmetry. In other words, a large change in dispersion, indicating 
high information asymmetry, suggests that there are informed and uninformed investors in the 
market. By contrast, when dispersion level is low, there is low uncertainty about the stock. 
When dispersion does not change much, investors are more likely to be trading against people 
with essentially the same information. Further tests show that the lack of consensus, measured 
by (1 ),  is positively associated with subsequent stock returns, but the uncertainty in 
forecast dispersion, measured by ,V  is negatively associated with subsequent stock returns. 
These results are in line with L'Her and Suret (1996) who show that increases in forecast 
dispersion are negatively associated with contemporaneous stock returns.  
Doukas, Kim, and Pantzalis (2004) show that forecast dispersion is higher among 
value stocks than growth stocks. Given that 1) on average value stocks earn higher returns 
than growth stocks; see Rosenberg, Reid, and Lanstein (1985), Fama and French (1992), and 
2) value stocks have greater exposure to forecast dispersion, they argue that forecast 
dispersion represents a risk factor. Further they construct a disagreement factor and show a 
positive (negative) and significant relationship between returns of value (growth) stocks and 
the disagreement factor.
6
 Thus, they favor the view that investors command a premium for 
value stocks because these stocks are exposed to greater disagreement; see Doukas, Kim, and 
Pantzalis (2002). In another study, Doukas, Kim, and Pantzalis (2006a) largely replicate the 
negative relationship between forecast dispersion and stock returns, and show that the effect is 
most pronounced among small stocks and stocks having low institutional ownership. Then, 
                                                 
6
 To construct the disagreement factor, they rank company-year observations by forecast dispersion and form 
two equal-weighted portfolios based on the top 30 percent and bottom 30 percent dispersion rankings. For these 
portfolios, they compute monthly returns for the next 12 months. This process leads to the construction of return 
series of 210 monthly observations from July 1983 through December 2001. The disagreement factor is the 
return difference between the top 30 percent and bottom 30 percent portfolio returns. 
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they examine the differences of opinion under different states of earnings expectations about 
future stock payoffs; i.e., pessimism vs. optimism. The finding is that when analyst forecasts 
are optimistic, this valuation pattern reverses. The average return difference between high-
dispersion and low-dispersion stocks is significantly positive across all size groups. However, 
when analysts’ earnings expectations are pessimistic, the return spreads between high 
dispersion and low dispersion stocks within each size category is negative. The evidence 
suggests that investors tend to overvalue (undervalue) low-dispersion stocks when analysts’ 
forecasts are optimistic (pessimistic), thus realizing low (high) subsequent returns. 
Existing literature on forecast dispersion mainly focuses on stock returns. However, 
Güntay and Hackbarth (2010) and Mansi, Maxwell, and Miller (2006) examine the corporate 
bond market. Corporate bonds of high-dispersion stocks demand higher credit spreads and 
earn higher subsequent returns. High-dispersion firms have lower credit ratings, thus they 
interpret forecast dispersion as a forward-looking measure of information risk. Their result 
also suggest that the argument of  Miller (1977) does not equally apply to bond market as it 
does to equity market. From their own conversations with stock dealers, Longstaff, Mithal, 
and Neis (2005) report that the cost of shorting corporate bonds is about five basis points, 
while this cost can rise to 50–75 basis points for the bonds of financially distressed firms 
(footnote 25). Güntay and Hackbarth (2010) further argue that this relative lack of short-sale 
costs for corporate bonds permits bond prices to reflect the views of both pessimistic and 
optimistic investors. 
  
1.3.4 Dispersion-return relationship outside the U.S. 
The vast majority of studies use U.S. data. However, there is some evidence that 
forecast dispersion keeps its predictive power elsewhere. Studying the German market, 
Dische (2002) shows that high-dispersion stocks underperform low-dispersion stocks. 
Hintikka (2008) and Daniševská (2004) present negative dispersion-return relationship for 
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Finland, France, Netherlands, and Germany, but not for the U.K. Finally, Gharghori, See, and 
Veeraraghavan (2007) and Zellweger, Meister, and Fueglistaller (2007) find a negative 
dispersion-return relationship in Australia and Switzerland, respectively. Leippold and Lohre 
(2009) confirm this persuasive evidence on the U.S. and major European markets. They show 
that the dispersion effect concentrates in a three-year window from 2000 to 2003, after the 
burst of so-called “dotcom bubble” when most uncertainty about high dispersion stock is 
resolved. It would have been highly profitable during this time to short high-dispersion 
stocks, but because during the “dotcom bubble” stock prices reached high levels, the authors 
argue that margin calls would make it unfeasible to profit from shorting high-dispersion 
stocks. This finding gives additional support to Miller (1977) hypothesis. The results in this 
subsection are also unexplained by the Fama and French (1993) and Carhart (1997) models. 
 
1.4 Conclusion 
This chapter shows that the question of whether forecast dispersion represents a risk 
measure or simply a noise measure of analyst disagreement is still a subject of both 
theoretical debate and empirical investigation. Theory suggests that the sign of the theoretical 
relationship between differences of opinion and expected stock returns remains an open 
question. For example, a number of papers contend that in the absence of short-sale costs, 
differences of opinion represents priced factor, produces low current prices, and generates a 
positive relationship between differences of opinion and subsequent stock returns. However, 
when short-sale costs are absent, the relation becomes negative. In summary, some studies 
predict a positive relationship, some derive no relationship, while others predict a negative 
relationship.  
To review the empirical literature, I employ the widely use earnings forecast 
dispersion as a proxy for the differences of opinion. The empirical literature also brings 
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conflicting evidence on the relation between contemporaneous forecast dispersion and 
subsequent returns. Some propose that higher dispersion introduces a larger optimistic bias 
into stock prices as optimistic investors bid prices up, while short sale constraints prevent 
pessimistic views from being reflected in stock prices, thus causing high dispersion stocks to 
become overpriced. This literature also reports positive correlation between forecast 
dispersion and commonly used measures of risk such as the beta, standard deviation of 
returns, and the standard deviation of earnings. Thus, they conclude that the relation between 
forecast dispersion and subsequent stock returns cannot have risk-based explanation. By 
contrast, papers supporting the positive dispersion-returns relationship show that after 
controlling for stock uncertainty, stocks that have high forecast dispersion or high lack of 
consensus earn high future returns. Thus, they support forecast dispersion being a proxy for 
risk. 
In sum, the debate is still ongoing with a growing number of studies suggesting 
different explanations including short-sale restrictions and the shortcoming of using realized 
returns rather than the theory-suggested ex-ante expected returns, among other explanations. 
All these studies, however, differ in terms of sample selection and the period considered, as 
well as in empirical methods. Thus, many questions remain unexplored about the driving 
forces behind the predictive power of forecast dispersion. In the next chapters, I conduct a 
careful empirical investigation of the dispersion anomaly. In particular, I examine whether the 
negative dispersion-return relationship is due to measurement issues such as different proxies 
employed for analyst differences of opinion or whether the dispersion anomaly is simply due 
to other well-known market anomalies. I also conduct a thorough analysis on the determinants 
of forecast dispersion suggested by the extant literature, such as firm risk, information 
asymmetries, forecasting difficulties, analyst conflicts of interest and the like. In addition, I 
study whether the dispersion-return relationship is due to determinants of forecast dispersion 
or it merely proxies for other explanations of expected returns. 
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Table 1.1: Empirical papers on dispersion-return relationship 
Papers presented in the table use forecast dispersion as a measure of differences of opinion. I examine its relation with U.S. stocks returns as opposed to e.g., corporate bond yields or European stock returns. I sort papers by 
year. The “Dispersion” column presents the definition of the forecast dispersion measure. The “Horizon” column shows whether the forecasted earnings are quarterly, annual, or long-term growth forecasts. The “Coverage” 
column provides the minimum number of analysts’ forecast used to compute the forecast dispersion. The “Age” column shows the maximum age of the forecast, if any, to be included in the computation of the summary 
statistics, and the “Rel” column presents the empirical relationship between forecast dispersion and future stock returns in the corresponding paper. 
 
Reference Period Dispersion* Horizon** Coverage Age*** Rel Key results 





l 2  + Forecast dispersion explains a higher proportion of returns than the traditional beta. The results are robust to 
the addition of market return and national income. 







a 3  + Develop new beta CAPM incorporating forecast dispersion that provides a better risk adjustment. Stocks 
with high forecast dispersion have higher subsequent returns. The results stay intact after historical beta is 
included. 
 







a 2  + Value stocks have higher forecast dispersion than growth stocks. The return advantage of value strategies is a 
reward for the greater disagreement about their future earnings. This relationship is unexplained by the Fama 
and French (1993) and Carhart (1997) models, augmented by the disagreement factor. 
 




(1 )V   a 2  + Both lack of consensus, measured by1 , and forecast dispersion represent risk measures, after 
controlling for the uncertainty .V   
 




(1 )V   q 2 30d +,- The lack of consensus, measured by 1 ,  is positively associated with future stock returns, but the 
uncertainty, measured by ,V  is negatively associated with future stock returns. 
 





a 2,5  +,- Show significant negative correlation between forecast dispersion and subsequent realized returns. However, 
the correlation becomes positive between forecast dispersion and expected returns based on portfolio 










a, l 2  +,- Find negative returns to a dispersion of one-year forecasts, but positive returns for dispersion of growth 
forecasts. For the portfolio of all stocks in the S&P500 index, both measures of dispersion are positively 
correlated with subsequent realized returns. The predictive power of forecast dispersion remains unaffected 
by the addition of Fama and French (1993) and Carhart (1997) factors. 
 







a 2 3m +,- When there is low forecast dispersion among analysts, the credibility of their earnings forecasts increases, 
and so does the confidence of investors in analysts’ forecasts, causing overvaluation (undervaluation) when 
earnings expectations are optimistic (pessimistic). 
 































a 2  - Dispersion in S&P 500 stocks’ earnings forecasts predicts subsequent returns, similar to Diether et al. (2002), 
but at the aggregate market level. The results are likewise attributed to stock prices reflecting the most 
optimistic valuations (in this case due to reluctance to engage in short-selling). 
        







a 2  - The negative dispersion-return relationship remains unchanged after the inclusion of firm characteristics such 
as size, book-to-market, bid-ask spread, dividend yields, and momentum returns. 







a 2  - The market does not entirely assimilate the information contained in forecast dispersion in a timely manner. 
The results are similar when stock returns are adjusted for beta, size, book to market ratio, and past returns. 
 





a 2  - The dispersion strategy returns are unrelated to size, book-to-market, industry, liquidity, momentum, post-


























a 2  - The post-earnings-announcement drift explains the negative dispersion-return relationship - high forecast 
dispersion is associated with poor earnings performance that precedes negative price drifts. Fama and French 
(1993) and Carhart (1997) models do not account for the relatively low returns earned by high-dispersion 
firms. 
 








a 2  - Forecast dispersion results from analyst slow and non-synchronous response to negative news. The 








a 2  - Trading costs increase with forecast dispersion. High forecast dispersion stocks are overpriced because 
forecast dispersion coincides with trading costs.  







a 2  - The predictability of forecast dispersion on subsequent stock returns mainly comes from the denominator 
effect (absolute value of average forecast) rather than from the numerator effect (standard deviation) of the 
dispersion measure.  Results are unexplained by size, book-to-market, and momentum phenomena. 
 







a 2  - The dispersion effect disappears after controlling for the incentive-induced upward bias in consensus 
forecasts. 







a, q 2 30d - High differences of opinion stocks earn lower returns in the 3 days window around earnings announcements. 
This evidence is similar across five different proxies for differences of opinion (earnings volatility, return 
volatility, forecast dispersion, firm age, and share turnover). 







a 2  - Credit risk subsumes dispersion effect. The profitability of dispersion is significant only during periods of 
credit rating downgrades. The dispersion effect is concentrated in non-investment grade firms (S&P BB+ and 
below). The results are robust to inclusion of short-sale costs, illiquidity, and leverage. 
*std = standard deviation of analyst forecasts, avg =  average analyst forecast,  price = stock price prior to portfolio formation date, eps = earnings of S&P500 index, bvps = book value per share 
**a=annual, q = quarterly, l = long-term 
***m=months, d = days 
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Chapter 2: Forecast Dispersion and Stock Returns: A Re-Examination 
 
2.1 Introduction 
Explaining cross-sectional differences in average stock returns is one of the challenges 
of modern finance. Researchers have identified many patterns in average stock returns and 
because the CAPM does not explain them, they are called stock market anomalies. The 
number of documented market anomalies is large and continues to grow. Forecast dispersion 
anomaly is one of the recent market anomalies and as Chapter 1 summarizes, the empirical 
relationship between contemporaneous dispersion and future returns remains an open 
question. 
Given the seemingly contradictory results in the literature, in this chapter I study 1) 
whether the dispersion-return relationship is robust to different dispersion measures and to 
longer period than considered in the extant literature, and 2) whether the dispersion-return 
relationship is related to other well-known financial anomalies. This is an important step to 
understand the unique existence of the dispersion anomaly and I contribute to the literature by 
studying these questions in depth. In particular, I investigate the connection of forecast 
dispersion anomaly with Francis, LaFond, Olsson, and Schipper (2005) accruals quality, 
Titman, Wei, and Xie (2004) capital investment growth, Cooper, Gulen, and Schill (2008) 
asset growth, and Loughran and Ritter (1995) equity issuance anomalies. Titman et al. (2004) 
find that high-investing firms have low future returns, and interpret their finding with 
investors underreacting to overinvestment. Cooper et al. (2008) observe negative correlation 
between firm’s asset growth and future returns, and suggest that investors overreaction to 
investment in asset growth causes this negative correlation. The theoretical explanation for the 
asset growth-return arises if the reduction in firm risk following the exercise of growth options 
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induces a negative relationship between investment in asset growth and future returns; see 
Cochrane (1991) and Berk, Green, and Naik (1999). Francis et al. (2005) presents evidence of 
risk premium for firms with poorer earnings quality, as captured by Dechow and Dichev 
(2002)’s measure of accruals quality. Loughran and Ritter (1995) show that the stock 
performance after initial public offerings (IPOs) or seasoned equity offerings (SEOs) is poor 
relative to non-issuing firms, and suggest that investors may be too optimistic about the 
prospects of issuing firms. Similar to the forecast dispersion anomaly, these anomalies refer to 
firm’s financial variables predicting low stock returns. I explore whether the dispersion 
anomaly and these four anomalies are independent effects.  
My results strongly suggest that contemporaneous dispersion is negatively correlated 
with future stock returns. Consistent with previous studies, the dispersion effect is most 
pronounced among the smallest size stocks. It also appears that the negative dispersion-return 
link is robust to different measures of dispersion, e.g., the range, the standard deviation of 
forecasts scaled by price, and the exclusion of stale (old) forecasts. In addition, my analysis 
does not provide any discernible link between dispersion anomaly and the well-known 
anomalies discussed above. 
The layout of this chapter is as follows. Section 2.2 presents the link of forecast 
dispersion with stock returns. In Section 2.3, I discuss the robustness of that relationship. 
Section 2.4 studies whether the dispersion anomaly is distinct from the other well-known 
anomalies. Section 2.5 concludes. 
 
2.2 Dispersion-return relationship 
The research problem addressed here concerns the detailed assessment of the 
predictability of forecast dispersion on future stock returns. The central question is whether 
we can achieve abnormal returns based on publicly available earnings forecasts. Yet, 
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beginning with Cowles (1933, 1944) evidence persists that analyst advices do not produce 
abnormal returns. Diether et al. (2002) show the opposite - that forecast dispersion does 
predict stock returns. If following analysts’ forecasts can make positive abnormal profits, then 
markets are inefficient. On the other hand, Womack (1996) argues that positive abnormal 
returns are limited by the search and information costs of the analysts.  
Because many papers that incorporate forecast dispersion still produce conflicting 
results, the debate can only be resolved by means of a careful empirical investigation. I take a 
step in that direction and below I provide thorough examination on the relationship between 
forecast dispersion and stock returns by extending the analysis of previous papers to a longer 
period - from February 1983 to December 2007. 
 
2.2.1 Sample characteristics 
My sample merges several datasets. Analysts’ earnings per share forecasts and 
recommendations are from I/B/E/S files. Returns are from CRSP monthly stock file that 
includes NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ stocks. For some of the tests in Section 2.4, firm 
accounting data from the Compustat Industrial Annual file are also used. Appendix A details 
the sample selection process. I first present summary statistics of the sample to provide a basis 
for comparison with other studies. 
Table 2.1 gives an overview of sample characteristics. As shown in Panel A, in 
February of 1983 only 34.59% of CRSP stocks are eligible to be included in the sample. 
There is a clear deepening in eligible stocks over time, with the fraction of eligible stocks 
being 58.19% at the end of 2007. The average size of eligible stocks is 2.6 billion - that is 
almost twice larger than the average size of CRSP stocks, indicating that my sample is tilted 
toward large market capitalization firms. On average, there are 2,147 eligible firms per month 




Table 2.1: Sample characteristics 
Panel A reports statistics for CRSP ordinary common shares that are traded in NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ by removing financial 
institutions. Panel B limits the sample to the eligible stocks. A stock is eligible to be included in the analysis if it has a one fiscal year I/B/E/S 
earnings estimate, is covered by two or more analysts, and has a price greater than five dollars. The period considered is February 1983 




Panel A: All CRSP stocks 
 



















1983/02 4,302 310.4 34.59  1,488 812.3 8.82 
1983/12 4,778 321.6 34.74  1,660 841.5 9.03 
1984/12 4,808 298.3 35.84  1,723 774.9 8.95 
1985/12 4,672 367.1 36.99  1,728 925.3 10.07 
1986/12 4,859 397.0 36.06  1,752 1018.6 9.78 
1987/12 4,987 384.9 33.23  1,657 1088.2 9.90 
1988/12 4,744 436.5 36.00  1,708 1142.7 10.13 
1989/12 4,568 551.6 38.20  1,745 1371.6 10.07 
1990/12 4,484 516.8 36.04  1,616 1378.3 10.06 
1991/12 4,582 686.7 40.16  1,840 1635.6 9.29 
1992/12 4,690 721.8 44.67  2,095 1549.0 8.78 
1993/12 5,142 742.4 45.68  2,349 1541.4 8.54 
1994/12 5,421 703.8 46.08  2,498 1460.4 8.26 
1995/12 5,613 910.0 48.26  2,709 1800.5 7.98 
1996/12 6,051 1024.5 51.81  3,135 1909.4 7.32 
1997/12 6,096 1295.1 51.79  3,157 2415.3 7.20 
1998/12 5,711 1757.5 50.60  2,890 3366.4 8.04 
1999/12 5,439 2473.7 52.90  2,877 4513.9 7.92 
2000/12 5,234 2236.1 43.98  2,302 4910.8 8.03 
2001/12 4,601 2207.1 45.97  2,115 4652.4 8.27 
2002/12 4,211 1824.0 43.62  1,837 3978.5 8.31 
2003/12 3,904 2573.8 53.84  2,102 4600.2 8.72 
2004/12 3,873 2883.0 56.70  2,196 4883.5 8.80 
2005/12 3,801 3039.8 57.93  2,202 5080.3 8.49 
2006/12 3,743 3414.7 61.29  2,294 5413.4 8.65 
2007/12 3,686 3663.6 58.19  2,145 6117.1 8.53 
        
Average 4,769 1,375 45.2  2,147 2,661 8.77 
 
 
Table 2.2 brings additional descriptive statistics for the sample stocks and five 
portfolios equally sorted by forecast dispersion. As can be seen, although high dispersion 
firms have slightly lower analyst coverage and tend on average to be smaller, they are not 
typically small firms. The high dispersion firm has average (median) market capitalization of 
984 (262) million dollars. This reflects the fact that analysts usually do not cover small firms. 
In addition to being smaller than the overall sample, high dispersion firms tend to have higher 
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value of average and median recommendations, higher standard deviation of 
recommendations, less buy and more sell recommendations.
7
 All together, these results 
indicate that these firms are not performing well. 
Miller (1977) argues that when investors are overconfident about the precision of their 
signal, differences of opinion induces excessive trading in stocks, resulting in higher trading 
volume (or turnover) for firms with higher differences of opinion. My empirical finding, 
consistent also with the previous literature, supports Miller’s view that high dispersion firms 
have high turnover; see also Comiskey et al. (1987), Ajinkya et al. (1991). As a measure of 
trading volume, I use trading turnover, defined as the ratio of the number of shares traded at 
the month-end to the total number of shares outstanding at the month-end. Lo and Wang 
(2000) argue that using trading turnover as a measure of trading volume has an advantage in 
that it is unaffected by “neutral” changes of units such as stock splits and stock dividends. 
Moreover, one problem with using the number of shares traded as a measure of trading 
volume is that it is unscaled, therefore highly correlated with firm size. However, Chordia and 
Swaminathan (2000) show that the correlation between trading turnover and firm size is much 
lower than that between other measures of trading volume and firm size. 
  
                                                 
7
 I/B/E/S codes analyst recommendations using a 1-5 scale, with 1 signifying a strong buy, 2 a buy, 3 a hold, 4 
an underperform, and 5 a sell. Thus, high value of recommendation indicates poor recommendation. 
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Table 2.2: The distribution of firm characteristics 
This table reports the average statistics for all stocks and stocks equally sorted by five dispersion groups. Forecast dispersion is the standard 
deviation of all outstanding current fiscal year earnings forecasts scaled by the absolute value of the average forecast as reported in the 
I/B/E/S Summary History file. Each month stock characteristics are averaged first over the stocks in every group and then over the sample 
period. Stocks with an average forecast of zero are assigned to the highest dispersion group, and stocks with a price less than or equal 5 
dollars are excluded from the sample. Stocks are held for one month. The period considered is February 1983 through December 2007.  
 
Characteristic Dispersion Avg Std 25% Median 75% 






All 8.72 7.15 3.34 6.28 11.83 
D1 9.28 7.81 3.36 6.42 13.06 
D2 9.59 7.24 4.05 7.33 13.15 
D3 8.83 7.06 3.63 6.49 11.73 
D4 8.12 6.68 3.26 5.81 10.69 








All 2,603 10,158 189 480 1,474 
D1 4,397 14,763 273 720 2,390 
D2 2,976 10,295 264 666 1,965 
D3 2,228 8,006 199 481 1,389 
D4 1,623 6,077 157 358 1,017 







All 1.35 1.55 0.51 0.89 1.63 
D1 1.12 1.18 0.46 0.76 1.34 
D2 1.29 1.41 0.50 0.85 1.55 
D3 1.43 1.61 0.53 0.93 1.72 
D4 1.50 1.72 0.56 1.00 1.81 







All 2.13 0.54 1.74 2.10 2.50 
D1 2.05 0.72 1.39 2.09 2.70 
D2 2.08 0.49 1.67 2.00 2.46 
D3 2.18 0.38 1.91 2.13 2.39 
D4 2.31 0.42 2.03 2.26 2.56 







All 2.15 0.68 1.73 2.14 2.70 
D1 2.05 0.80 1.29 2.23 2.76 
D2 2.11 0.61 1.70 2.04 2.54 
D3 2.23 0.60 1.99 2.17 2.69 
D4 2.31 0.71 1.87 2.49 2.95 
D5 2.31 0.65 2.00 2.02 2.80 






All 0.74 0.33 0.59 0.76 0.92 
D1 0.30 0.24 0.00 0.40 0.52 
D2 0.69 0.07 0.63 0.69 0.75 
D3 0.90 0.06 0.85 0.90 0.95 
D4 1.13 0.07 1.08 1.11 1.17 







All 61.78 28.47 42.18 64.02 87.38 
D1 65.65 40.17 30.71 79.23 100.00 
D2 67.52 26.76 47.44 73.36 90.68 
D3 55.88 18.44 43.91 59.03 70.29 
D4 48.92 17.38 36.15 49.97 62.40 







All 3.73 8.77 0.00 0.00 3.58 
D1 1.44 5.79 0.00 0.00 0.00 
D2 2.06 7.08 0.00 0.00 0.52 
D3 3.52 6.89 0.00 0.26 4.27 
D4 9.37 9.94 0.53 7.36 14.54 
D5 17.92 17.12 0.54 16.47 29.03 
*Because in year 1993 there are few recommendations in the I/B/E/S recommendations file, the period 





2.2.2 Portfolio selection 
I assign stocks to portfolios based on forecast dispersion in order to draw conclusions 
about average returns for these portfolios. This standard approach reduces the variability in 
returns; see e.g., Jegadeesh and Titman (1993). I form portfolios using three separate ranking 
procedures. Because the results from all three procedures are similar, I report only results 
from procedure 1. 
 
In-sample breakpoints 
Procedure 1: Each month, stocks are equally assigned into quintiles based on the 
forecast dispersion of the previous month.
8
 Stocks with the lowest forecast dispersion are 
placed into quintile 1 (D1), and those with the highest forecast dispersion are in quintile 5 
(D5). I then perform two-way sorting on size and dispersion. This procedure has been 
extensively used in the literature back to Banz (1981) and Basu (1983), among others. Using 
in-sample breakpoints, each month I equally assign stocks to quintiles based on their market 
capitalization of the previous month.
9
 Quintile 1 includes the smallest stocks and quintile 5 
includes the largest stocks. Stocks in each size quintile are further ranked into five dispersion 
quintiles based on the forecast dispersion of the previous month. The purpose of this two-way 
sorting is to hold one variable constant while investigating the impact of the other. This 
classification results in 25 portfolios, each of which contains 87 stocks. Stocks are held for 
one month.
10
 I calculate monthly portfolio returns as the equal-weighted, value-weighted, and 
median average of returns of all stocks in a portfolio.  
Procedure 2: This procedure is identical to procedure 1 except that firms are first 
ranked based on the dispersion and then ranked on size. 
                                                 
8
 The reason portfolio formation chosen at the quintile rather than decile level is to have more firms in the 
portfolios. Nevertheless, I obtain similar results when forming decile portfolios. 
9




, 60th and 80
th
 breakpoints does 
not guarantee that the portfolios will contain equal number of stocks. However, even this sorting does not 
significantly alter my results. Thus, I report the results of in-sample breakpoints.  
10
 Section 2.3.6 presents the results when stocks are held for more than one month. 
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Procedure 3: This procedure independently ranks stocks based on the size and 
dispersion. This method is described in Reinganum (1981) and Cook and Rozeff (1984). 
 
Alternative breakpoints 
As in  Fama and French (2008), stocks in each month are allocated to three size groups 




 percentiles of previous month 
market capitalization of NYSE stocks. I also sort stocks into three size groups - small, 





percentiles of previous month market cap of NYSE stocks. Then, in each size group, I rank 
stocks into further quintiles based on forecast dispersion of the previous month. 
 
2.2.3 Portfolio returns 
 
In-sample breakpoints 
The second column of Panel A in Table 2.3 shows a strong negative relationship 
between average returns and forecast dispersion. In particular, for all sample stocks the 
average monthly return differential between low- and high-dispersion (D1- D5) portfolios is 
0.66% with t-stat of 3. Not reported here, results are similar when using  Newey and West 
(1987) standard errors with 3 as the maximum lag order of autocorrelation.
11
 
The average monthly return of D1-D5 strategy declines as the average size increases. 
While the return differential between the low- and high-dispersion stocks is positive and 
significant for the smallest stocks, it becomes insignificant for stocks in the two highest 
                                                 
11
 In non-tabulated results, I also get similar results for firms only in NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ, separately; 
the highest return differential however is observed for NASDAQ stocks. Results remain the same for the limited 
sample of only December fiscal year end firms that accounts 63% of all sample firms. The unreported results 
indicate that equal-weighted returns on the D1-D5 portfolio excluding January returns also persist; the dispersion 
effect is even stronger. Specifically, monthly returns for the equal-weighted D1-D5 portfolio returns are 0.86%, 
t=3.84 for the full sample, 1.39%, t=7.15 for S1 size group, 0.78%, t=3.23 for S2 size group, 0.89%, t=3.17 for 
S3 size group. Avramov et al. (2009) also show that dispersion profitability exists only in non-January months. 
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market capitalization quintiles. In particular, the D1-D5 strategy for the smallest quintile earns 
1.23 % monthly returns on average (14.76% annualized). Thus, it does not appear that we are 
simply picking up a size effect, since the two-way sorts still produce a strong negative relation 
between average returns and dispersion for the first three quintiles. Panel D shows that stocks 
in the first three quintiles together represent 6.78% of market capitalization. In Panel A and B, 
I present equal-weighted and value-weighted portfolio returns, respectively. As expected, 
within the same size quintile, value-weighted returns are close to the equal-weighted returns. 
However, for all stocks the average of the monthly value-weighted returns on the D1- D5 
strategy reduces to 0.23% that is not statistically significant (t-stat = 0.88). This signals the 
overweighting of small stocks in computing equal-weighted returns. Thus, the overall 
evidence indicates the presence of a substantial dispersion effect.  
As shown in Panel C and consistent with previous studies, contemporaneous 
dispersion and future return volatility are strongly positively correlated; see e.g., 
Athanassakos and Kalimipalli (2003). Similarly, Ajinkya and Gift (1985) report positive 
correlation but between forecast dispersion and implied standard deviation of stock returns; 
see also Graham and Harvey (1996). Harris and Raviv (1993) develop a model that 
investigates the role of differences of opinion (as opposed to information asymmetry) on 
trading volume and return volatility. They report positive relationship between forecast 
dispersion and return volatility. One explanation for this relationship is that analysts are more 
optimistic when forecast dispersion is high and thus issue more downward revisions of their 
forecasts that, as a result, create higher future return volatility. In Section 3.3, I conduct 




Table 2.3: Dispersion anomaly using in-sample breakpoints 
Using in-sample breakpoints each month stocks are equally sorted in five groups based on the level of market capitalization of the previous 
month end. Stocks in each size group are then equally sorted into five additional groups based on the forecast dispersion of the previous 
month. Forecast dispersion is the standard deviation of all outstanding current fiscal year earnings forecasts scaled by the absolute value of 
the average forecast as reported in the I/B/E/S Summary History file. Stocks with an average forecast of zero are assigned to the highest 
dispersion group, and stocks with a price less than or equal 5 dollars are excluded from the sample. Stocks are held for one month. The table 
reports average monthly equal-weighted, average value-weighted, average median portfolio returns and average standard deviations of 
returns along with the percentages of market cap and number of all stocks. The period considered is February 1983 through December 2007. 
Numbers in brackets are the t-statistics based on standard errors adjusted for one lag autocorrelation (*5%, **1%).  
 






Small    Large 
S1-S5 t(S1-S5) 
S1 S2 S3 S4 S5 
All stocks 1.05 0.96 1.02 1.12 1.09 1.08 -0.13 [-0.63] 
D1 1.29 1.50 1.23 1.44 1.26 1.19 0.31 [1.33] 
D2 1.16 1.22 1.26 1.19 1.10 1.05 0.17 [0.70] 
D3 1.16 0.77 1.07 1.14 1.06 1.08 -0.31 [-1.40] 
D4 0.90 0.72 0.90 1.04 1.10 1.11 -0.39 [-1.73] 
D5 0.63 0.28 0.57 0.76 0.95 1.00 -0.72** [-2.96] 
D1-D5 0.66** 1.23** 0.66** 0.68* 0.30 0.20   
t(D1-D5) [3.00] [6.49] [2.86] [2.49] [1.16] [0.78]   






Small    Large 
S1-S5 t(S1-S5) 
S1 S2 S3 S4 S5 
All stocks 1.05 0.99 1.02 1.11 1.08 1.05 -0.06 [-0.25] 
D1 1.10 1.48 1.20 1.42 1.25 1.18 0.31 [1.09] 
D2 0.98 1.22 1.26 1.15 1.10 0.92 0.30 [1.13] 
D3 1.11 0.79 1.08 1.12 1.02 1.01 -0.23 [-0.86] 
D4 1.01 0.81 0.92 1.02 1.13 1.08 -0.27 [-1.04] 
D5 0.87 0.34 0.56 0.81 0.95 1.01 -0.67* [-2.50] 
D1-D5 0.23 1.14** 0.64** 0.61* 0.30 0.16     
t(D1-D5) [0.88] [5.60] [2.79] [2.26] [1.16] [0.61]     






Small    Large 
S1-S5 t(S1-S5) 
S1 S2 S3 S4 S5 
All stocks 12.21 14.33 13.63 12.33 10.72 8.56 5.77** [48.62] 
D1 10.53 13.14 12.15 10.86 9.23 7.02 6.12** [43.36] 
D2 11.04 13.82 12.89 11.31 9.73 7.59 6.23** [38.19] 
D3 12.20 14.22 13.45 12.14 10.40 8.32 5.91** [36.73] 
D4 13.18 14.77 14.27 12.83 11.08 9.01 5.76** [34.29] 
D5 14.31 15.47 14.92 13.88 12.31 9.84 5.63** [31.78] 
D1-D5 -3.78** -2.33** -2.77** -3.02** -3.08** -2.82**   
t(D1-D5) [-29.33] [-12.49] [-16.84] [-15.07] [-16.57] [-19.75]   
Panel D: Percentage of market cap and number of all stocks 
Percentage of market cap 0.77 1.92 4.09 10.17 83.04   
Percentage of number of all stocks 19.93 20.00 19.99 20.01 20.06   
 
 
 Banz (1981) provides evidence that, on average, smaller firms have higher risk 
adjusted returns than larger firms. However, Panel A of Table 2.3 shows that small stocks do 
not earn higher returns than large stocks; the difference is -0.13% with a t-stat of -0.63. 
Ciccone (2003) also shows similar outcome for his sample. This may be due to the 
requirements of sample selection that biases my sample toward surviving firms that are larger 
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than the population. On the other hand, perhaps market participants have altered their 
investment strategies in a way that has eliminated this source of size-return predictability. 
This finding is in contrast with Berk (1995), who argues that we should always observe 
negative relation between firm size and its return. 
 
Fama and French (2008) and Cooper et al. (2008) breakpoints 
Panel A in Table 2.4 shows that D1-D5 strategy is profitable for both micro and small 
stocks, earning statistically significant average monthly returns of 1.16% and 0.59%, 
respectively. Note that micro and small stocks together account for 64.03% of all stocks but 
represent only 8.17% of market capitalization.  
Panel B shows that when sorting by Cooper et al. (2008)’s breakpoints, it is only the 
small stocks for which D1-D5 strategy earns statistically significant 1.01% monthly returns. 
Note that small stocks represent only 3.11% of market capitalization. Thus, the results from 





Table 2.4: Dispersion anomaly using alternative breakpoints 
Panel A presents average equal-weighted portfolio returns when stocks are sorted in three size groups based on Fama and French (2008) 20th 
and 50th NYSE market capitalization breakpoints of the previous month. Panel B presents the average equal-weighted portfolio returns when 
stocks are sorted in three size groups based on Cooper et al. (2008) 30th and 70th NYSE market capitalization breakpoints of the previous 
month. Stocks in each size group are then sorted into five additional groups based on forecast dispersion of the previous month. Forecast 
dispersion is the standard deviation of all outstanding current fiscal year earnings forecasts scaled by the absolute value of the average 
forecast as reported in the I/B/E/S Summary History file. Stocks with an average forecast of zero are assigned to the highest dispersion 
group, and stocks with a price less than 5 are excluded from the sample. Stocks are held for one month. The table reports average monthly 
equal-weighted, average value-weighted, average median portfolio returns and average standard deviations of returns along with the 
percentages of market cap and number of all stocks. The period considered is February 1983 through December 2007. Numbers in brackets 
are the t-statistics based on standard errors adjusted for one lag autocorrelation (*5%, **1%). 
 




All but  
Micro 
All but  
Small 
All but  
Big Micro Small Big 
All stocks 0.98 1.15 1.10 1.12 1.00 1.05 
D1 1.43 1.39 1.21 1.29 1.24 1.36 
D2 1.25 1.25 1.08 1.14 1.16 1.26 
D3 0.86 1.18 1.06 1.15 1.10 1.04 
D4 0.83 1.05 1.18 1.10 0.84 0.88 
D5 0.27 0.80 0.98 0.90 0.57 0.50 
D1-D5 1.16** 0.59* 0.22 0.39 0.66** 0.86** 
t(D1-D5) [6.34] [2.51] [0.88] [1.59] [2.99] [4.40] 
Percentage of market cap 1.53 6.64 91.82 98.47 93.36 8.18 
Percentage of number of all stocks 29.15 34.88 35.97 70.85 65.12 64.03 









Large Small Medium Large 
All stocks 1.02 1.12 1.10 1.11 1.02 1.05 
D1 1.42 1.31 1.21 1.25 1.29 1.34 
D2 1.23 1.11 1.10 1.12 1.19 1.18 
D3 0.97 1.13 1.08 1.13 1.10 1.12 
D4 0.82 1.15 1.08 1.12 0.83 0.89 
D5 0.40 0.92 1.03 0.96 0.53 0.58 
D1-D5 1.01** 0.38 0.18 0.29 0.76** 0.76** 
t(D1-D5) [5.32] [1.53] [0.69] [1.14] [3.56] [3.63] 
Percentage of market cap 3.11 14.24 82.65 96.89 85.76 17.35 
Percentage of number of all stocks 42.43 37.88 19.69 57.57 62.12 80.31 
 
 
2.3 Robustness checks 
The most commonly used measure of analyst disagreement is the ratio of the standard 
deviation of forecasts to the absolute value of the average forecast. If the average forecast is 
zero, then they assign the stock to the highest dispersion category. Though widely used in the 
literature, this dispersion measure has several shortcomings. First, it requires an arbitrary 
decision rule when the average forecast is zero or negative. If the average forecast is zero, the 
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stock is assigned to the highest dispersion group.
12
 Second, scaling by the average forecast or 
actual earnings can generate a significant misclassification. For example, if actual earnings 
are small, there is a good chance that the forecast dispersion will be high regardless of the 
level of disagreement between analysts. For example, consider a normally profitable firm with 
regular EPS around 1 dollar per share. If for one bad year EPS is close to zero, its absolute 
average forecast may be one cent per share, but the range of forecasts may vary from –2 
dollars to 3 dollars. Dividing standard deviation of forecasts to the absolute value of the 
average forecast will inappropriately classify such firm into a high dispersion group, although 
the 5-dollar range in the forecasts may be normal for this firm. Employing stock price as the 
scaling variable does not cause this type of misclassification.  
Third, as shown in Panel A of Table 2.5, the distribution of this dispersion measure is 
highly skewed; its average is almost four times as large as the median and its standard 
deviation more than five times the average, thus indicating a severe outlier problem.
13
 For 
example, we do not encounter such an outlier problem when price is used as a denominator 
since for this measure the average is about half of the median while the standard deviation is 
about twice the average. Fourth, as Cen et al. (2007) document, the predictability of forecast 
dispersion on subsequent stock returns mainly comes from the denominator effect (absolute 




Given the potential flaws behind the predictive power of forecast dispersion, there is a 
need to check the robustness of the dispersion effect across different proxies of differences of 
opinion. The objective of this section is to analyze this robustness check, and below I present 
                                                 
12
 None of the results in Chapter 2 significantly changes when firms with zero mean forecasts are assigned to the 
lowest dispersion group. Also, not reported here, even excluding observations with zero mean earnings forecasts 
does not affect my results. 
13
 Previous studies have also documented skewness in earnings forecasts; see Gu and Wu (2003) and the 
references therein. 
14
 In a follow-up study, Cen, Wei, and Zhang (2008) show that the higher the forecasted EPS the higher the 
future stock returns. 
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the alternative definitions that are employed to test the robustness of previous results on the 
dispersion-return relationship. 
 
2.3.1 Price as denominator 
The first alternative measure of dispersion is the standard deviation of the analysts’ 
forecasts as reported in the I/B/E/S Summary History file scaled by the month-end price. This 
measure of dispersion has been used in numerous papers including Lang and Lundholm 
(1996), Han and Manry (2000), and Mansi et al. (2006), among others. 
 
2.3.2 Range as dispersion 
Inexperienced analysts have a tendency to herd and herding among them is known to 
reduce the forecast dispersion.
 
 The motives for herding is that analysts issue forecasts that are 
close to the consensus in order to minimize their forecast error. De Bondt and Forbes (1999) 
show that analysts’ coverage is also related to herding among analysts. Devenow and Welch 
(1996), Bikhchandani and Sharma (2001), and Hirshleifer and Teoh (2003) review the 
herding literature. To reduce the impact of herding on results, I define dispersion as the range, 
i.e., the absolute difference of maximum and minimum forecast scaled both by the absolute 
average of the forecasts and by the month end price. The range measure is also used as a 
primary measure of dispersion by Tse and Yan (2008) and Goetzmann and Massa (2005) 
motivated by the idea that it could be meaningfully computed especially when the number of 





Table 2.5: Descriptive statistics of different dispersion measures 
Panel A reports summary statistics (correlation coefficients) of different dispersion measures for all stocks and stocks equally sorted by five 
analyst dispersion groups. Panel B presents correlation coefficients between the different dispersion measures; Pearson coefficients are above 
the diagonal line and Spearman coefficients are below the line. Each month dispersions are averaged first over the stocks in every group and 
then over the sample period February 1983 to December 2007. Forecast dispersion is measured as 1) the standard deviation of all outstanding 
current fiscal year earnings forecasts scaled by the absolute value of the average forecast as reported in the IBES Summary History file, 2) 
the standard deviation of the analysts’ forecasts deflated by the month end price of the summary forecast report date, 3) the range scaled by 
the absolute value of the average forecast, 4) the range scaled by the month end price of the summary forecast report date, and 5) excluding 
analyst guidance; i.e., during the earnings announcement date until 90 days before the next announcement date use the forecasts for the 
current fiscal year end and during the 90 days before the next announcement use the forecasts of the following-fiscal-year end. Stocks with a 
price less than or equal 5 dollars are excluded. Because not enough forecasts are available before December 1983 in order to account for the 
analyst guidance, the period considered is January 1984 through December 2007. 
 
Panel A: Summary statistics 
 Definition of dispersion 
d 
Dispersion Avg Std 25% Median 75% 
Standard deviation scaled by 
the absolute average forecast 
 
All 0.20 1.10 0.02 0.05 0.12 
D1 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 
D2 0.03 0.01 0.03 0.03 0.04 
D3 0.06 0.01 0.05 0.06 0.07 
D4 0.12 0.03 0.10 0.12 0.15 
D5 0.97 2.60 0.25 0.37 0.73 




All 0.007 0.017 0.001 0.003 0.007 
D1 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 
D2 0.002 0.000 0.002 0.002 0.002 
D3 0.004 0.001 0.003 0.004 0.004 
D4 0.007 0.002 0.006 0.007 0.008 
D5 0.027 0.034 0.013 0.018 0.028 







All 0.51 2.99 0.06 0.13 0.30 
D1 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.05 
D2 0.08 0.01 0.07 0.08 0.09 
D3 0.15 0.03 0.13 0.15 0.17 
D4 0.29 0.07 0.24 0.28 0.35 
D5 2.30 6.82 0.58 0.86 1.66 






All 0.02 0.04 0.00 0.01 0.02 
D1 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
D2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 
D3 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 
D4 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.02 
D5 0.06 0.08 0.03 0.04 0.06 







All 0.20 1.06 0.03 0.05 0.12 
D1 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 
D2 0.03 0.01 0.03 0.03 0.04 
D3 0.06 0.01 0.05 0.06 0.07 
D4 0.13 0.03 0.10 0.12 0.15 
D5 0.91 2.48 0.25 0.35 0.66 
 
Panel B: Correlation coefficients 
 Standard 
deviation scaled 
















Standard deviation scaled 
by the absolute average 
forecast 
 
 0.76 0.98 0.76 0.67 
Standard deviation scaled 
by the price 
 
0.79  0.76 0.99 0.32 
Range scaled by the 
absolute average forecast 
 
0.97 0.80  0.77 0.65 
Range scaled by stock 
price 
 
0.80 0.99 0.82  0.32 
Dispersion excluding 
analyst guidance 





2.3.3 Excluding analyst guidance 
During the last decade, a surprisingly high percentage of U.S. firms has fulfilled or 
beaten analysts' forecasts; see Brown (2001), Bartov, Givoly, and Hayn (2002). A widespread 
way to meet analyst expectations is to inject pessimism into their forecasts by providing 
analysts with negative clues, or so-called analyst downward guidance. Degeorge, Patel, and 
Zeckhauser (1999) show that management successfully induces analysts to lower their 
earnings expectations to an achievable level; see Matsumoto (2002), Baik and Jiang (2006). 
There is also some evidence in Bowen et al. (2002) that conference calls decrease forecast 
dispersion. Managers may release negative information along the year and in particular, 
during the last quarter of the fiscal year, in order to create a positive earnings surprise at the 
announcement that translates in positive abnormal stock returns. Therefore, low dispersion 
could lead to positive returns close to earnings releases.
15
 To address the problem of analyst 
guidance, during the 90 days before the earnings announcement, I measure forecast dispersion 
for the next fiscal year end.
16
 During the remaining months, dispersion is based on the current 
fiscal year end earnings forecasts. I/B/E/S provides earnings forecasts for the current fiscal 
year (up to 12 months ahead) as well as for the next fiscal year. However, since there are not 
enough forecasts before December 1983 to compute dispersion, the period starts in January 
1984. 
Table 2.6 shows a strong negative relationship between forecast dispersion and stock 
returns for all alternative dispersion measures. This enhances the evidence of a strong 
predictive power of forecast dispersion on stock returns. Hence, we are in a position to 
confirm that the negative dispersion-return relationship is not affected by the different  
                                                 
15
 One can also argue that forecast dispersion of earnings should normally decrease as time moves closer to the 
earnings announcement. In other words, dispersion will normally be higher at the beginning of the fiscal year 
than close to the earnings announcement simply because the forecast horizon is shorter; see Elton, Gruber, and 
Gultekin (1984). However, my primary idea here relies on the excess decrease of the forecast dispersion due to 
the analyst guidance that is unrelated to the normal change in dispersion over time. 
16
 I assume that next-year these forecasts are less subject to analyst guidance than the forecasts issued in the last 
quarter for the current fiscal year end. As a robustness check, I also used 30 and 60 days window before the 
earnings announcement day, and the results remain essentially the same. 
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Table 2.6: Dispersion anomaly for different dispersion measures 
Using in-sample breakpoints each month stocks are equally sorted in five groups based on the level of market capitalization of the previous 
month end. Stocks in each size group are then equally sorted into five additional groups based on forecast dispersion of the previous month. 
In Panel A dispersion is defined as the standard deviation of the analysts’ forecasts deflated by the month end price of the summary forecast 
report date. In Panel B and C, dispersion is defined as the range deflated by the absolute value of the average forecast and the month end 
price of the summary forecast report date, respectively. Panel D accounts for the analyst guidance; i.e., during the earnings announcement 
date until 90 days before the next announcement date use the forecasts for the current fiscal year end and during the 90 days before the next 
announcement use the forecasts for the following-fiscal-year end. Stocks with an average forecast of zero are assigned to the highest 
dispersion group, and stocks with a price less than or equal 5 dollars are excluded from the sample. Stocks are held for one month. The 
period considered is February 1983 through December 2007. The table reports average monthly equal-weighted portfolio returns. Numbers 
in brackets are the t-statistics based on standard errors adjusted for one lag autocorrelation (*5%, **1%). 
 








Small    Large 
S1 S2 S3 S4 S5 
D1 1.16 1.43 1.21 1.31 1.08 1.12 
D2 1.15 1.17 1.22 1.10 1.04 0.99 
D3 1.11 0.86 0.96 1.20 1.11 1.16 
D4 1.03 0.85 0.94 1.03 1.13 1.04 
D5 0.70 0.20 0.66 0.94 1.08 1.12 
D1-D5 0.46* 1.23** 0.55** 0.37 0.00 0.00 
t(D1-D5) [2.54] [6.69] [2.78] [1.74] [0.00] [0.02] 






Small    Large 
S1 S2 S3 S4 S5 
D1 1.33 1.55 1.32 1.34 1.28 1.18 
D2 1.15 1.16 1.19 1.31 1.05 1.07 
D3 1.01 0.80 1.06 1.08 1.06 1.10 
D4 0.97 0.71 0.87 1.03 1.19 1.02 
D5 0.70 0.30 0.55 0.82 0.88 1.07 
D1-D5 0.63** 1.24** 0.77** 0.52* 0.40 0.12 
t(D1-D5) [3.11] [6.41] [3.45] [1.96] [1.68] [0.48] 






Small    Large 
S1 S2 S3 S4 S5 
D1 1.17 1.43 1.16 1.23 1.16 1.11 
D2 1.18 1.21 1.33 1.21 0.94 1.04 
D3 1.04 0.81 0.95 1.12 1.16 1.03 
D4 1.01 0.89 0.89 1.12 1.14 1.15 
D5 0.82 0.23 0.71 0.92 1.04 1.09 
D1-D5 0.35* 1.19** 0.45* 0.31 0.13 0.01 
t(D1-D5) [2.01] [6.35] [2.21] [1.41] [0.55] [0.06] 






Small    Large 
S1 S2 S3 S4 S5 
D1 1.16 1.37 1.20 1.27 1.02 1.12 
D2 1.10 1.13 1.13 1.10 0.94 1.00 
D3 1.07 0.71 0.99 1.17 1.05 1.03 
D4 0.78 0.42 0.60 0.82 1.15 1.04 
D5 0.54 0.19 0.49 0.75 0.80 1.02 
D1-D5 0.61* 1.18** 0.71** 0.52 0.22 0.11 
t(D1-D5) [2.55] [5.80] [2.72] [1.75] [0.77] [0.41] 
 
 
forecast dispersion measures. This result is not surprising given the high correlation between 




2.3.4 Excluding stale forecasts 
Most studies examining the dispersion-return relationship use the I/B/E/S Unadjusted 
Summary Statistics file to compute forecast dispersion. In I/B/E/S, however, stale forecasts 
are common. Stale forecasts normally tend to increase the forecast dispersion; see Barron and 
Stuerke (1998). I/B/E/S uses all outstanding forecasts without any limitation on the forecast 
age when computing summary statistics. This problem becomes more acute when analysts are 
not constrained to communicate their forecasts at a specific date. One feature of the I/B/E/S 
Summary Statistics file is that it does not contain dates of the analysts’ earnings forecasts, and 
the issue of stale forecasts is amplified when some analysts are slow in responding to bad 
news and do not downgrade their forecasts; see Brown and Han (1992), Scherbina (2008), 
Erturk (2006), Hwang and Li (2008). Previous research estimating the accuracy of earnings 
forecasts shows that the most significant variable explaining the lack of accuracy is the 
forecast age; see Elton et al. (1984), Brown (2001), and Brown and Mohd (2003). Several 
recent studies address this problem and eliminate stale forecasts when computing consensus 
or dispersion; see Johnson (2004), Daniševská (2004), and Doukas et al. (2006a). 
Because I/B/E/S consensus include stale forecasts, using it to study properties of 
analysts’ forecasts might lead to biased conclusions. Investors may over- or under-react to old 
forecasts (by anchoring to the previous decision that was made too early instead of waiting for 
more data), hence stale forecasts maybe be overweighed when computing dispersion. To 
analyze the impact of stale forecasts on the results, I compute forecast dispersion by 
eliminating from I/B/E/S Detail Unadjusted file forecasts older than 90, 180, and 360 days 
before the day when I/B/E/S computes the summary statistics. I/B/E/S statistical period is the 
third Thursday of each month. If an analyst makes more than one forecast in a given month, 
only the last forecast is used in my calculations. The definition of the dispersion measure is as 




Table 2.7: Dispersion anomaly excluding stale forecasts 
Using in-sample breakpoints each month stocks are equally sorted in five groups based on the level of market capitalization of the previous 
month end. Stocks in each size group are then equally sorted into five additional groups based on forecast of the previous month. Dispersion 
is defined as the ratio of the standard deviation of analysts’ current-fiscal-year annual earnings per share forecasts to the absolute value of the 
average forecast after eliminating forecasts older than 90, 180, and 360 days. Stocks with an average forecast of zero are assigned to the 
highest dispersion group, and stocks with a price less than or equal 5 dollars are excluded from the sample. Stocks are held for one month. 
The period considered is February 1983 through December 1997. The table reports average monthly equal-weighted portfolio returns. 
Numbers in brackets are the t-statistics based on standard errors adjusted for one lag autocorrelation (*5%, **1%). 
 
Panel A: Forecast age less than 90 days 





Small    Large 
S1 S2 S3 S4 S5 
D1 1.44 1.45 1.40 1.49 1.35 1.50 
D2 1.40 1.33 1.37 1.42 1.42 1.39 
D3 1.26 0.76 1.34 1.30 1.28 1.39 
D4 1.17 0.92 1.05 1.32 1.36 1.22 
D5 0.70 -0.03 0.62 0.97 0.94 1.22 
D1-D5 0.74** 1.49** 0.77** 0.52* 0.41 0.28 
t(D1-D5) [4.27] [6.61] [4.00] [2.49] [1.82] [1.33] 






Small    Large 
S1 S2 S3 S4 S5 
D1 1.46 1.45 1.53 1.50 1.44 1.43 
D2 1.40 1.34 1.43 1.34 1.37 1.29 
D3 1.29 0.98 1.37 1.38 1.39 1.34 
D4 1.09 0.74 1.06 1.15 1.34 1.27 
D5 0.76 0.03 0.50 1.01 1.08 1.23 
D1-D5 0.70** 1.42** 1.03** 0.49* 0.35 0.20 
t(D1-D5) [4.27] [6.39] [5.28] [2.31] [1.77] [0.95] 






Small    Large 
S1 S2 S3 S4 S5 
D1 1.45 1.46 1.48 1.56 1.38 1.44 
D2 1.42 1.33 1.42 1.41 1.41 1.33 
D3 1.27 1.00 1.23 1.45 1.43 1.32 
D4 1.13 0.73 1.07 1.08 1.32 1.23 
D5 0.77 0.06 0.63 0.97 1.12 1.26 
D1-D5 0.69** 1.40** 0.84** 0.60** 0.26 0.17 
t(D1-D5) [4.25] [6.32] [4.24] [2.76] [1.28] [0.87] 
 
 
reducing noise created by the inclusion of stale forecasts in the consensus. In addition, it 
provides greater reliability that changes in forecasts are related to information in the recent 
past. 
Because in the I/B/E/S Detail Unadjusted file there are not enough forecasts starting 
1998 to compute dispersion, the period considered spans from February 1983 to December 
1997. Results, shown in Table 2.7, show that the elimination of old forecasts do not 
significantly alter results. For instance, monthly equal-weighted return for all stocks on the 
D1- D5 strategy (after excluding forecasts older than 90 days) is 0.74% with a t-stat of 4.27. I 
observe similar results when older than 180, and 360 days forecasts are eliminated. Thus, it 
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does not appear that the exclusion of old forecasts impacts the predictable power of dispersion 
on stock returns. 
 
2.3.5 Increase of analysts’ minimum coverage 
As Table 1.1 shows, most studies use two or three forecasts to compute forecast 
dispersion. However, dispersion computed from few forecasts could be a very noisy measure 
of disagreement. For example, Comiskey et al. (1987, p.237) concludes that “…the value of 
the forecast dispersion measure, as a heterogeneous expectations surrogate, is greater with the 
addition of more analyst forecasts”. And yet, only few papers require a firm to be covered by 
more than two analysts; see e.g., Ajinkya et al. (1991), Qu et al. (2004), Ackert and 
Athanassakos (1997). De Bondt and Forbes (1999) show that as more analysts produce more 
forecasts, disagreement rises but only up to a point - once there are eight analysts following 
the firm, additional forecasts do not add to the forecast dispersion. When the sample is 
restricted to stocks covered by at least 5 analysts, there is still dispersion effect but it is 
significantly reduced; see Qu et al. (2004). Table 2.8 shows how the increase in the minimum 
coverage affects the results. 
Equal-weighted D1-D5 portfolio returns are decreasing as the minimum coverage 
increases and gets insignificantly different from zero already when the data is restricted to 
stocks covered by at least seven analysts.
17
 This result agrees with the view that dispersion 
computed from few forecasts is a noisy measure of analyst disagreement; however, it has a 
predictive power on future stock returns. Bhushan (1989) and Shores (1990), among others, 
note that large firms generally are more heavily followed by analysts. Hence, one reason that 
we do not observe any strong negative dispersion-return relation when the data is limited to 
extensively covered firms may be that this sample is tilted toward larger firms. And for these  
                                                 
17
 Limiting the sample to firms covered by seven analysts still produces on average 40 stocks in each of the 25 
portfolios; hence, we can still view them as well-diversified portfolios. 
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Table 2.8: Dispersion anomaly increasing analyst coverage 
Using in-sample breakpoints each month stocks are equally sorted in five groups based on the level of market capitalization of the previous 
month end. Stocks in each size group are then equally sorted into five additional groups based on forecast of the previous month. Forecast 
dispersion is the standard deviation of all outstanding current fiscal year earnings forecasts scaled by the absolute value of the average 
forecast as reported in the I/B/E/S Summary History file. I require a firm to be covered by at least 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7 analysts. Stocks with an 
average forecast of zero are assigned to the highest dispersion group, and stocks with a price less than or equal 5 dollars are excluded from 
the sample. Stocks are held for one month. The period considered is February 1983 through December 2007. The table reports average 
monthly equal-weighted portfolio returns. Numbers in brackets are the t-statistics based on standard errors adjusted for one lag 
autocorrelation (*5%, **1%). 






Small    Large 
S1 S2 S3 S4 S5 
D1 1.26 1.47 1.25 1.40 1.18 1.24 
D2 1.17 1.17 1.28 1.10 1.10 1.01 
D3 1.13 0.90 1.14 1.20 1.03 1.06 
D4 0.95 0.74 0.94 1.03 1.13 1.07 
D5 0.72 0.34 0.68 0.90 0.99 1.00 
D1-D5 0.55* 1.13** 0.56* 0.51 0.20 0.24 
t(D1-D5) [2.28] [5.23] [2.36] [1.83] [0.72] [0.95] 






Small    Large 
S1 S2 S3 S4 S5 
D1 1.25 1.21 1.33 1.32 1.11 1.29 
D2 1.14 1.11 1.35 0.98 1.21 1.00 
D3 1.06 0.99 1.09 1.01 1.01 1.06 
D4 1.02 0.70 1.16 1.03 1.17 1.14 
D5 0.80 0.41 0.90 0.92 1.01 1.06 
D1-D5 0.45 0.81** 0.43 0.40 0.10 0.23 
t(D1-D5) [1.85] [3.34] [1.66] [1.43] [0.39] [0.89] 






Small    Large 
S1 S2 S3 S4 S5 
D1 1.24 1.20 1.39 1.24 1.18 1.27 
D2 1.13 1.18 1.15 0.99 1.23 1.05 
D3 1.09 1.09 1.06 1.00 0.99 1.04 
D4 1.04 0.81 1.09 1.08 1.21 1.09 
D5 0.88 0.67 0.86 1.01 1.06 1.03 
D1-D5 0.35 0.53* 0.52 0.23 0.12 0.24 
t(D1-D5) [1.39] [2.23] [1.88] [0.86] [0.48] [0.94] 






Small    Large 
S1 S2 S3 S4 S5 
D1 1.24 1.32 1.22 1.22 1.18 1.31 
D2 1.12 1.24 1.09 0.95 1.22 1.07 
D3 1.10 0.98 1.21 0.97 1.08 1.00 
D4 1.07 0.96 1.01 1.14 1.19 1.09 
D5 0.93 0.76 0.98 0.98 1.08 1.05 
D1-D5 0.30 0.55* 0.23 0.23 0.11 0.26 
t(D1-D5) [1.15] [2.17] [0.81] [0.85] [0.42] [1.02] 






Small    Large 
S1 S2 S3 S4 S5 
D1 1.24 1.32 1.21 1.26 1.22 1.31 
D2 1.12 1.22 0.97 1.10 1.17 1.03 
D3 1.04 0.96 1.03 0.94 1.13 1.08 
D4 1.09 0.93 1.13 1.03 1.22 1.00 
D5 1.00 0.88 1.09 1.27 0.93 0.99 
D1-D5 0.24 0.43 0.13 -0.01 0.29 0.32 
t(D1-D5) [0.89] [1.59] [0.45] [-0.02] [1.08] [1.18] 
 
firms the negative dispersion-return relationship is less pronounced, as shown by Diether et al. 
(2002) and also reported in Table 2.3.  
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Figure 1: Different holding periods 
This figure plots the average equal-weighted D1-D5 portfolio returns for sample stocks. At the end of each month, stocks are ranked into 
quintiles based on forecast dispersion and assigned into portfolios without a lag. Forecast dispersion is the standard deviation of all 
outstanding current fiscal year earnings forecasts scaled by the absolute value of the average forecast as reported in the I/B/E/S Summary 
History file. Stocks with a price less than or equal 5 dollars are excluded from the sample. Stocks are then held in the portfolio for 1 up to 12 
months. The period considered is February 1983 through December 2007. 
 
 
2.3.6 Different holding periods 
I also hold a stock in a portfolio for periods ranging from one month to one year. At 
the end of each month, I rank stocks into forecast dispersion quintiles and assign into 
portfolios without a lag. Figure 1 shows the equal-weighted returns for D1-D5 portfolio. For 
relatively short holding periods, the results are similar to those of the one-month holding 
strategy because essentially the same stocks are selected by both strategies. This strategy 
delivers statistically significant equal-weighted returns up to six month, but for longer holding 
periods, returns for this strategy are lower and statistically insignificant. Even after six months 
after the portfolio formation day, a period during which any information contained in forecast 
dispersion should definitely have been recognized and removed from the stock price, the 
return difference is still 0.43% with a t-stat of 1.96. This result suggests that the market 
gradually notices and removes the information hidden in forecast dispersion, but even after 













































2.3.7 Dispersion as standard deviation of recommendations 
One more way to investigate the relation of analysts’ disagreement and stock returns is 
to use an alternative proxy of analyst disagreement - the standard deviation of 
recommendations as reported in the I/B/E/S Recommendations Summary file.
18
 This measure 
of disagreement has several advantages. First, yearly earnings forecasts are affected by how 
close a firm is to the end of the fiscal year and by how important earnings guidance is for a 
firm. These considerations are less likely to influence the recommendations. Second, yearly 
forecasts typically have to be normalized to be made comparable across firms and the 
normalization may introduce noise in comparisons of forecasts. However, standard deviation 
of recommendations is directly comparable across firms so no normalization is required. 
Although I/B/E/S provides Recommendations Summary file starting in November 1993, the 
number of recommendations published in 1993 is sparse. Hence, the period considered here is 
from January 1994 to December 2007. The database contains 867,549 summary statistics of 
recommendations of U.S. firms over the sample period. To be eligible, a firm must have at 
least two analysts issuing recommendations. This yields an average of 2,442 firms per month.  
Results, illustrated in Panel A of Table 2.9, do not suggest any discernible link 
between standard deviation of recommendations and future stock returns. For comparison, 
Panel B presents the results when dispersion is computed from earnings forecasts, using the 
same sample of stocks as in Panel A. Note that although the average return of D1-D5 strategy 
has decreased in the later period, the strong negative dispersion-return relation still holds for 
the smallest size group.
19
 These results suggest that dispersion of recommendations and 
dispersion of earnings forecasts are empirically two different proxies of analyst disagreement  
  
                                                 
18
 In non-tabulated tables, I also observe similar results when dispersion is computed as the standard deviation of 
long-term earnings growth forecasts.  
19
 That the profitable power of dispersion disappears over time is also shown in Dische (2002, p.225) and 




Table 2.9: Dispersion anomaly for recommendations 
Using in-sample breakpoints each month stocks are equally sorted in five groups based on the level of market capitalization of the previous 
month end. Stocks in each size group are then sorted into five additional dispersion groups based on dispersion of the previous month. Panel 
A reports average monthly equal-weighted portfolio returns when dispersion is defined as the standard deviation of analysts’ 
recommendations, as reported in the I/B/E/S Summary Recommendations file. Panel B reports the same strategy returns for the same period 
when dispersion is the standard deviation of all outstanding current fiscal year earnings forecasts scaled by the absolute value of the average 
forecast as reported in the I/B/E/S Summary History file. Stocks with a price less than or equal 5 dollars are excluded from the sample. 
Stocks are held for one month. The period considered is January 1994 through December 2007. Numbers in brackets are the t-statistics based 
on standard errors adjusted for one lag autocorrelation (*5%, **1%). 
 






Small    Large 
S1 S2 S3 S4 S5 
D1 0.86 1.04 0.82 0.95 0.58 0.56 
D2 1.00 1.04 1.04 0.93 0.82 0.86 
D3 0.94 0.91 0.74 1.17 1.09 0.90 
D4 0.89 0.57 0.77 0.93 0.92 0.94 
D5 0.89 0.77 0.79 0.85 0.95 1.18 
D1-D5 -0.03 0.27 0.03 0.10 -0.38 -0.63 
t(D1-D5) [-0.21] [1.10] [0.11] [0.38] [-1.34] [-1.71] 






Small    Large 
S1 S2 S3 S4 S5 
D1 1.08 1.47 1.08 1.23 0.94 1.00 
D2 1.00 1.11 1.11 1.05 0.83 0.82 
D3 1.00 0.81 0.87 0.99 0.89 0.87 
D4 0.85 0.87 0.86 0.97 0.85 0.92 
D5 0.64 0.33 0.52 0.77 0.99 0.98 
D1-D5 0.44 1.14** 0.57 0.46 -0.06 0.02 
t(D1-D5) [1.23] [4.10] [1.50] [1.07] [-0.14] [0.05] 
 
 
- the former does not predict stock returns but the later does. Hence, more research is needed 
to understand the cause of this difference; see Bradshaw (2004). 
 
2.4 The relation with other anomalies 
Stock market anomalies with respect to the CAPM are patterns in average stock 
prices, usually related to firm characteristics. For extensive surveys of literature on market 
anomalies see De Bondt and Thaler (1989), Dimson and Mussavian (1998); Dimson and 
Mussavian (1999), Malkiel (2003), among others. Fama and French (1996) show that their 
three factor model (market, SMB, and HML) explains Bhandari (1988)’s leverage, De Bondt 
and Thaler (1985)’s reversal in long-term returns, Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny (1994)’s 
past sales growth, E/P, and C/P anomalies. Since variables like size, E/P, leverage, and book-
to-market are all scaled versions of a firm's stock price, it is reasonable to expect that some of 
them are redundant for explaining average returns. Chen and Zhang (2008) present another 
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three factor model (market, investment, and productivity) that explains a number of other 
anomalies including Sloan (1996)’s accrual, Campbell, Hilscher, and Szilagyi (2008)’s default 
risk, Pontiff and Woodgate (2008)’s net shares issuance, Loughran and Ritter (1995)’s 
SEO/IPO, and Jegadeesh and Titman (1993)’s short-term momentum of returns. In addition, 
there is evidence that momentum anomaly is related to Lee and Swaminathan (2000)’s 
volume and Vassalou and Apedjinou (2004)’s corporate innovation anomalies. However, 
many other anomalies are left unexplained by the above mentioned factors, among them are 
the forecast dispersion anomaly, Bernard and Thomas (1989)’s earnings surprise, Pastor and 
Stambaugh (2003)’s liquidity, Francis et al. (2005)’s accruals  quality, Ang, Hodrick, Xing, 
and Zhang (2006)’s idiosyncratic volatility, Cooper et al. (2008)’s asset growth, and 
Giovinazzo (2008)’s asset intensity anomalies. 
The dispersion anomaly is another new challenge for asset pricing models, and several 
authors have addressed the question whether the dispersion anomaly is related to some of the 
well-known anomalies. For instance, in order to determine whether the results are influenced 
by the value anomaly, Diether et al. (2002) first classify stocks in three book-to-market 
groups and next into three size groups with each category. Finally, there are three dispersion 
groups within each of the nine categories. In all nine categories, there is a tendency for the 
average return to fall as dispersion increases. Another nine-way sort is done by momentum 
based on returns from 12 months earlier to 2 months earlier (winners versus losers), then by 
size and finally by dispersion. The dispersion effect is not significant among winner stocks, 
but it is in the predicted direction for the loser categories; see Doukas et al. (2006a). Thus, the 
dispersion anomaly is distinct from value and momentum anomalies.  
Chen and Jiambalvo (2004) explain the negative dispersion-return relationship by the 
post-earnings-announcement drift. Specifically, after sorting firms by prior-period 
standardized unexpected earnings, the difference between the subsequent returns of high 
versus low dispersion firms is no longer statistically significant. The result is consistent with 
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the findings of Erturk (2006) and Hwang and Li (2008) that the dispersion anomaly may be 
related to analyst incentives to underreact to bad news. Chen and Jiambalvo (2004) further 
test the hypothesis of Diether et al. (2002) that when dispersion is high, prices reflect the 
beliefs of optimistic investors. If investors holding the high dispersion stocks are optimistic, 
then their responses to bad news, measured as negative unexpected earnings, should be 
particularly strong. However, Chen and Jiambalvo (2004) show that the earnings response 
coefficients for high dispersion/bad news firms are lower than for low dispersion/bad news 
firms; see also Imhoff and Lobo (1992), Kinney, Burgstahler, and Martin (2002). These 
results call into question the argument that optimism accounts for the low returns earned by 
firms with high dispersion.  
Focusing on a sample of firms rated by Standard & Poor’s, Avramov et al. (2009) 
show that liquidity proxies such as turnover, firm size, and the Amihud (2002) illiquidity 
measure do not capture the dispersion effect. Sadka and Scherbina (2007) link the dispersion 
anomaly to trading costs. Given a decline in transaction costs, an increase in aggregate market 
liquidity forces the prices of high-disagreement stocks to converge down to fundamentals. 
This is exactly when high-dispersion stocks experience the most pronounced price corrections 
and the lowest returns, whereas returns on low-dispersion stocks are positively correlated with 
changes in aggregate liquidity. Since high- and low-dispersion stocks have an opposite 
relation with respect to aggregate liquidity changes, the performance of a portfolio short in 
high-dispersion stocks and long in low-dispersion stocks is positively related to changes in 
market liquidity. 
The research question addressed in this section concerns whether the predictive power 
of forecast dispersion on stock returns can be explained by other well-known financial 
variables that are found to explain average stock returns. I continue this line of research and 
below compare the dispersion effect to other important determinants of the cross-sectional 
returns, not previously examined in the literature. 
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2.4.1 Accruals quality 
Accruals quality (AQ) is a widely used measure of information risk. In a recent 
influential paper, Francis et al. (2005) find that poorer AQ is associated with larger costs of 
debt and equity, so they conclude that AQ is priced. In contrast, Core, Guay, and Verdi (2008) 
argue that AQ is not priced after carefully conducting several asset-pricing tests. While much 
research has focussed on the link between the AQ and stock returns, little has been done on 
the link between AQ and forecast dispersion. Hence, motivated by the idea that reporting 
choices affect both forecast dispersion and the AQ, my tests here examine the AQ-dispersion 
link. Appendix B details how AQ is measured. Average and median values of AQ are 0.085 
and 0.067, respectively; all the values of AQ are in the range of 0.005 and 0.871 (not reported 
here).  
One of the few papers studying the relationship between AQ and forecast dispersion is 
Cohen (2003). Based on regression analysis, he provides evidence that firms with high-quality 
financial reporting policies have lower forecast dispersion and higher analyst following. I go 
beyond this observation and show in Panel A of Table 2.10 the previous fiscal year end AQ 
for each portfolio. Consistent with Cohen (2003), the second column shows that high 
dispersion firms have indeed poorer accruals quality than low dispersion stocks. This negative 
relationship holds for all size groups. The largest AQ difference between low- and high-
dispersion firms however is observed for the firms in S2 size quintile and equals -0.032 with a 
highly significant t-stat of -12.62. I also confirm the well documented fact (e.g., Table 4 in 
Francis et al. (2005)) that accruals quality positively correlates with the size of the firm; large 
firms have lower standard deviations of residuals than small firms, the difference being 0.026 
with a t-stat of 7.97. 
Panel B presents the average equal-weighted portfolio returns for the restricted 




Table 2.10: Dispersion and accruals quality anomalies 
The table reports the average AQ and average monthly equal-weighted portfolio returns. Using in-sample breakpoints each month stocks are 
equally sorted in five groups based on the level of market capitalization of the previous month (or AQ of the previous fiscal year end). Stocks 
in each size (AQ) group are then sorted into five additional groups based on forecast dispersion of the previous month. Forecast dispersion is 
the standard deviation of all outstanding current fiscal year earnings forecasts scaled by the absolute value of the average forecast as reported 
in the I/B/E/S Summary History file. Stocks with an average forecast of zero are assigned to the highest dispersion group, and stocks with a 
price less than or equal 5 dollars are excluded from the sample. Stocks are held for one month. The period considered is February 1983 
through December 2006. Numbers in brackets are the t-statistics based on standard errors adjusted for one lag autocorrelation (*5%, **1%). 
 






Small    Large 
S1-S5 t(S1-S5) 
S1 S2 S3 S4 S5 
All stocks 0.085 0.100 0.092 0.082 0.076 0.074 0.026** [7.97] 
D1 0.075 0.091 0.079 0.075 0.067 0.070 0.020** [17.38] 
D2 0.076 0.093 0.083 0.072 0.070 0.068 0.025** [16.20] 
D3 0.082 0.098 0.090 0.076 0.073 0.072 0.026** [18.91] 
D4 0.093 0.106 0.099 0.088 0.082 0.078 0.028** [8.43] 
D5 0.102 0.115 0.111 0.097 0.088 0.084 0.031** [6.28] 
D1-D5 -0.027** -0.024** -0.032** -0.021** -0.020** -0.014**   
t(D1-D5) [-9.36] [-11.02] [-12.62] [-4.93] [-4.70] [-1.65]   






Small    Large 
S1-S5 t(S1-S5) 
S1 S2 S3 S4 S5 
All stocks 1.14 1.15 1.23 1.12 1.17 1.05 0.10 [0.45] 
D1 1.32 1.52 1.43 1.30 1.24 1.25 0.27 [1.05] 
D2 1.15 1.30 1.42 1.07 1.26 1.04 0.26 [0.96] 
D3 1.15 1.21 1.18 1.01 1.08 0.74 0.47 [1.74] 
D4 1.14 0.97 1.20 1.18 1.14 1.15 -0.18 [-0.66] 
D5 0.95 0.69 0.92 1.06 1.14 1.09 -0.40 [-1.32] 
D1-D5 0.37 0.83** 0.51 0.24 0.11 0.17   
t(D1-D5) [1.56] [2.95] [1.83] [0.88] [0.41] [0.69]   






Small    Large 
AQ1-AQ5 t(AQ1-AQ5) 
AQ1 AQ2 AQ3 AQ4 AQ5 
All stocks 1.14 1.17 1.24 1.10 1.14 1.07 0.10 [0.41] 
D1 1.32 1.21 1.35 1.43 1.27 1.31 -0.10 [-0.46] 
D2 1.15 1.16 1.33 1.13 1.11 0.90 0.26 [0.84] 
D3 1.15 1.23 1.14 1.01 1.25 1.28 -0.05 [-0.16] 
D4 1.14 1.01 1.26 1.04 1.11 1.27 -0.26 [-0.73] 
D5 0.95 1.22 1.11 0.92 0.98 0.59 0.63 [1.95] 
D1-D5 0.37 -0.01 0.24 0.51* 0.29 0.72*   
t(D1-D5) [1.56] [-0.04] [0.93] [2.00] [0.99] [2.41]   
 
 
insignificant for all stocks,
20
 it is still significant for the firms in the smallest size group. 
Further, to explore whether AQ subsumes the predictive power of dispersion on future stock 
returns, I sort firms first by AQ variable and then by forecast dispersion. More precisely, each 
month using in-sample AQ breakpoints of the previous fiscal year end, I assign stocks into 
one of five AQ quintiles. Stocks with the lowest standard deviation of the residuals are placed 
                                                 
20
 This may be due to the additional requirement that a firm must have sufficient data in Compustat Industrial 




into AQ1 quintile, and those with the highest standard deviation of the residuals are in AQ5 
quintile. Note that larger standard deviation of residuals is interpreted as lower earnings 
quality. Stocks in each AQ quintile are then ranked into five additional quintiles based on the 
forecast dispersion of the previous month. This sorting on average gives 30 stocks in each of 
the 25 portfolios. As shown in Panel C, there still exists a strong negative relation between 
contemporaneous dispersion and future stock returns. For example, for firms in AQ5 group 
the difference of average monthly equal-weighted returns of D1-D5 strategy equals significant 
0.72% (t-stat=2.41%). Results are similar for the AQ3 group. Hence, it does not appear that 
AQ explains the puzzling dispersion-returns relation. 
 
2.4.2 Capital investment growth 
Several papers document the negative relation between investment and average 
returns. Cochrane (1991) is among the first to show this relation in the time series. Titman et 
al. (2004) find a similar relation in the cross-section and interpret the evidence as investors 
underreacting to overinvestment. More specifically, they show that firms that increase their 
level of abnormal capital investment (CI) the most tend to achieve lower stock returns for the 
five subsequent years. Here I study whether the effect of high forecast dispersion firms is 
different from the effect of CI documented by Titman et al. (2004). Similar to them, abnormal 





C E  + C E  + C E
3
yC I   
where 
y
C E  is the firm’s capital expenditures (#128) scaled by its total assets in year y.
21
 
Restricting the sample to the firms that have sufficient data in Compustat Industrial annual 
file produces 993 eligible firms per month. Panel A of Table 2.11 shows the distribution 
                                                 
21
 Using sales as the deflator, as done in Titman et al. (2004), does not significantly change the results. 
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characteristics of the CI variable. It reveals that small firms invest relatively more than large 
firms - the average difference is 0.11% with a t-stat of 7.16. Notice that the largest firms 
disinvest, e.g., firms in the largest size quintile disinvest with a rate of -0.022%. Not reported 




Panel B presents the average equal-weighted portfolio returns for this sample. 
Although the return differential of the D1-D5 strategy is slightly lower for the restricted 
sample than for the full sample, the results are largely consistent with the results obtained in 
Table 2.3. In particular, the D1-D5 strategy for the smallest size quintile earns 1.17 % 
monthly average return (t-stat=4.61%). To investigate whether CI underperformance can 
explain the underperformance of dispersion, I make a further two-way cut on CI and 
dispersion. More precisely, I form five CI groups based on the CI level of the previous fiscal 
year end, and then stocks in each CI group are sorted into five portfolios based on the level of 
forecast dispersion of the previous month. On average this sort produces 40 stocks in each of 
the 25 CI/Dispersion portfolios.  
First,  note that the results of this test, presented in Panel C, are consistent with Titman 
et al. (2004) showing that the spread return of low CI and high CI amounts significant 0.21% 
monthly return with a t-stat of 1.86. I also observe that the difference between low- and high 
dispersion portfolio returns is still significantly different from zero at conventional levels. 
More specifically, the average D1-D5 returns for CI1 and CI5 groups are highly significant 
with 0.6% (t-stat = 2.26) and 0.84% (t-stat = 2.93) respectively. Thus, my analysis does not 
suggest that the CI variable captures the dispersion effect. 
  
                                                 
22
 This finding in contrast to prior study of Gilchrist, Himmelberg, and Huberman (2005). However, their 
definition of dispersion of analysts’ forecasts differs from the definition employed in this study. 
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Table 2.11: Dispersion and capital investment anomalies 
The table reports average CI and average monthly equal-weighted portfolio returns. Using in-sample breakpoints each month stocks are 
sorted in five groups based on the level of market capitalization of the previous month (or CI of the previous fiscal year end). Stocks in each 
size (CI) group are then sorted into five additional groups based on forecast dispersion of the previous month. Forecast dispersion is the 
standard deviation of all outstanding current fiscal year earnings forecasts scaled by the absolute value of the average forecast as reported in 
the I/B/E/S Summary History file. Stocks with an average forecast of zero are assigned to the highest dispersion group, and stocks with a 
price less than or equal 5 dollars are excluded from the sample. Stocks are held for one month. The period considered is February 1983 
through December 2006. Numbers in brackets are the t-statistics based on standard errors adjusted for one lag autocorrelation (*5%, **1%). 
 
 






Small    Large 
S1-S5 t(S1-S5) 
S1 S2 S3 S4 S5 
All stocks 0.030 0.088 0.060 0.019 0.005 -0.022 0.110** [7.16] 
D1 0.029 0.108 0.053 0.042 0.011 -0.015 0.123** [8.09] 
D2 0.019 0.080 0.045 0.024 0.007 -0.030 0.110** [8.75] 
D3 0.022 0.083 0.046 0.014 -0.002 -0.027 0.109** [8.25] 
D4 0.035 0.093 0.060 0.000 0.012 -0.017 0.111** [5.75] 
D5 0.048 0.073 0.097 0.016 -0.002 -0.022 0.095** [4.99] 
D1-D5 -0.019 0.035* -0.045* 0.026 0.012 0.007   
t(D1-D5) [-1.86] [2.12] [-2.22] [1.77] [0.61] [0.73]   






Small    Large 
S1-S5 t(S1-S5) 
S1 S2 S3 S4 S5 
All stocks 1.19 1.21 1.29 1.24 1.14 1.09 0.12 [0.55] 
D1 1.39 1.70 1.51 1.50 1.22 1.31 0.40 [1.51] 
D2 1.26 1.44 1.42 1.21 1.11 1.06 0.37 [1.38] 
D3 1.22 1.30 1.19 1.13 1.13 0.87 0.44 [1.55] 
D4 1.14 1.00 1.33 1.35 1.14 1.22 -0.22 [-0.83] 
D5 0.94 0.53 0.98 1.05 1.10 1.00 -0.47 [-1.60] 
D1-D5 0.44 1.17** 0.53 0.45 0.12 0.31   
t(D1-D5) [1.83] [4.61] [1.87] [1.60] [0.46] [1.23]   






Small    Large 
CI1-CI5 t(CI1-CI5) 
CI1 CI2 CI3 CI4 CI5 
All stocks 1.19 1.26 1.24 1.22 1.20 1.06 0.21 [1.86] 
D1 1.39 1.45 1.46 1.42 1.24 1.38 0.07 [0.46] 
D2 1.26 1.28 1.15 1.25 1.29 1.28 0.00 [0.00] 
D3 1.22 1.50 1.27 1.23 1.27 1.01 0.49* [2.42] 
D4 1.14 1.23 1.14 1.12 1.23 1.08 0.15 [0.81] 
D5 0.94 0.85 1.19 1.08 0.93 0.54 0.31 [1.42] 
D1-D5 0.44 0.60* 0.27 0.34 0.31 0.84**   
t(D1-D5) [1.83] [2.26] [0.98] [1.32] [1.21] [2.93]   
 
 
2.4.3 Asset growth 
Motivated by the work of Cooper et al. (2008), the potential candidate here to explain 
the dispersion effect is the total asset growth rate (AG). Exploring the predictive power of AG 
for stock returns, Cooper et al. (2008) find that it is the most important predictor of the future 
abnormal returns, and interpret their evidence as investor overreaction. In their sample 
covering the period of 1968-2003, firms with low AG outperformed firms with high AG by an 
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astounding 20% equal-weighted annual return.
23
 Their results is robust even for large 
capitalization stocks, a subgroup of firms for which other documented predictors of the cross-
section (such as forecast dispersion) lose much of their predictive ability. Following Cooper et 
al. (2008), the AG rate is estimated as the yearly growth rate in total assets (# 6), i.e. in fiscal 
year end y ,
y
AG  is measured as follows, 
1
1










Limiting the sample to the stocks that have enough data in the Compustat Industrial 
Annual file to compute asset growth rate yields on average 1,183 sample stocks per month. 
Panel A of Table 2.12, that reports distribution characteristics of the asset growth also shows 
that small capitalization stocks grow faster than large capitalization stocks. In non-tabulated 
results, I also observe a negative relation between asset growth rate and forecast dispersion. 
The average (median) asset growth rate over the sample period is 0.3% (0.11%) per year. My 
statistic slightly differs from what Cooper et al. (2008) report due to the different periods 
considered. Further, Panel B shows that D1-D5 strategy earns highly significant return for the 
equal-weighted portfolios. More specifically, the average difference between low- and high-
dispersion portfolio monthly returns equals 0.57% (6.84% annualized) with a t-stat of 2.39. 
Although the average monthly return differential between low- and high-dispersion portfolios 
declines as the average size increases, it remains significant at conventional levels for the 
stocks in the two highest market capitalization quintiles. To study whether the AG variable 
can explain the anomalous relationship between forecast dispersion and stock returns, Panel C 
further provides the results for a two-way cut on AG and dispersion of analysts’ forecasts. 
This sort provides 47 stocks in each of the 25 portfolios.  
 
                                                 
23
 A survey conducted by McKinsey (2007) also reveals that firms themselves knew that they were not great at 
capital discipline. The survey said, "17 percent of the capital invested by their companies went toward 
underperforming investment that should be terminated and that 16 percent of their investments were a mistake to 
have financed in the first place". 
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Table 2.12: Dispersion and asset growth anomalies 
The table reports average AG and average monthly equal-weighted portfolio returns. Using in sample breakpoints each month stocks are 
sorted in five groups based on the level of market capitalization of the previous month end (or AG of the previous fiscal year end). Stocks in 
each size (AG) group are then sorted into five additional groups based on forecast dispersion of the previous month. Forecast dispersion is 
the standard deviation of all outstanding current fiscal year earnings forecasts scaled by the absolute value of the average forecast as reported 
in the I/B/E/S Summary History file. Stocks with an average forecast of zero are assigned to the highest dispersion group, and stocks with a 
price less than or equal 5 dollars are excluded from the sample. Stocks are held for one month. The period considered is February 1983 
through December 2006. Numbers in brackets are the t-statistics based on standard errors adjusted for one lag autocorrelation (*5%, **1%). 
 
 






Small    Large 
S1-S5 t(S1-S5) 
S1 S2 S3 S4 S5 
All stocks 0.30 0.39 0.38 0.32 0.24 0.18 0.22** [7.62] 
D1 0.29 0.43 0.40 0.31 0.24 0.15 0.28** [14.19] 
D2 0.29 0.41 0.40 0.32 0.23 0.16 0.25** [15.42] 
D3 0.31 0.41 0.38 0.34 0.25 0.16 0.24** [13.85] 
D4 0.32 0.37 0.37 0.31 0.24 0.19 0.18** [8.32] 
D5 0.31 0.33 0.35 0.30 0.23 0.23 0.10** [2.84] 
D1-D5 -0.03 0.10** 0.06* 0.01 0.00 -0.08   
t(D1-D5) [-1.27] [6.01] [2.46] [0.57] [0.20] [-1.85]   






Small    Large 
S1-S5 t(S1-S5) 
S1 S2 S3 S4 S5 
All stocks 1.13 1.06 1.17 1.23 1.08 1.09 -0.03 [-0.11] 
D1 1.36 1.57 1.45 1.52 1.14 1.30 0.27 [0.97] 
D2 1.23 1.30 1.41 1.25 1.18 1.02 0.28 [0.99] 
D3 1.22 1.05 1.12 1.14 1.07 0.94 0.11 [0.43] 
D4 0.99 0.78 1.04 1.25 1.14 1.19 -0.41 [-1.45] 
D5 0.79 0.47 0.76 1.01 0.92 1.00 -0.53 [-1.83] 
D1-D5 0.57* 1.10** 0.70* 0.51 0.22 0.30   
t(D1-D5) [2.39] [4.58] [2.55] [1.80] [0.82] [1.19]   






Small    Large 
AG1-AG5 t(AG1-AG5) 
AG1 AG2 AG3 AG4 AG5 
All stocks 1.13 1.35 1.32 1.32 1.14 0.51 0.85** [3.60] 
D1 1.36 1.39 1.56 1.45 1.32 0.86 0.53 [1.94] 
D2 1.23 1.47 1.35 1.36 1.25 0.84 0.63* [2.03] 
D3 1.22 1.28 1.39 1.46 1.08 0.60 0.68* [2.20] 
D4 0.99 1.35 1.30 1.34 1.18 0.20 1.15** [4.22] 
D5 0.79 1.30 0.97 0.97 0.88 -0.07 1.37** [5.28] 
D1-D5 0.57* 0.10 0.59* 0.49* 0.43 0.93**   
t(D1-D5) [2.39] [0.32] [2.40] [2.14] [1.63] [3.57]   
 
 
First, I confirm Cooper et al. (2008)’s finding that low asset growth firms outperform 
high asset growth firms. In particular, the strategy long in low AG firms and short in high AG 
firms earns annual 10% return with a t-stat of 3.6. Note that except for the lowest AG group, 
D1-D5 equal-weighted portfolio returns significantly differ from zero. The message from this 




Table 2.13: Dispersion and equity offering anomalies 
Each month I exclude stocks that have issued stocks (an IPO or a SEO) during the past 60 months. Then, using in-sample breakpoints each 
month stocks are sorted in five equal groups based on the level of market capitalization of the previous month end. Stocks in each size group 
are then sorted into five additional groups based on forecast dispersion of the previous month. Forecast dispersion is the standard deviation of 
all outstanding current fiscal year earnings forecasts scaled by the absolute value of the average forecast as reported in the I/B/E/S Summary 
History file. Stocks with an average forecast of zero are assigned to the highest dispersion group, and stocks with a price less than or equal 5 
dollars are excluded from the sample. Stocks are held for one month. The period considered is February 1983 through December 2007. The 
table reports average monthly equal-weighted portfolio returns. Numbers in brackets are the t-statistics based on standard errors adjusted for 
one lag autocorrelation (*5%, **1%). 






Small    Large 
S1 S2 S3 S4 S5 
D1 1.30 1.49 1.34 1.44 1.21 1.26 
D2 1.20 1.31 1.23 1.13 1.15 1.07 
D3 1.19 1.07 1.22 1.14 1.11 1.05 
D4 1.04 0.78 0.99 1.13 1.20 1.14 
D5 0.69 0.35 0.50 0.88 0.95 1.11 
D1-D5 0.61** 1.13** 0.84** 0.56* 0.26 0.16 
t(D1-D5) [2.71] [5.26] [3.50] [2.25] [1.02] [0.62] 
 
 
2.4.4 The effect of equity offerings 
Research on long term performance of initial public offering (IPO) and seasoned 
equity offering (SEO) was initiated by Loughran and Ritter (1995). They show that equity-
offering firms, whether an IPO or a SEO, have low long-run stock returns. To check whether 
the negative dispersion-return relationship is attributable to these equity-offering firms, I re-
examine the dispersion-return relationship for firms that have not issued equity in any of the 
past 60 months. On average, 27 stocks are removed from each of the 25 portfolios, reducing 
the average number of stocks in these portfolios from 87 to 60. I use the Thomson Financial 
Global Issues Dataset to identify firms involved in any equity offering, either an IPO or a 
SEO.  
Table 2.13 shows that the underperformance of the high dispersion firms relative to 
low dispersion firms still persists. Specifically, the raw return on the D1-D5 portfolio for all 
stocks is 0.61% per month (7.32% annualized) with a t-stat of 2.71. This empirical finding 
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suggests that the negative dispersion-return relation is not due to the effect of equity offering, 





In this chapter, I empirically re-examine the relationship between forecast dispersion 
and stock returns. Consistent with the existing literature, I provide strong evidence that 
contemporaneous forecast dispersion is negatively correlated with future stock returns. This 
effect is most pronounced in the smallest market capitalization stocks and is robust across 
different measures of dispersion that I consider in Section 2.3. This suggests that the market 
does not entirely assimilate the information contained in the forecast dispersion in a timely 
manner. 
The significant negative dispersion-return association is robust to different measures 
of dispersion. However, I do not find any evident relationship between stock returns and the 
standard deviation of recommendations and long-term forecasts. My analysis further suggests 
that we cannot explain the negative dispersion-return relationship by the accruals quality, 
asset growth, capital investment, and equity issuance anomalies. Hence, the dispersion-return 
relationship is strongly negative and not directly connected to other documented anomalies. 
Thus, more research is needed to understand what does the forecast dispersion measure that 
has predictive power on stock returns, and in the next two chapters I further investigate the 
dispersion-return relationship. 
  
                                                 
24
 The unreported results indicate that value-weighted and median returns on the D1-D5 portfolio excluding 
firms that have issued new equity in any of the past 60 months also persist. Specifically, the returns for the 
value-weighted (median) the returns are 1.05%, t=4.56 (1.68%, t=8.25) for S1 size group, 0.84%, t=3.49 (1.46%, 
t=6.46) for S2 size group, 0.55%, t=2.22 (1.02%, t=4.53) for S3 size group.  
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Chapter 3: The Determinants of Forecast Dispersion 
 
3.1 Introduction 
How can we explain the negative correlation between contemporaneous forecast 
dispersion and future stock returns? What are the determinants of analyst forecast dispersion? 
What causes analysts to disagree in their forecasts? These are the questions of interest in this 
chapter. Two comprehensive reviews of the forecast literature by Givoly and Lakonishok 
(1984) and Brown (1993) conclude that we know very little about the determinants of forecast 
dispersion and how such determinants are related to one another. Schipper (1991) suggests 
that future research should investigate the causes of analyst disagreement and what 
information is impounded in analysts' forecasts. Evidence shows that forecast dispersion has 
several dimensions including information asymmetries and differences of opinion. On one 
hand, a group of analysts can have superior information. On the other hand, even when having 
the same information set, for example after earnings announcements, analysts revise their 
forecasts not necessarily in the same direction; see Bamber et al. (1997), Bamber et al. (1999), 
Kandel and Pearson (1995), among others. 
In order to broaden our knowledge on the relation between forecast dispersion and 
stock returns, it is essential to understand more on the determinants of forecast dispersion. 
Despite the important role of forecast dispersion in asset pricing, there is little research on 
what determines forecast dispersion. This chapter fills this gap by conducting an analysis on 
the determinants of forecast dispersion. I show that forecast dispersion is simultaneously 
associated with firm’s idiosyncratic risk, firm’s information environment, analysts’ differing 
information sets, forecasting difficulty, and several other determinants suggested by the extant 




3.2 Forecast dispersion and data 
3.2.1 Forecast dispersion 
Forecast dispersion (FDisp) is the standard deviation of individual analysts’ current-
fiscal-year annual earnings per share forecasts divided by the absolute value of the average 
earnings forecasts.
25
 This measure of analyst disagreement has been widely used in the prior 
literature. To compute forecast statistics (standard deviation and average), I use I/B/E/S 
Unadjusted Detail History file that is a timeline of individual earnings forecasts unadjusted for 
stock splits. When computing forecast dispersion, for a given analyst I retain the most recent 
forecast. I use individual analyst forecasts for two reasons. First, Diether et al. (2002), Payne 
and Thomas (2003) and Baber and Kang (2002) show that the split-adjustment procedure can 
lead to wrong conclusions. Second, I/B/E/S Summary Statistics file often includes stale 
forecasts in computing forecast statistics; see Morse, Stephan, and Stice (1991), Brown and 
Han (1992), Stickel (1996), Barron and Stuerke (1998). 
To ensure that prior-period financial data is available, I compute forecast dispersion on 
the last day of six months before firm fiscal-year-end. For example, for a firm with a fiscal-
year-end of December 31
st
, 2009, forecast dispersion is computed on June 30
th
, 2009. The 
choice of mid-year, admittedly arbitrary, provides comparability across firms and years. 
Keeping forecast horizon constant for all firms is important because forecast dispersion also 
depends on forecast horizon. Elton et al. (1984) show evidence that forecast dispersion, 
computed as the standard deviation of forecasts, declines during the fiscal year and that most 
of the decrease occurs in the first months of the year. Finally, holding forecast horizon 
constant for all firms enables us to include non-December fiscal-year-end firms that comprise 
37% of the sample. For December fiscal-year-end firms, Figure 2 illustrates the timeline of 
                                                 
25
 25 zero-average-forecast observations are excluded from the sample representing 0.04% of all observations. 
There are 4,791 observations with negative average forecast that comprises about 9% of all observations. One 
explanation of so few negative average forecasts is the well-known upward bias in the distribution of earning 
forecasts; see Das, Levine, and Sivaramakrishnan (1998), Eames and Glover (2003), Stickel (1995), McNichols 
and O'Brien (1997). 
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computation of forecast dispersion. In the sample, 97% (99%) of firms report their actual 
earnings during the first three (six) months of the next fiscal year. 
 
3.2.2 Other data sources 
Data on stock returns, prices, and shares outstanding are from the CRSP monthly stock 
file. I select ordinary common shares (i.e., share codes 10 and 11) traded on NYSE, AMEX, 
or NASDAQ, and remove financial institutions. To minimize the problem of bid-ask spread, I 
follow Jegadeesh and Titman (2001) and exclude firms with a stock price less than USD 5 a 
share on the day when forecast dispersion is computed. To mitigate the problem of extreme 
values, all variables are winsorized at 0.5% and 99.5% levels. I exclude stocks followed by 
less than two analysts and eliminate observations with negative book value and total assets. 
Results are however similar when analyst coverage is set to a minimum of three, four, or five 
analysts. 
 Accounting and credit rating data is from the Compustat. Equity issuance data is from 
Thomson Financial Securities Data Corporation (SDC) database. SDC lists IPO and SEO 
issuance advisors retained on a deal, and I/B/E/S provides the name of the broker issuing a 
forecast. I match I/B/E/S brokers and SDC advisors using their corporate names. In most 
instances, the names in the two databases are qualitatively the same and can be easily 
matched.
26
 The sample period spans from January 1983 to December 2007. I choose 1983 as a 
starting year because the Unadjusted Detail History file is not available prior to 1983.  
 
3.2.3 Sample characteristics 
Table 3.1 presents descriptive statistics of forecast dispersion. The sample consists of 
7,920 different firms with 52,165 observations of forecast dispersion data. In 1983, 1,380  
                                                 
26
 I use SAS “SPEDIS” function with a maximum distance equal to 30 between I/B/E/S broker name and SDC 
advisor names. This procedure matches about 90% of observations in the I/B/E/S Unadjusted Detail History file. 
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Table 3.1: Sample characteristics 
The sample consists of CRSP ordinary common shares traded on the NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ after removing financial institutions. 
Firms must also have a one fiscal year I/B/E/S earnings estimate, to be covered by two or more analysts, and have a price greater than five 
dollars. FDisp is the forecast dispersion computed as the standard deviation of all outstanding current fiscal year earnings forecasts scaled by 
the absolute value of the average forecast, excluding stocks with average forecast of zero. Market value (of equity) is the stock price times 













(in millions)  
FDisp 
Average Std 25% Median 75% 
1983 1,380 11.91 913  0.35 0.80 0.06 0.13 0.28 
1984 1,559 11.94 768  0.25 0.62 0.05 0.10 0.23 
1985 1,653 11.29 889  0.30 0.76 0.05 0.11 0.25 
1986 1,452 11.61 1,236  0.38 0.82 0.06 0.15 0.34 
1987 1,538 11.21 1,401  0.35 0.83 0.06 0.14 0.31 
1988 1,682 10.39 1,171  0.23 0.50 0.04 0.09 0.22 
1989 1,728 10.35 1,279  0.22 0.60 0.04 0.08 0.18 
1990 1,663 10.31 1,419  0.22 0.58 0.04 0.08 0.20 
1991 1,771 9.95 1,485  0.30 0.74 0.04 0.10 0.25 
1992 1,907 9.04 1,570  0.26 0.73 0.04 0.08 0.21 
1993 2,139 8.54 1,560  0.21 0.57 0.03 0.06 0.18 
1994 2,395 8.18 1,445  0.19 0.56 0.03 0.06 0.16 
1995 2,524 7.92 1,687  0.17 0.56 0.02 0.05 0.13 
1996 2,895 7.28 1,827  0.21 0.61 0.02 0.06 0.17 
1997 3,064 7.18 2,079  0.17 0.52 0.02 0.05 0.13 
1998 3,004 7.12 2,551  0.17 0.50 0.02 0.04 0.13 
1999 2,752 7.80 3,126  0.18 0.55 0.02 0.04 0.13 
2000 2,642 7.63 3,710  0.16 0.50 0.02 0.04 0.12 
2001 2,136 8.12 3,780  0.19 0.53 0.02 0.06 0.16 
2002 1,830 7.66 3,670  0.19 0.61 0.02 0.04 0.13 
2003 1,876 8.11 3,642  0.18 0.61 0.02 0.04 0.12 
2004 2,088 8.23 3,966  0.16 0.57 0.02 0.04 0.11 
2005 2,125 8.17 4,262  0.15 0.51 0.02 0.04 0.10 
2006 2,187 7.80 4,390  0.16 0.46 0.02 0.05 0.12 
2007 2,200 8.12 4,870  0.17 0.55 0.02 0.05 0.12 
          
Average  2,088 9.03 2,348  0.22 0.61 0.03 0.07 0.18 
 
firms are eligible. There is a clear deepening in eligible stocks up to 3,064 firms in 1997 
followed by a decrease. At the end of 2007, 2,200 firms are eligible. The number of analysts 
covering the firms varies from 2 analysts, the minimum to impose in order to compute the 
dispersion, to a maximum of 56 analysts, with an average (median) of 9 (6) analysts. 
Consistent with previous studies, forecast dispersion is highly skewed - its average is almost 
three times larger than the median; see Gu and Wu (2003). Because of analyst coverage 
requirements, my sample consists of relatively large firms with average market value of USD 
2.3 billion. The sample consists of 48% of firms traded on NYSE and NASDAQ each, and the 
remaining 4% firms are traded on AMEX. 
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Figure 2: Timeline of computing forecast dispersion 
The figure shows the timeline of forecast dispersion computation for December fiscal-year-end firms for year T. For all firms forecast horizon is 6 month prior to fiscal-year-end. 





Months when forecasts are released 
6 months 
June T December T January - March T 




3.3 Is Forecast dispersion related to firm risk or economic uncertainty? 
 
3.3.1 Firm risk 
A number of studies suggest that one of the important determinants of forecast dispersion 
is firm risk; see Friend, Westerfield, and Granito (1978), Cragg and Malkiel (1982), Malkiel 
(1982), Farrelly and Reichenstein (1984), Carvell and Strebel (1984), and Harris (1986), 
among others. More precisely, these authors find a positive relationship between forecast 
dispersion and subsequent returns, thus conclude that forecast dispersion proxies for firm risk. 
Among others, Diether et al. (2002) and Irani and Karamanou (2003) show that forecast 
dispersion is also positively correlated with the standard deviation of returns and beta, two 
frequently used proxies of firm risk. Supportive theoretical work on the positive relation 
between forecast dispersion and return volatility are Shalen (1993) and Wang (1998). Using 
foreign exchange survey data, Frankel and Froot (1990) also find positive relation between 
forecast dispersion and return volatility. 
I differentiate between systematic risk and idiosyncratic risk. As a proxy for 
systematic risk, I employ the widely used factors: size (SMB), book-to-market (HML) and 
winner minus loser factors (WML). To be precise, I estimate firm’s systematic risk in the 
following model 
, , , , ,
- ( - ) ,
i t f t i i m t f t i t i t i t i t
R R R R s SM B h H M L w W M L       
 
where ,i t  is the error term, and the subscripts i and t represent respectively firm and time 
when forecast dispersion is measured. All factors are computed over previous -1 to -52 
weekly returns relative to the week when forecast dispersion is computed. I further employ 
firm’s idiosyncratic risk - the residual variance ,i t  and denote it by ,i tRV . I use weekly 
returns because small stocks are not traded every day but they normally trade at least once a  
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week. Weekly returns are thus less affected by “thin trades”; see Scholes and Williams 
(1977), Dimson and Marsh (1983), Maynes and Rumsey (1993), and Butler and Osborne 
(1998). 
 
3.3.2 Economic uncertainty 
It is reasonable to suppose that situations in which future economic state is difficult to 
forecast will, in general, be situations in which firm-specific earnings are also difficult to 
forecast, thus forecasts will differ more. This is because the state of economy is likely to 
influence firm earnings, at least on aggregate level. If analysts regard firm-specific earnings 
forecast as consisting of a systematic and idiosyncratic part of the realization, then they 
should also pay attention on the systematic component, i.e., the state of the economy. Hope 
and Kang (2005) show that economic uncertainty decreases forecast accuracy that itself 
affects forecast dispersion; see Elton et al. (1984) and Kwon (2002). To test this hypothesis, I 
include economic uncertainty in the model, proxied by the uncertainty index (Unc) of 
Anderson et al. (2009). Using the Survey of Professional Forecasters, Anderson et al. (2009) 
measure economic uncertainty as the dispersion of aggregate corporate profits (rather than 
earning forecasts of individual firms).
27
 
Because the uncertainty index is available quarterly, I construct maximally correlated 
weekly portfolios also known as factor-mimicking portfolios for the uncertainty index. 





f a b B     
                                                 
27
 I sincerely thank Evan Anderson for kindly providing the uncertainty index. The spanning portfolios are from 





f  is the realized value of uncertainty index and tB  denotes the time t excess returns 
(zero cost) on a vector of base assets. Following Lamont (2001) and Vassalou (2003), the base 
assets include the six value-weighted Fama–French portfolios constructed from the 
intersections of two market value and three book-to-market portfolios. The factor-mimicking 
portfolio is the estimated value of 
'ˆˆ
t
a b B . Following Anderson et al. (2009), to estimate the 
sensitivity of stock returns to uncertainty index, I employ the following model: 
, , , , , ,
- ( - ) ,
i t f t i i m t f t i U nc t i t
R R R R u R       
where ,i t  is the error term, the subscripts i and t represent respectively firm and time when 
forecast dispersion is measured, and ,U nc tR  is the factor-mimicking value of uncertainty 
index. The model is estimated over the previous -1 to -52 weeks relative to the week when 
forecast dispersion is computed.  
 
3.3.3 Results 
To examine the relationship between firm risk and economic uncertainty with forecast 
dispersion, I estimate the following models: 
, 1 , 2 , 3 , 4 , 5 , ,
, 1 , 2 , 3 , 5 , ,
, 1 , 5 ,
Fam a-French 3 +  M om entum  factors (FF3+M O M )
R ,
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Table 3.2: Dispersion, risk, and uncertainty 
The dependent variable is forecast dispersion (FDisp), defined as the ratio of standard deviation of analyst current fiscal-year annual earnings 
per share forecasts to the absolute value of the average forecast. Stocks with average forecast of zero are excluded. The period considered is 
January 1983 through December 2007. The t-statistics are based on the standard errors clustered by firm and time (*5%, ** 1%). 
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where ,i t  is the error term, and the subscripts i and t represent respectively firm and time 
when forecast dispersion is measured. To control for time trend and firm characteristics that 
can affect forecast dispersion, I add time 
t




Results, presented in 
Table 3.2, show that forecast dispersion is strongly positively related with firm’s idiosyncratic 
risk in all specifications.
29
 A one-unit increase in residual variance increases forecast 
dispersion by 13.8%, in the specification of FF3+MOM. In term of magnitude, this translates 
                                                 
28
 Results are qualitatively similar when using industry dummies instead of firm dummies. For robustness check, 
I employed both CRSP four-digit industry SIC code and Fama-French 12 industry classifications as industry 
dummies, obtained from Ken French’s website: 
http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/index.html. 
29
 Results are similar when estimating the models for firms with credit rating data and for firms without credit 
rating.   
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into 63% (=13.8/22) increase in forecast dispersion. Note that the average forecast dispersion 
is 22%. Interestingly, firm’s beta is negatively correlated with forecast dispersion. This result 
is consistent with Diether et al. (2002, p.2130) who show that, after controlling for firm’s 
idiosyncratic risk, firm’s beta is negatively related with forecast dispersion. My result also 
supports Elton et al. (1984) finding that economic uncertainty plays little role in analysts’ 
forecast error. Decomposing forecast error in economic, industry, and firm components, they 
find that only 3% of forecast error is attributable to misestimating economic performance and 
that that the biggest portion of forecast error comes from misestimating industry and firm 
performances. Not reported here, the results of Lagrange multiplier (LM) test show that while 
FF3+MOM significantly improves the model fit both over FF3 and CAPM, CAPM+UNC 
does not results in a better fit than CAPM. We are in a position to confirm that forecast 
dispersion does not embed a classic measure of firm systematic risk (since it is negatively 
related to market beta and winner/loser factor) or economic uncertainty, but rather it proxies 
firm’s idiosyncratic risk.  
 
3.4 Are forecast dispersion and idiosyncratic risk anomalies related? 
The evidence in Section 3.3 suggests that firms with high idiosyncratic risk have high 
dispersion. Here, I examine whether the dispersion-return relation becomes insignificant after 
controlling for idiosyncratic risk proxied by firm’s residual variance, RV. Because 
idiosyncratic risk is negatively related associated with the cross-section of future stock 
returns; see Ang et al. (2006), and forecast dispersion is highly correlated with idiosyncratic 





Table 3.3: Dispersion and idiosyncratic risk anomalies 
Using in-sample breakpoints each month stocks are equally sorted in five groups based on the level of idiosyncratic risk (proxied by the RV) 
of the previous month end. Stocks in each size group are then equally sorted into five additional groups based on the forecast dispersion of 
the previous month. Stocks with an average forecast of zero are assigned to the highest dispersion group, and stocks with a price less than or 
equal 5 dollars are excluded from the sample. Stocks are held for one month. The table reports average monthly equal-weighted returns. In 
brackets are the t-statistics, adjusted for one lag autocorrelation, (*5%, **1%). The period considered is January 1984 through December 
2007. 
 
Panel A: First by RV then by dispersion 






   Large 
RV1- RV5 t(RV1- RV5) 
RV2 RV3 RV4 RV5 
D1 1.31 1.41 1.39 1.21 0.83 0.48 [1.06] 
D2 1.22 1.30 1.40 1.05 0.60 0.62 [1.31] 
D3 1.28 1.32 1.16 1.02 0.38 0.89 [1.84] 
D4 1.22 1.24 1.15 1.17 0.44 0.77 [1.68] 
D5 1.31 1.16 1.06 0.69 0.22 1.09 [2.45]* 
D1-D5 0.00 0.24 0.33 0.53 0.61   
t(D1-D5)  [0.02]  [1.80]    [1.99]*      [2.98]**       [3.11]**   
 
Panel B: First by dispersion then RV 






   Large 
D1-D5 t(D1- D5) 
D2 D3 D4 D5 
RV1 1.27 1.19 1.25 1.18 1.21 0.06     [0.36] 
RV2 1.38 1.33 1.28 1.23 1.03 0.35     [1.81] 
RV3 1.38 1.35 1.23 1.12 0.86 0.52     [1.98]* 
RV4 1.42 1.30 1.05 0.97 0.61 0.81 [2.79]** 
RV5 1.01 0.82 0.52 0.37 0.12 0.89 [3.41]** 
RV1-RV5 0.26 0.37 0.73 0.81 1.09   
t(RV1-RV5)  [0.67]  [0.85]  [1.55]     [1.75]*       [2.48]**   
 
 
I perform two-way sorting on RV and FDisp. Each month, stocks are equally assigned 
into quintiles based on the RV of the previous month. Stocks with the lowest idiosyncratic risk 
are placed into quintile RV1, and those with the highest idiosyncratic risk are in quintile RV5. 
Stocks in each size quintile are further ranked into five dispersion quintiles based on the 
FDisp of the previous month. Stocks are held for one month and the monthly portfolio return 
is the equal-weighted returns of all the stocks in a portfolio. Table 3.3 presents supporting 
evidence that idiosyncratic risk is not driving the forecast dispersion effect.
30
 While the return 
                                                 
30
 As shown in Panel B, results are qualitatively similar when firms are first ranked based on their FDisp and 
then ranked based on RV. Results are also qualitatively similar for subsamples of rated and non-rated firms. 
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differential between the low- and high-dispersion stocks is positive and significant for the 
highest RV stocks, it becomes insignificant for stocks in the two smallest RV quintiles. Similar 
to results of Table 2.3, when stocks are first sorted by market capitalization and then by 
dispersion, D1-D5 strategy delivers statistically significant returns for three RV groups - RV3, 
RV4, and RV5, both in Panel A and B. In particular, the D1-D5 strategy for the largest 
quintile RV5 earns 0.61 % monthly returns on average (7.32% annualized) that is statistically 
significant at 1% level. Thus, it does not appear that we are simply picking up a residual 
variance effect, since the two-way sorts still produce a strong negative relation between 
average returns and dispersion for the highest three RV quintiles. In sum, although RV 
significantly correlates with forecast dispersion (as shown in Section 3.3), the ability of 
forecast dispersion to predict future returns in not attributable to the predictive power of 
residual variance. 
 
3.5 Explanatory variables of forecast dispersion 
Here I consider a number of variables, in addition to residual variance, that prior 
literature shows to be associated with forecast dispersion. The precise definitions of the 
explanatory variables along with discussion of their influence on forecast dispersion follow. 




3.5.1.1 Information environment 
Firm size is a proxy for information environment; see Bhushan (1989), O’Brien and 
Bhushan (1990). Large firms attract more analysts following because the cost of acquiring 
information is low and because of interest of more potential transactions business. Large firms 
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also release more public information than smaller ones thus enriching their information 
environment. I proxy firm size by the natural logarithm of market value of equity (LogMV), 
where market value is the share price times the number of shares outstanding.  
Firm’s real activity is also associated with forecasting difficulty. Growth firms are 
difficult to analyze and forecast because of the uncertainty surrounding new projects; see 
Schultz (2010). Growth opportunities are also likely to be associated with information 
asymmetries between managers and analysts with regards to firm’s future investment 
opportunities; see Myers (1977) and Myers and Majluf (1984). This is because managers of 
firms with high growth opportunities have better knowledge on their investment opportunities 
than analysts have. The macro-economic uncertainty in conjunction with information 
asymmetries should also magnify forecast dispersion. To control for the impact of growth 
opportunities I include the book-to-market ratio (BM) in the model that is also routinely used 
as another measure of firm risk; see e.g., Fama and French (1992), Bulkley, Harris, and 
Herrerias (2004). 
 
3.5.1.2 Information flow 
Another determinant that is considered to influence forecast dispersion is analysts’ 
differing information sets. Earnings forecasts reported at different dates convey differential 
information impounded in them. Prior research shows that forecast accuracy is associated 
with forecast age because forecasts issued at different dates reflect differential information; 
see Clement (1999), O’Brien (1988), Bonner, Walther, and Young (2003). Therefore, it may 
well be that forecast dispersion is also attributable to differences in forecast ages, therefore to 
differences in the information impounded in them. Thus, as a proxy for analysts’ differing 
information sets, I employ the standard deviation of forecast ages from non-conflicted 
analysts (FAgeStd). If the number of non-conflicted analysts is below two, then FAgeStd is set 
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to zero. Age is the number of calendar days between analyst’s last forecast for a firm and the 
day when forecast dispersion is computed (the last day of six months before firm’s fiscal-
year-end). Although several studies use trading days such as O’Brien (1988), O'Brien (1990), 
Das (1998), and Sinha, Brown, and Das (1997), I use calendar days such as Clement (1999), 
Das and Saudagaran (1998), Brown (2001), Hodgdon, Tondkar, Harless, and Adhikari (2008), 
among others. For example, if an analyst released his last forecast on May 15
th
, 2009 for a 
firm with a fiscal-year-end of December 31
st
, 2009 (for which forecast dispersion is computed 
on June 30
th
, 2009), the forecast age is 46 days.  
 
3.5.1.3 Information asymmetries 
Evidence suggests that forecast dispersion also depends on information asymmetries. 
For example, Lang and Lundholm (1996) find that more disclosure decreases forecast 
dispersion, by increasing the precision of analysts’ shared information. Using conference call 
data, Bowen et al. (2002) show that information availability is negatively correlated with 
forecast dispersion. I employ two proxies for information asymmetries – the relative bid-ask 
spread (BidAskSpr) and the Info/Noise measure of Burlacu, Fontaine, Jimenez-Garcès, and 
Seasholes (2008). The bid-ask spread is the absolute value of the difference between the bid 
and ask prices, scaled by the middle price. When bid and ask prices are missing, I set the 
spread to zero and estimate the BidAskSpr by averaging the daily bid-ask spreads for a given 
firm during the previous 50 trading days relative to the day when forecast dispersion is 
computed. Using Admati (1985)’s noisy rational expectations equilibrium framework, from 
current prices Burlacu et al. (2008) construct a measure of information precision. Investors 
demand high return for a stock with low private information about its future dividends. 
Burlacu et al. (2008) define their measure as 2 2log( / (1 - )),R R where 2R  is from regressing 
stock return on its own price and the prices of other stocks in the same industry. When 2R  is a 
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low, stock prices are relatively uninformative and the amount of private information is high. 
Conversely, when 2R  is high, stock prices reveal more public than private information. It is 
likely to be less difficult and/or less costly to gather information on firms with rich 
information environment than on opaque firms. 
 
3.5.2 Change in rating 
The change in credit rating reflects credit agency's (e.g., Standard & Poor’s) 
assessment on firm’s credit quality. I proxy change in firm risk by the  change in Standard & 
Poor’s long-term issuer credit rating during the past twelve months (∆Rat). Negative ∆Rat 
indicates deterioration in credit rating. For firms not covered by credit analysts (i.e., with no 
credit rating), ∆Rat is replaced by the change of Altman (1968)’s Z-Score (∆ZScr). The Z-
Score is a widely used measure of default probability computed as a linear combination of 
five financial ratios. Previous literature shows that the Z-Score is highly accurate in predicting 
bankruptcy within two years. I expect a negative association between ∆Rat (∆ZScr) and 
FDisp meaning that credit rating deterioration increases forecast dispersion because of 
financial analysts’ non-synchronous response to bad news about a firm. 
 
3.5.3 Forecasting difficulty 
A number of studies present positive relationship between complexity of forecasting 
task and analysts’ forecasts error; see Clement (1999), Lang and Lundholm (1996), Duru and 
Reeb (2002), among others. Elton et al. (1984) document persistency in forecasting difficulty, 
i.e., if analysts made large errors in the previous year, they are likely to make large errors in 
the current year too. Comiskey, Mulford, and Porter (1986) support forecast error as an 
effective measure of forecasting difficulty. I follow Comiskey et al. (1986) and proxy the 
forecasting difficulty by the relative forecast error (RelFE) of the previous year. It is the 
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absolute difference between average (consensus) forecast and actual earnings divided by the 
actual earnings. Zero actual earnings observations are excluded from the sample.
31
 Actual 
earnings are from I/B/E/S Actual Unadjusted file. For example, forecast error for a firm with 
December 2000 fiscal-year-end is the absolute value of the difference between the consensus 
earnings forecast at June 2000 and the actual earnings for December 2000 divided by the 
actual earnings for December 2000. In other words, analysts’ prior aggregate forecast error 
measures forecasting difficulty.  
 
3.5.4 Herding 
Analysts’ herding behavior is another influential factor driving forecast dispersion. 
Welch (2000) and Jegadeesh, Kim, Krische, and Lee (2004) show that analysts herd more 
when recent returns are positive. In other words, when recent stock returns are positive and 
the consensus is optimistic, analysts herd toward the consensus. Using the classification 
method adopted in the analyst herding literature, I classify a forecast as bold if it is above both 
the prevailing consensus and the most recent forecast issued by the same analyst, or else 
below both; see Clement (1999), Gleason and Lee (2003), Kumar (2010). All other forecasts 
are classified as herding forecasts, and the proportion of herding forecasts proxies for analyst 
herding (Herd).  
 
3.5.5 Conflicts of interest 
The choice of how frequently and when analysts revise their forecast may not only 
depend on their forecasting ability and/or new information but also on their conflicts of 
interest with a firm they follow. Because of the conflicts of interest, conflicted analysts should 
be slow in incorporating bad news in their forecast revisions while non-conflicted analysts are 
                                                 
31
 There are only 87 zero-actual observations that accounts for 0.21% of all observations. 
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not; see Lin and McNichols (1998), Ljungqvist, Marston, and Wilhelm (2006). This 
asymmetric behavior among analysts creates high forecast dispersion, especially for firms 
with bad news that are followed by both conflicted and non-conflicted analysts; see Erturk 
(2006), Hwang and Li (2008), Scherbina (2008). To proxy analyst conflicts of interest, I 
compute the proportion p of conflicted (non-conflicted) analysts and calculate the information 
entropy as      , , , ,1 1i t i t i i t i tConfInt p Log p p Log p    . Everything else equal, this 
functional attains its maximum when conflicted and non-conflicted analysts are in equal 
proportion. This is exactly when analyst conflicts of interest has its highest impact on forecast 
dispersion. Analysts are marked as conflicted if they work for an investment bank that led or 
co-led IPOs or SEOs before the current earnings forecasts.  
I further differentiate between loser and winner firms, and compute stock past 
performance as the compounded stock returns over the past -1 to -12 months (PastRet). If 
PastRet is negative then the firm is classified as loser firm, otherwise, it is classified as 
winner. The hypothesis is that poor past returns lead analysts to diverge more in their 
forecasts, thus increasing forecast dispersion. Indeed, there is evidence that forecast 
dispersion differ for profit vs. loss firms; see Das (1998), Han and Manry (2000), Brown 
(2001), Agrawal et al. (2006), Ciccone (2001), among others. Chan, Jegadeesh, and 
Lakonishok (1996) find that although some analysts downward their forecasts following poor 
stock price performance, on average analysts remain overly optimistic in their forecasts. They 
conjecture that “… analysts may remain optimistic and wait for additional confirmatory 
evidence of poor earnings before slowly modifying their estimates”. Erturk (2006) and Hwang 
and Li (2008) contend that when analysts are slow in responding to bad news, coupled with 





3.6 Empirical model and results 
 
3.6.1 Descriptive statistics 
Table 3.4 presents descriptive statistics for forecast dispersion and its determinants. In 
my sample Standard & Poor’s rated firms account about 30% of the sample firms which is 
consistent with Avramov et al. (2009) statistics. For both rated and non-rated firms, average 
forecast dispersion is more than three times larger than the median. Consistent with the 
general finding in literature it shows that forecast dispersion is highly skewed; see also 
Johnson (2004), Verardo (2009), Gu and Wu (2003), Athanassakos and Kalimipalli (2003), 
among others. Rated firms have an average of USD 5.9 billion market value that is about 2.5 
times larger than the average firm. The average (median) difference between market value of 
equity for rated versus non-rated firms is approximately USD 4.9 (USD 1.4) billion. Note that 
∆Rat and ∆ZScr have negative average values indicating that my sample firms have 
deteriorating credit conditions. Not reported here, the average value of ZScr is 7.7 and Rat of 
14 that corresponds to BBB Standard & Poor’s rating. The percentage number of forecasts 
issued by investment banks is about 85% (87%) for rated (non-rated) firms. ConfInt equals 
0.34 (0.26) for (non-) rated firms.
32
 Similar statistics of conflicts of interest is also reported in 
Ertimur, Sunder, and Sunder (2007). Note that residual variance for a rated firm is almost half 
of that of non-rated firms – indicating that credit analyst following significantly decreases 
information asymmetries about a firm thus reducing firm’s idiosyncratic risk. I observe 
similar statistics for the other explanatory variables such as BM, Herd, RelFE between rated 
and non-rated firms. 
Table 3.5 report Pearson and Spearman correlations between forecast dispersion and 
its explanatory variables. I observe strong positive correlation between FDisp and RV. There 
                                                 
32




Table 3.4: Descriptive statistics of explanatory variables 
Panel A (B) reports the descriptive statistics on variables in the regression model for (non-) rated firms. Appendix C presents detailed 
information on how each variable is computed. 
 
Panel A: Descriptive statistics for rated firms 
Variables Obs Avg Std 25% 50% 75% 
FDisp 13,117 0.20 0.60 0.02 0.06 0.16 
RV 13,117 0.23 0.28 0.08 0.14 0.27 
Log(MV) 13,117 7.53 1.51 6.51 7.49 8.49 
MV (in millions) 13,117 5,927 12,398 672 1,781 4,848 
BM 13,117 0.62 0.43 0.31 0.52 0.82 
FAgeStd 13,117 0.12 0.19 0.00 0.00 0.19 
BidAskSpr 13,117 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 
Info/Noise 13,117 -1.52 0.56 -1.87 -1.49 -1.14 
∆Rat 13,117 -0.03 0.67 0.00 0.00 0.00 
RelFE 13,117 0.57 1.93 0.04 0.12 0.38 
Herd 13,117 0.29 0.26 0.06 0.25 0.46 
ConfInt 13,117 0.34 0.24 0.00 0.39 0.54 
%InvBank 13,117 0.85 0.14 0.77 0.86 1.00 
 
Panel B: Descriptive statistics for non-rated firms 
Variables Obs Avg Std 25% 50% 75% 
FDisp 22,233 0.20 0.58 0.03 0.06 0.16 
RV 22,233 0.41 0.43 0.15 0.28 0.51 
Log(MV) 22,233 5.91 1.29 4.99 5.86 6.75 
MV (in millions) 22,233 981 3,088 146 349 852 
BM 22,233 0.54 0.40 0.26 0.44 0.71 
FAgeStd 22,233 0.06 0.14 0.00 0.00 0.00 
BidAskSpr 22,233 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.02 
Info/Noise 22,233 -1.45 0.55 -1.78 -1.41 -1.08 
∆ZScr 22,233 -0.64 6.43 -1.11 -0.05 0.67 
RelFE 22,233 0.65 2.02 0.06 0.16 0.46 
Herd 22,233 0.28 0.30 0.00 0.21 0.50 
ConfInt 22,233 0.26 0.28 0.00 0.00 0.54 
%InvBank 22,233 0.87 0.18 0.75 1.00 1.00 
 
is also statistically significant positive correlation between FDisp and RelFE (a surrogate for 
forecasting difficulty or earnings predictability), meaning that when forecasting task 
complexity is high, analysts’ forecast differ more. Consistent with the prior findings in the 
literature, I also observe negative correlation between FDisp and Herd; see also Hwang and 
Li (2008), Erturk (2006), Scherbina (2008), and Lobo and Tung (2000). This suggests that 
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Table 3.5: Correlation of explanatory variables 
Panel A (B) reports the correlations among the variables for (non-) rated sample. Pearson coefficients are above the diagonal line and 
Spearman coefficients are below the line. Appendix C presents detailed information on how each variable is computed. 
 



























































0.29 -0.24 0.21 0.15 -0.06 0.04 -0.11 0.49 -0.06 0.18 
RV 0.14  -0.36 -0.04 -0.25 0.31 0.10 -0.05 0.36 -0.05 -0.21 
Log(MV) -0.15 -0.26 
 
-0.41 0.31 -0.21 -0.10 0.05 -0.28 0.11 0.12 
BM 0.15 0.07 -0.38 
 
0.01 0.01 0.04 -0.16 0.18 -0.09 0.05 
FAgeStd 0.03 -0.18 0.18 0.02 
 
-0.30 -0.01 -0.01 -0.04 0.10 0.70 
BidAskSpr 0.05 0.24 -0.34 0.14 -0.17 
 
0.03 -0.01 0.03 -0.06 -0.30 
Info/Noise 0.02 0.07 -0.10 0.02 -0.01 0.05  -0.01 0.06 0.03 0.00 
∆Rat -0.11 -0.07 0.04 -0.17 -0.01 -0.02 0.00 
 
-0.14 0.01 -0.03 
RelFE 0.18 0.15 -0.17 0.11 -0.01 0.07 0.02 -0.11 
 
0.00 0.04 
Herd -0.05 -0.01 0.09 -0.10 0.04 -0.06 0.02 0.01 0.00 
 
0.05 
ConfInt 0.04 -0.20 0.17 0.00 0.51 -0.17 0.00 -0.03 0.01 0.00 
  
  




























































0.18 -0.20 0.20 0.16 -0.01 -0.02 -0.12 0.42 -0.08 0.17 
RV 0.12  -0.28 -0.21 -0.31 0.32 0.06 -0.11 0.26 -0.02 -0.29 
Log(MV) -0.11 -0.14 
 
-0.37 0.26 -0.50 -0.09 0.13 -0.25 0.14 0.15 
BM 0.13 -0.14 -0.32 
 
0.13 0.03 0.02 -0.15 0.17 -0.11 0.15 
FAgeStd 0.05 -0.19 0.20 0.13 
 
-0.36 -0.05 0.02 0.00 0.07 0.65 
BidAskSpr 0.04 0.11 -0.55 0.14 -0.20 
 
0.07 -0.10 0.06 -0.09 -0.30 
Info/Noise -0.02 0.02 -0.09 0.01 -0.04 0.08  0.01 0.01 0.03 -0.03 
∆ZScr -0.04 -0.14 0.07 -0.04 0.01 -0.05 0.02 
 
-0.14 0.00 0.03 
RelFE 0.16 0.12 -0.14 0.13 -0.01 0.09 0.01 -0.05 
 
0.00 0.04 
Herd -0.06 0.02 0.10 -0.11 0.01 -0.07 0.04 0.01 0.01 
 
0.03 
ConfInt 0.04 -0.22 0.15 0.14 0.50 -0.22 -0.03 0.04 0.00 -0.02 
  
 
when analysts herd less in their forecasts, it creates larger forecast dispersion. As predicted, 
forecast dispersion is also related to information flow/arrival. In particular, FAgeStd is 
positively correlated with FDisp, suggesting that forecast dispersion is high when large firms 
have low forecast dispersion. Contrary to the prediction, I observe a positive correlation 
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between FDisp and BM, suggesting that growth firms have larger forecast dispersion than 
value firms. This result is however consistent with Doukas et al. (2004). 
 
3.6.2 Empirical model 
The empirical method to examine the determinants of forecast dispersion is by regressing 
forecast dispersion on its determinants discussed in Section 3.5. I split the sample into two 
subsamples – firms with credit rating data and firms without credit rating. For rated firms the 
specification of the baseline model is as follows: 
 
, 1 , 2 , 3 , 4 , 5 ,
6 , 7 , 8 , 9 , ,
Re ( ) /
                 Re                     (1)
i t i t i t i t i t i t
i t i t i t i t i t i t
FDisp sidVar Log M V BM FAgeStd Info Noise
Rat lFE Herd ConfInt
    
      
    
       
 
where ,i t  is the error term, and the subscripts i and t represent respectively firm and time 
when forecast dispersion is measured. To control for time trend and firm characteristics that 
can affect forecast dispersion, I add time t  and firm fixed effects i .
33
 For non-rated firms, 
∆Rat is replaced with the yearly change in Altman’s Z-Score (∆ZScr). Because one lag is 
necessary for computing RelFE, the period considered for the regression analysis of non-rated 
firms is January 1984 through December 2007. For the specification including ∆Rat, the 
sample starts in January 1986 because of data availability.  
When dealing with panel data, there can be strong residual correlation within firms over 
time (time-series dependence) as well as strong residual correlation across firms for a given 
period (cross-sectional dependence). These time-series and cross-sectional residual 
correlations create a bias in ordinary least squares (OLS). To account for these correlations, t-
statistics are calculated with firm- and time-clustered standard errors, using the procedure in 
Cameron, Gelbach, and Miller (2006), Petersen (2009), and Thompson (2009). 
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 Results are qualitatively similar when using industry dummies instead of firm dummies. I tried CRSP four-





Panel A of Table 3.6 presents regression results from estimating equation (1). Column (1) 
reports results for the sample of firms rated by Standard & Poor’s, column (2) is for firms 
without rating, and column (3) reports results for the full sample. As predicted, the coefficient 
of RV is significantly positive in all specifications. This implies that high firm idiosyncratic 
risk leads analysts to issue more dispersed forecast.
34
 A 1% increase in residual variance 
increases forecast dispersion by 0.15% for rated firms and 0.14% for the full sample. As Panel 
B shows, the results are robust to the exclusion of RV from equation (1). The coefficient of 
Log(MV) is also highly significant in all specifications. For example, for rated firms an 
increase in firm’s market value by 2.7 times decreases forecast dispersion by 6.48% - that is 
30% of the average. 
Contrary to the prediction, I obtain statistically significant positive coefficient for the BM 
ratio. This finding suggests that value firms have higher forecast dispersion than growth firms. 
To provide context, the average BM ratio is equal to 0.62 for rated firms, and 0.54 for non-
rated firms. Thus, keeping the book value constant, for rated firms a decrease in firm’s market 
value by 2.6 (=1.62/0.62) times increases the BM ratio by one unit. This in turn increases 
forecast dispersion by about 0.17 that is 77% of average forecast dispersion. Other researchers 
have shown such result; see Ciccone (2001) and Doukas et al. (2004). Because value firms 
often earn high returns, Doukas et al. (2004) conclude that “…value investment strategies 
yield higher returns because value stocks are riskier, in the sense that investor disagreement 
about their future growth in earnings is greater than it is about growth stocks”.  
  
                                                 
34
 Results not reported here remain unchanged when residual variance is replaced by total variance. 
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Table 3.6: Explaining forecast dispersion 
The dependent variable is forecast dispersion (FDisp), defined as the ratio of standard deviation of analyst current fiscal-year annual earnings 
per share forecasts to the absolute value of the average forecast. Stocks with average forecast of zero are excluded. See Appendix C for the 
definitions of explanatory variables. The period considered is January 1984 through December 2007. Numbers in brackets are the t-statistics, 
based on the standard errors clustered by firm and time (*5%, ** 1%). 
 






















RV (+) 0.150* 0.120** 0.138**     
 [2.42] [3.26] [4.68]     
        
Log(MV) (-) -0.0648** -0.0298* -0.0517**  -0.0708** -0.0319* -0.0551** 
 [-2.87] [-2.29] [-5.31]  [-3.13] [-2.52] [-5.35] 
        
BM (-) 0.170** 0.271** 0.215**  0.179** 0.269** 0.218** 
 [2.65] [6.03] [5.71]  [2.79] [6.01] [5.77] 
        
FAgeStd (+) 0.101* 0.106* 0.108**  0.0968* 0.100* 0.0996** 
 [2.19] [2.35] [3.03]  [2.09] [2.24] [2.80] 
        
Info/Noise (-) -0.000942 -0.0161 -0.0136  0.00135 -0.0160 -0.0127 
 [-0.09] [-1.69] [-1.92]  [0.13] [-1.68] [-1.81] 
        
∆Rat/∆ZScr (-) -0.0452** -0.000745 -0.000805  -0.0487** -0.000892 -0.000979 
 [-3.58] [-1.08] [-1.15]  [-3.83] [-1.22] [-1.21] 
        
RelFE (+) 0.0250** 0.0240** 0.0272**  0.0260** 0.0256** 0.0287** 
 [4.00] [6.07] [8.54]  [4.14] [6.45] [8.74] 
        
Herd (-) -0.0658** -0.0819** -0.0735**  -0.0651** -0.0814** -0.0728** 
 [-3.85] [-5.66] [-6.70]  [-3.78] [-5.57] [-6.46] 
        
ConfInt(+) -0.0152 0.00745 0.0101  -0.0151 0.00740 0.00803 
 [-0.29] [0.36] [0.47]  [-0.28] [0.35] [0.36] 
        
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Time FE Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
        
Observations 13,117 22,233 35,350  13,117 22,233 35,350 
Adjusted R-squared 26.2 28.7 25.1  26.0 28.5 24.8 
 
Focusing on rated firms, I further show that firms with rating downgrades (i.e., negative 
∆Rat) have high forecast dispersion. On average, one-notch decrease of credit rating quality 
(e.g., from BB+ to BB) increases forecast dispersion by about 4.5%. To better place the 
magnitude of this estimate, recall that the average forecast dispersion is 22%. Thus, one-notch 
decrease of credit rating increases forecast dispersion by about 20% (~ 4.4/22) of the average. 
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I do not observe any explanatory power for ∆ZScr, the change in Altman’s Z-Score. One 
potential explanation is that this score does not add any piece of new information while credit 
risk analysts incorporate information that goes beyond accounting information. Taken 
together, my findings provide additional support that firm idiosyncratic risk is an important 
component of forecast dispersion; see also Malkiel (1982), Williams (1977), Johnson (2004), 
Qu et al. (2004), Doukas et al. (2004), among others. 
Interestingly, information asymmetry does not have significant impact on forecast 
dispersion. Note that when Info/Noise is used to proxy for the information asymmetry, it has 
differential impact on forecast dispersion for rated versus non-rated firms. For rated firms, the 
coefficient of Info/Noise is insignificant -0.09% and -1.61% for non-rated firms, significant at 
10% level. This differential impact indicates that credit analysts affect the information 
environment of rated firms by issuing credit rating that reflects their assessment on firm’s 
credit quality. Table 3.7 presents the results when BidAskSpr is used to proxy for the 
information asymmetry. I observe no discernible association between information 
asymmetries and forecast dispersion, and the coefficient of BidAskSpr is statistically 
insignificant in all specifications. In sum, it does not seem that information asymmetry 
surrounding a firm is a significant source of forecast dispersion. 
Corroborating previous results in the literature, I find that analyst herding decreases 
forecast dispersion. Consistent with the view that forecasting difficulty leads to higher 
forecast dispersion, my results show that the difficulty of forecasting (proxied by RelFE) 
increases forecast dispersion.
35
 FAgeStd is also highly positively significant implying that  
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 Cohen, Hann, and Ogneva (2007, p.272) state that “prior to the early 1990s, I/B/E/S did not always adjust 
actual earnings to exclude items not forecasted by analysts, thereby creating a mismatch between its actual 
(realized) and forecasted (expected) earnings”. My findings, however, remain unchanged when the sample is 




Table 3.7: Explaining forecast dispersion with bid-ask spread 
The dependent variable is forecast dispersion (FDisp), defined as the ratio of standard deviation of analyst current fiscal-year annual earnings 
per share forecasts to the absolute value of the average forecast. Stocks with average forecast of zero are excluded. See Appendix C for the 
definitions of explanatory variables. The period considered is January 1984 through December 2007. Numbers in brackets are the t-statistics, 
based on the standard errors clustered by firm and time (*5%, ** 1%). 
 
























RV (+) 0.151* 0.120** 0.137**     
 [2.42] [3.26] [4.67]     
        
Log(MV) (-) -0.0663** -0.0264 -0.0512**  -0.0718** -0.0286* -0.0546** 
 [-3.04] [-1.94] [-5.10]  [-3.28] [-2.14] [-5.18] 
        
BM (-) 0.172** 0.271** 0.216**  0.180** 0.268** 0.218** 
 [2.63] [6.06] [5.71]  [2.75] [6.05] [5.78] 
        
FAgeStd (+) 0.100* 0.107* 0.108**  0.0964* 0.101* 0.0998** 
 [2.18] [2.37] [3.07]  [2.09] [2.26] [2.82] 
        
BidAskSpr (+) -0.608 0.497 0.0269  -0.376 0.477 0.0294 
 [-0.43] [0.84] [0.06]  [-0.27] [0.78] [0.06] 
        
∆Rat/∆ZScr (-) -0.0452** -0.000764 -0.000834  -0.0487** -0.000911 -0.00101 
 [-3.58] [-1.11] [-1.21]  [-3.83] [-1.26] [-1.26] 
        
RelFE (+) 0.0250** 0.0239** 0.0272**  0.0260** 0.0255** 0.0287** 
 [4.01] [5.99] [8.51]  [4.15] [6.36] [8.70] 
        
Herd (-) -0.0658** -0.0833** -0.0745**  -0.0650** -0.0827** -0.0738** 
 [-3.84] [-5.79] [-6.79]  [-3.76] [-5.69] [-6.54] 
        
ConfInt(+) -0.0158 0.00746 0.00960  -0.0155 0.00739 0.00760 
 [-0.30] [0.37] [0.44]  [-0.29] [0.36] [0.34] 
        
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Time FE Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
        
Observations 13,117 22,233 35,350  13,117 22,233 35,350 
Adjusted R-squared 26.2 28.7 25.1  26.0 28.4 24.8 
 
forecasts issued at different points in time are more dispersed, due to differences of 
information reflected in them. Mozes (2003) and Dunn and Nathan (1998) also show that 
when analysts revise their forecasts at different speed, forecast dispersion increases. The 
coefficient of ConfInt is insignificantly different from zero suggesting that the presence of 
investment banking analysts does not affect forecast dispersion. However, as shown in 
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Table3.8, analysts’ conflict of interest is only present during periods of bad news, proxied by 
stock return’s decreases. It is the asymmetry of analysts’ behavior (conflicted vs. non-
conflicted) with respect to bad news that contributes to the increase in forecast dispersion. 
 
Results for loser vs. winner firms 
Avramov et al. (2009) show that dispersion strategy concentrates among worst rated firms 
and is significant only during periods of deteriorating credit conditions. Hwang and Li (2008), 
Erturk (2006), hypothesize that the effect of analyst conflicts of interest on forecast dispersion 
is stronger for loss firms than for profit firms. Here, I test whether analyst conflicts of interest 
has differential impact for profit vs. loss firms, using the following extended model: 
 
 
, 1 , 2 , 3 , 4 ,
5 , 6 , 7 , 8 ,
9 , 10 ,R e 0 R e
R e ( )
                /  R e               (2)
                1 1
t
i t i t i t i t i t
i t i t i t i t
i t i tPast t Past
FD isp sidVar Log M V BM FAgeStd
Info N oise C hgRat lFE H erd
C onfInt C onfInt
   
   
 

   
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  

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The main interest is on 9 and 10 . The results presented in Table 3.8 confirm that 
following stock return plunges, analyst conflicts of interest increases forecast dispersion in all 
specifications. This result brings additional support to the hypothesis that when firm’s past 
stock performance is poor, the conflicted analysts are sluggish in revising their forecasts 
downward while the non-conflicted analysts are not; see Hwang and Li (2008), Erturk (2006), 
Lobo and Tung (2000), Han and Manry (2000), Brown (2001), among others. Chan et al. 
(1996) also show that analysts are in general slow in responding to bad news, and that stocks 
experiencing low past returns are associated with downward revisions in analyst estimates.  
In terms of economic magnitude, 1% increase in ConfInt increases forecast dispersion by 




Table 3.8: Explaining forecast dispersion for loser vs. winner firms 
The dependent variable is forecast dispersion (FDisp), defined as the ratio of standard deviation of analyst current fiscal-year annual earnings 
per share forecasts to the absolute value of the average forecast. Stocks with average forecast of zero are excluded. See Appendix C for the 
definitions of explanatory variables. The period considered is January 1984 through December 2007. Numbers in brackets are the t-statistics, 
based on the standard errors clustered by firm and time (*5%, ** 1%). 
 






















RV (+) 0.149* 0.117** 0.136**     
 [2.40] [3.19] [4.61]     
        
Log(MV) (-) -0.0623** -0.0280* -0.0492**  -0.0682** -0.0299* -0.0524** 
 [-2.74] [-2.20] [-5.03]  [-2.99] [-2.42] [-5.07] 
        
BM (-) 0.162** 0.257** 0.203**  0.170** 0.254** 0.205** 
 [2.59] [5.82] [5.67]  [2.73] [5.78] [5.73] 
        
FAgeStd (+) 0.103* 0.106* 0.108**  0.0988* 0.101* 0.101** 
 [2.24] [2.40] [3.17]  [2.14] [2.29] [2.93] 
        
Info/Noise (-) -0.000933 -0.0159 -0.0133  0.00135 -0.0158 -0.0124 
 [-0.09] [-1.66] [-1.89]  [0.14] [-1.66] [-1.78] 
        
∆Rat/∆ZScr (-) -0.0441** -0.000587 -0.000609  -0.0475** -0.000719 -0.000772 
 [-3.53] [-0.87] [-0.87]  [-3.78] [-1.00] [-0.96] 
        
RelFE (+) 0.0250** 0.0239** 0.0271**  0.0259** 0.0254** 0.0285** 
 [4.00] [6.07] [8.56]  [4.13] [6.44] [8.74] 
        
Herd (-) -0.0623** -0.0790** -0.0696**  -0.0615** -0.0782** -0.0688** 
 [-3.84] [-5.55] [-6.71]  [-3.75] [-5.47] [-6.46] 
        




-0.0477 -0.0368 -0.0314 
 
-0.0482 -0.0400 -0.0353 
 [-0.95] [-1.41] [-1.29]  [-0.96] [-1.51] [-1.42] 
        




0.0222 0.0650** 0.0706** 
 
0.0230 0.0690** 0.0711** 
 [0.35] [2.65] [2.63]  [0.36] [2.79] [2.60] 
        
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Time FE Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
        
Observations 13,117 22,233 35,350  13,117 22,233 35,350 
Adjusted R-squared 26.2 28.8 25.2  26.1 28.6 24.9 
 
 
impact of analyst conflicts during rating upgrades. One explanation that conflicts only matter 
for financially distressed firms is because financial analysts at investment banks do not revise 
their earnings forecasts (or do so only partially or with a delay) after credit analysts issue their 
rating change. Credit analysts in rating agencies do not face the same incentives as analyst in 
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investment banks. Therefore, credit analyst opinion is a more accurate proxy of the quality of 
firm. This may explain the finding of Avramov et al. (2009) that the dispersion effect 
becomes insignificant after controlling for credit rating. 
 
3.7 Conclusion  
This chapter examines the determinants of one of the most commonly used measures 
of analyst disagreement - the earnings forecast dispersion. Regression analysis shows that 
forecast dispersion is a complex concept and that it simultaneously contains information about 
firm-specific risk, firm past performance, analysts’ differing information set, forecasting 
difficulty, and analyst herding. In addition, I observe that analyst conflicts of interest matters 
for loser firms and has no significant impact on forecast dispersion for winner firms. One 
explanation is that financial analysts at investment banks do not revise their earnings forecasts 
(or do so only partially or with a delay) after bad news about a firm. Overall, the results 
suggest that caution should be employed when using forecast dispersion as a measure of only 
firm riskiness or forecasting difficulty, or the like. These results are important not only to 
understand what causes analyst disagreement but also, as I will show in Chapter 4, to further 




Chapter 4: Does Forecast Dispersion Matter for Stock Returns? 
 
In this chapter, I investigate whether the dispersion anomaly is existent after 
controlling for the determinants of forecast dispersion. The ability of determinants to explain 
the dispersion anomaly would indicate the lack of direct relationship between forecast 
dispersion and stock returns, while the inability would strengthen the uniqueness of dispersion 
anomaly. 
4.1 Introduction 
Most previous tests trying to explain the forecast dispersion anomaly use portfolio 
sorts. My aim in this chapter is to present additional tests that avoid some of the problems of 
earlier studies. Roll (1977) and Lo and MacKinlay (1990) criticize the use of portfolios and 
suggest using individual stocks in tests of asset pricing models. Roll (1977) argues that the 
portfolio formation process, by concealing possibly return relevant stock characteristics 
within portfolio averages, will make it difficult to reject the null hypothesis of no effect on 
returns. Lo and MacKinlay (1990) make an opposite point, that if the researcher forms 
portfolios based on characteristics that prior research has shown to be relevant for expected 
returns, he will be inclined to reject the null hypothesis too often due to a "data-snooping 
bias." Although both critics seem at odds, they are complementary rather than competing; 
portfolio formation may both make some return-irrelevant characteristics appear significant, 
and disguise the empirical relevance of other return-relevant characteristics.  
This chapter assesses whether incorporating determinants of forecast dispersion as 
conditioning information in asset-pricing models helps capture the impact of the dispersion 
effect on raw and risk-adjusted returns of individual stocks. In other words, I study whether 
forecast dispersion is priced in a cross-sectional analysis based on stocks (and not portfolios) 
after accounting for the effect of APT-type factors and determinants of forecast dispersion. Lo 
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and MacKinlay (1990) argue that portfolio formation procedures based on some empirically 
motivated characteristic can lead to the spurious conclusion that that characteristic has a 
significant effect on returns. Following Avramov and Chordia (2006), stock level beta is 
allowed to vary with firm’s market value of equity and book-to-market ratio as well as with 
macroeconomic variables. Although none of the models examined fully capture the forecast 
dispersion effect, it becomes less important in the conditional models and is no longer 
significant for the sample of rated firms. Furthermore, consistent with Avramov and Chordia 
(2006), I show that the conditional models capture the momentum effect. 
 
4.2 Methodology 
I evaluate the influence of forecast dispersion on stock returns using the conditional 
multi-factor model developed by Brennan, Chordia, and Subrahmanyam (1998). I follow 
Avramov and Chordia (2006) and first run regressions of excess stock return on asset pricing 
factors with loadings that vary in cross-section and over time with firm’s market value of 
equity and the book-to-market ratio, as well as with macroeconomic variables. I then run 
cross-sectional regressions of risk-adjusted returns, rather than gross returns, as dependent 
variables on the firm characteristics including firm’s market value of equity, residual 
variance, book-to-market ratio, momentum, and forecast dispersion (the main variable of 
interest). Under the null hypothesis of exact pricing, all these characteristics should be 
insignificant. The use of risk-adjusted returns in asset pricing tests intends to address the 
error-in-variables bias in estimating the cross-section regression coefficients in finite samples. 
 Brennan et al. (1998) propose the following K-factors model that generates stock 
returns: 




i t t i t i k t k t t k t i t
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
   
  , 
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where ,i tR is the realized return for stock i  at time t , and ,k tf  is the return on the 'k th  risk-
factor mimicking portfolio at time t , , , -1i k t  is the conditional beta corresponding to the 'k th
factor, 1tE   is the conditional expectations operator, and  1 , ,| 0t i t k tE f  . The factor model 
expresses the unanticipated factor return,  , 1 ,k t t k tf E f , as a  linear regression on the 
unanticipated part of the factors. The exact or equilibrium version of the APT implies that 
expected returns can be written as:
36
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where ,f tR
 
is the return on the riskless asset at time t . From the above two equations, we can 
now write realized returns as: 
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and risk-adjusted returns as: 
*
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  is the estimated conditional beta from the first-pass time-series regression over 
the entire period. The null hypothesis is whether forecast dispersion has incremental 
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Firm characteristics are divided into two groups. The control variables in the first 
group are firm’s residual variance, change in Z-Score, market value, book-to-market ratio, 
turnover, and momentum that are known to be related with expected stock returns. In the 
second group, I have forecast dispersion that is the main variable interest. I run the estimation 




can predict stock returns over their role as linear instruments for the betas. 
I follow Avramov and Chordia (2006) and consider the following asset pricing 
models: (1) CAPM, (2) Fama and French (1993) three factor model, (3) Fama and French 
model augmented by the Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) momentum factor, and (4) Fama and 
French model augmented by the Pastor and Stambaugh (2003) liquidity factor.
37
 Time varying 
beta is a linear function of market value, book-to-market ratio, and a macroeconomic variable: 
, 1 ,0 ,1 1 ,2 ,3 1 , 1 ,4 ,5 1 , 1
( ) ( ) ,
i t i i t i i t i t i i t i t
z z M V z BM      
     
       
where 1tz is the corporate spread as an indicator of the state of the economy, measured as 
the differential between BAA and AAA rated corporate bond yields from Moody’s.  
 
4.3 Data 
4.3.1 Sample selection 
My sample merges several datasets of U.S. firms spanning January 1983 to December 
2007. To address concerns that the U.S. Summary History file makes use of analysts’ 
forecasts that are no longer current, I calculate the month-end averages and standard 
deviations from the individual earning forecasts in the unadjusted Detail History file; see 
Diether et al. (2002), Payne and Thomas (2003), and Baber and Kang (2002). Forecast 
                                                 
37
 I use the Pastor-Stambaugh value-weighted liquidity traded factor that is long in high sensitivity to liquidity 
stocks and short in low sensitivity to liquidity stocks. 
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dispersion, FDisp, is the standard deviation of annual earnings forecasts scaled by the 
absolute value of the average earnings forecast (with zero average-earnings forecast 
observations excluded). Stocks followed by fewer than two analysts are excluded. 
Stock returns for U.S. common stocks are from CRSP monthly stock file. I select 
ordinary common shares (share codes 10 and 11) traded in NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ, 
and remove financial institutions. To be included in the sample, the stock must have at least 
36 months return data. Observations on firm characteristics such as firm’s market value and 
B/M ratio lagged two months must be also available. I use the CRSP value-weighted returns 
to proxy for market returns. 
Firm accounting data is from the Compustat Industrial Annual file. To mitigate the 
problem of extreme values, all variables for regression analysis are winsorized at 0.5% and 
99.5% levels. Observations with negative book value, market value, and total assets are 
eliminated. To ensure that the accounting variables are known before the returns they are used 
to explain, as in Fama and French (1992), minimum 6-month gap between fiscal year-end and 
the return date is required. In other words, the value of book-to-market ratio for July of year t 
to June of year t + 1 is computed using accounting data as of the end of year t-1. For the risk-
adjustment, the control variables are market value, book-to-market ratio, turnover, and past 
cumulative returns. Variables are defined in Appendix D. 
 
4.3.2 Sample characteristics 
The total number of different firms in my sample is 5,257 with 562,129 valid forecast 
dispersion data. Table 4.1 presents the time-series averages of the cross-sectional averages 
and standard deviations of firm characteristics. Firms on average (median) have USD 2.17 




Table 4.1: Sample characteristics 
The table reports the time-series averages of the cross-sectional summary statistics for 5,257 distinct firms having forecast dispersion data. 
Each month firm characteristics are averaged first over the stocks and then over the sample period. Excess return is the firm excess return 
over 1-month Treasury bill rate. FDisp is the ratio of standard deviation of analyst current fiscal-year annual earnings per share forecasts to 
the absolute value of the average forecast (with zero-average forecast observations excluded). ResidDisp and ExplainDisp are the residual 
and explanatory part of FDisp. RV is the residual variance and ∆ZScr is the change in Altman’s Z-Score. MV is the market value in billions 
of dollars and BM is the book-to-market ratio. NYTurn (NDTurn) is turnover of NYSE-AMEX (NASDAQ) stocks. Ret2-3, Ret4-6, and Ret7-
12 are the cumulative returns over the second through third, fourth through sixth, and seventh through twelfth months before the current 
month, respectively. The period considered is January 1983 through December 2007. 
 
Characteristics Avg Std 25% Median 75% 
Excess return (%) 0.87 12.72 -6.07 0.25 6.96 
FDisp 0.25 0.72 0.03 0.07 0.19 
ResidDisp 0.35 0.52 0.17 0.26 0.37 
ExplainDisp 0.18 0.11 0.10 0.17 0.25 
RV 0.41 0.39 0.15 0.29 0.53 
∆ZScr -0.41 4.91 -0.79 -0.02 0.55 
MV (in billions) 2.17 6.42 0.16 0.44 1.37 
BM 0.63 0.57 0.27 0.48 0.81 
Turn(%) 12.80 12.85 4.98 8.66 15.68 
NYTurn(%) 4.70 7.35 0.03 1.02 7.10 
NDTurn(%) 8.10 13.48 0.00 1.85 11.23 
Ret2-3(%) 2.70 16.97 -7.41 1.75 11.50 
Ret4-6 (%) 4.40 21.12 -8.39 2.85 15.03 
Ret7-12 (%) 9.70 32.58 -10.18 5.93 24.16 
 
value is highly skewed, therefore in the regression analysis I employ the logarithm transform 
of MV. Excess return is firm’s raw return less 1-month Treasury bill rate. The average 
monthly turnover for NYSE-AMEX (NASDAQ) firms is 4.7% (8.1%). The average (median) 
book-to-market ratio of all stocks is 0.63 (0.48); this is lower than the statistics in Avramov 
and Chordia (2006) indicating that my sample is tilted toward growth firms with high market 
value due to the requirement of analyst following. 
 
4.4 Results 
I empirically asses the relationship between forecast dispersion and future stock 
returns in a time-varying beta framework for individual firms. I estimate the asset pricing 
models at monthly frequency. Following Brennan et al. (1998), firm characteristics are 
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deviations from the cross-sectional averages and are lagged two months with respect to the 
excess returns or the risk-adjusted returns that are the dependent variables in the regressions. 
This is to ensure any spurious association between the prior month return and the current 
month return caused by thin trading or bid-ask spread effects. To minimize the problem of 
bid-ask bounce, I follow Jegadeesh and Titman (2001) and exclude stocks priced at less than 
USD 5 lagged two months. A significant coefficient indicates that the firm characteristic 
under consideration is related to the cross-section of individual risk-adjusted return.  
 
4.4.1 Excess returns 
To begin with, Panel A of Table 4.2 presents the Fama-MacBeth coefficient estimates 
for the cross-sectional regressions of risk-unadjusted excess returns on forecast dispersion. 
FDisp is strongly significant for all specification except for rated firms. This result is in 
contrast with Avramov et al. (2009) who show statistically significant negative dispersion-
return association for rated firms. I further examine whether FDisp stays significant after 
accounting for firm characteristics that are best known to be associated with stock returns. 
FDisp remains significant after the control variables. This is consistent with my previous 
results and prior literature. Lagged returns are predominantly statistically significant, 
confirming earlier findings of Avramov and Chordia (2006) and Brennan et al. (1998).  
 
4.4.2 Risk-adjusted returns 
Here, I examine whether the relationship between FDisp and stock returns remains 
significant after Brennan et al. (1998)’s risk-adjustment. Panel B of Table 4.2 presents the 
Fama-MacBeth coefficient estimates for the cross-sectional regressions with risk-adjusted 
excess returns as dependent variables. The main interest is in the coefficient of FDisp and it is 
highly significant at 1% level for all risk-adjusted returns. This indicates that risk-adjustment   
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Table 4.2: Results for forecast dispersion 
Coefficient estimates are time-series averages of cross-sectional OLS regressions. The dependent variable in the first column is the excess return. In the second, third, fourth, and fifth columns it is the risk-adjusted 
excess return with respect to CAPM,  Fama and French (1993) three factor model, Fama and French model augmented by the Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) momentum factor, and Fama and French model augmented by 
the Pastor and Stambaugh (2003) liquidity factor, respectively. FDisp is the ratio of standard deviation of analyst current fiscal-year annual earnings per share forecasts to the absolute value of the average forecast (with 
zero-average forecast observations excluded). RV is the residual variance and ∆ZScr is the change in Altman’s Z-Score. MV is the market value in billions of dollars and BM is the book-to-market ratio. NYTurn 
(NDTurn) is turnover of NYSE-AMEX (NASDAQ) stocks. Ret2-3, Ret4-6, and Ret7-12 are the cumulative returns over the second through third, fourth through sixth, and seventh through twelfth months before the 
current month, respectively. NDDum is a dummy variable for NASDAQ stocks and equals 1 is the stock is traded in NASDAQ and 0 otherwise. The variables are the deviations from their cross-sectional averages in 
each month and lagged two months with respect to the current month. Stocks priced at less than $5 lagged two months are excluded. is the time-series averages of the monthly adjusted . t-statistics are in 
brackets (*5%, **1%). All coefficients are multiplied by 100. The period considered is January 1983 through December 2007. 
 
 
                          Panel A: Excess return Panel B: Risk-adjusted return                Panel C: Risk-adjusted return (time-varying) 
 
Rated Non-Rated All All  CAPM FF3 FF3+MOM FF3+LIQ  CAPM FF3 FF3+MOM FF3+LIQ 
FDisp 0.315 -0.197** -0.197** -0.103*  -0.143** -0.143** -0.126** -0.133**  -0.367** -0.141 -0.319* -0.196 
 
[0.52] [-2.63] [-3.05] [-2.15]  [-3.11] [-3.56] [-3.36] [-3.57]  [-4.00] [-1.37] [-2.38] [-1.39] 
RV    -0.163  -0.602** -0.391* -0.293 -0.392**  1.193** 2.045** 0.364 1.653** 
 
   [-0.61]  [-2.95] [-2.45] [-1.88] [-2.66]  [2.80] [4.45] [0.66] [3.76] 
∆ZScr    -0.0000396  0.00272 0.00131 0.0000194 0.000312  -0.00114 0.000477 -0.00534 0.0370 
 
   [-0.01]  [0.38] [0.22] [0.00] [0.06]  [-0.06] [0.02] [-0.23] [1.51] 
Log(MV)    -0.0267  -0.0141 0.0182 0.0347 0.0227  -0.156** -0.701** -0.351** -0.682** 
 
   [-0.69]  [-0.38] [0.96] [1.96] [1.26]  [-3.69] [-16.34] [-6.77] [-12.22] 
BM    0.0476  0.0780 -0.212** -0.174** -0.298**  -0.244 -0.619** -0.329* -1.342** 
 
   [0.45]  [0.85] [-3.55] [-3.11] [-5.21]  [-1.48] [-4.07] [-1.97] [-7.93] 
NYTurn    -2.258**  -2.739** -1.602** -1.174* -1.378**  1.005 1.129 2.010 -0.854 
 
   [-2.96]  [-4.18] [-2.87] [-2.24] [-2.61]  [1.06] [1.15] [1.83] [-0.86] 
NDTurn    -1.857**  -2.150** -1.032* -0.852* -0.918*  -5.631** -7.109** -3.662** -3.934* 
 
   [-3.13]  [-4.37] [-2.58] [-2.29] [-2.52]  [-7.53] [-7.43] [-3.02] [-2.45] 
Ret2-3    0.633  0.783** 0.739** 0.726** 0.766**  -0.0993 0.511 1.095 0.868 
 
   [1.89]  [2.61] [2.62] [2.83] [2.85]  [-0.15] [0.67] [1.45] [1.11] 
Ret4-6    1.428**  1.448** 1.250** 1.123** 1.174**  1.020 1.130 1.656* 1.079 
 
   [5.54]  [5.94] [5.87] [5.96] [5.87]  [1.74] [1.68] [2.54] [1.52] 
Ret7-12    0.616**  0.633** 0.559** 0.461** 0.518**  0.466 0.793 1.056* 0.817 
 
   [3.85]  [4.23] [4.15] [3.81] [4.21]  [1.03] [1.59] [2.16] [1.52] 
NDDum    0.150  0.148 0.277** 0.222** 0.269**  -1.625** -1.537** -0.794** -0.733** 
 
   [1.43]  [1.45] [4.13] [3.54] [4.34]  [-11.61] [-13.40] [-6.20] [-5.27] 
Constant 0.837* 0.746* 0.715* 0.632  -0.102 -0.163* -0.0437 -0.145*  0.118 1.139** 0.673** 1.108** 
 
[2.52] [2.14] [2.29] [1.95]  [-0.70] [-2.55] [-0.80] [-2.39]  [0.74] [9.81] [5.55] [8.72] 
Observations 173,449 332,836 506,285 443,113  443,113 443113 443,113 443,113  443,113 443,113 443,113 443,113 
2
R  (%) 4.11 0.35 0.34 7.28 
 
5.79 3.59 3.31 3.43 
 








by none of the considered factor models is able to capture the negative relationship between 
forecast dispersion and stock returns. Leippold and Lohre (2009) show that dispersion effect 
concentrates in a 3-year window from 2000 to 2003, after the burst of so-called “dotcom 
bubble” when most uncertainty about high dispersion stock is resolved. This finding supports 
Miller (1977) view that high forecast-dispersion stock prices reflect the valuation of optimists 
in the presence of high short-sale costs. As a result, forecast dispersion effect could be traced 
to either time-varying risk premia or time-varying asset pricing misspecification, or both. 
Thus, the forecast dispersion profitability could vary with business cycle. I modify the first 
pass regression to account for time-varying alpha that includes a vector of business cycle 
variable consisting of corporate spread, term spread and the 3-month Treasure bill yield.  
          Panel C of Table 4.2 shows that forecast dispersion remains highly correlated with 
time-varying risk-adjusted returns. This indicates that even when alpha varies with 
macroeconomic variables, the impact of forecast dispersion on cross-section of expected 
returns unrelated to business cycle variable is still highly significant. However, forecast 
dispersion becomes statistically insignificant for FF3 and FF3+LIQ time-varying 
specification, suggesting that forecast dispersion strategy is related to liquidity. This supports 
the finding of Sadka and Scherbina (2007) that stocks with high forecast dispersion have also 
high transaction costs, therefore preventing investors to exploit the dispersion strategy that has 
persisted through the years. ∆ZScr is not significant in any specification suggesting that the 
discreteness of ∆ZScr creates major impediment in predicting probability of default. Because 
financial ratios that are necessary to compute the Z-Score are available annually, the default 
probability of a firm is unchanged for twelve months. It is also noteworthy that some of the 
coefficients and constant terms in Panel C are different in magnitude from Panel B; see also 
Avramov and Chordia (2006, footnote 16) for a similar outcome. Interestingly, the 
relationship between stock returns and residual variance becomes positive when alpha varies 
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with business cycle; see Ang et al. (2006). Note also that lagged return variables are 
insignificant in almost all specifications suggesting that macroeconomic variables eliminate 
momentum profitability. 
 
4.4.3 Residual and explained dispersion 
The inability of the well-known risk-based asset pricing models to explain forecast 
dispersion effect suggests that forecast dispersion does not only proxy for firm’s riskiness. 
Next, I examine whether variables that explain forecast dispersion can capture the negative 
dispersion-return relationship, by decomposing FDisp into its two components - residual 
dispersion and explained dispersion. Explained dispersion (ExplainDisp) is the explanatory 
part of forecast dispersion from equation (1) as discussed in Chapter 3, and the residual 
dispersion (ResidDisp) is the difference between forecast dispersion and the explained 
dispersion.
38
 Table 4.3 shows that while ResidDisp remains strongly negatively correlated 
with both excess return and risk-adjusted returns in most specifications, ExplainDisp does not 
predict stock returns. In addition, when alpha varies with macroeconomic variables, the 
impact of ResidDisp is reduced, indicating that the dispersion strategy returns varies with 
business cycle.  
The asset-pricing framework above uses single stocks in cross-sectional tests that 
allow risk and expected return to vary with conditioning information. Next, I construct 
portfolios based on ResidDisp, in order to draw conclusions about average returns for 
different classes of stocks. Each month, stocks are equally assigned to one of quintiles based 
on their market value of the previous month. Quintile 1 includes the smallest stocks and 
quintile 5 includes the largest stocks. Stocks in each size quintile are further ranked into five 
dispersion quintiles based on the ResidDisp of previous month. The purpose of this two-way 
                                                 
38
 Results are similar when ResidDisp is defined using equation (2) of Chapter 3. 
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sorting is to hold one anomaly variable constant and to investigate the impact of the other. For 
the full sample this classification results in 25 portfolios that contain an average of 57 stocks. 
Monthly portfolio return are calculated as the equal-weighted and value-weighted returns of  
all the stocks in a portfolio. Stocks are held for one month. Consistent with regression results, 
Table 4.4 shows strong negative relationship between ResidDisp and stock returns. 
Focusing on equal-weighted portfolios, I show that for all sample firms (non-rated 
firms) the average monthly return differential between low- and high-dispersion, the D1- D5  
portfolios, is 0.34% (0.28%) with t-stat of 2.47 (2.27). Although for all firms the model 
explaining forecast dispersion reduces the dispersion effect (for comparison see Panel A of 
Table 2.3), the two-way sort still produces a strong negative relation between stock returns 
and residual dispersion. Note that for rated firms residual dispersion eliminates the dispersion 
strategy across all size groups. For comparison, the dispersion strategy for the same sample of 
rated firms yields average monthly return of 0.67% with a t-stat of 2.38 for the smallest size 
group only, not reported here. Taken together, although factors that explain forecast 
dispersion are able to reduce the dispersion profitability, the overall evidence indicates the 





Table 4.3: Results for residual and explained dispersion 
Coefficient estimates are time-series averages of cross-sectional OLS regressions. The dependent variable in the first column is the excess return. In the second, third, fourth, and fifth columns it is the risk-adjusted 
excess return with respect to CAPM,  Fama and French (1993) three factor model, Fama and French model augmented by the Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) momentum factor, and Fama and French model augmented 
by the Pastor and Stambaugh (2003) liquidity factor, respectively. ResidDisp and ExplainDisp are the residual and explanatory part of FDisp. RV is the residual variance and ∆ZScr is the change in Altman’s Z-Score. 
MV is the market value in billions of dollars and BM is the book-to-market ratio. NYTurn (NDTurn) is turnover of NYSE-AMEX (NASDAQ) stocks. Ret2-3, Ret4-6, and Ret7-12 are the cumulative returns over the 
second through third, fourth through sixth, and seventh through twelfth months before the current month, respectively. NDDum is a dummy variable for NASDAQ stocks and equals 1 if stock is traded in NASDAQ and 
0 otherwise. The variables are the deviations from their cross-sectional averages in each month and lagged two months with respect to the current month. Stocks priced at less than $5 lagged two months are excluded. 
2
R is the time-series averages of monthly 
2
R . The t-statistics are in brackets (*5%, **1%). All coefficients are multiplied by 100. The period considered is January 1984 through December 2007. 
 
 
                          Panel A: Excess return Panel B: Risk-adjusted return                Panel C: Risk-adjusted return (time-varying) 
 
Rated Non-Rated All All  CAPM FF3 FF3+MOM FF3+LIQ  CAPM FF3 FF3+MOM FF3+LIQ 
ResidDisp -0.0829 -0.246* -0.214* -0.108  -0.160* -0.152** -0.137** -0.153**  -0.407** -0.0814 -0.335* 0.0297 
 
[-0.84] [-2.25] [-2.52] [-1.61]  [-2.46] [-2.66] [-2.60] [-2.88]  [-3.70] [-0.64] [-2.04] [0.18] 
ExplainDisp 0.241 0.928 0.547 -0.325  -0.404 -0.0973 -0.0752 -0.0640  -1.474* -0.427 0.346 -0.982 
 
[0.47] [1.82] [1.11] [-0.93]  [-1.24] [-0.32] [-0.26] [-0.22]  [-2.42] [-0.56] [0.37] [-1.04] 
RV    -0.256  -0.669** -0.297 -0.184 -0.234  0.919* 2.016** 1.296* 1.489** 
 
   [-0.82]  [-2.73] [-1.53] [-0.97] [-1.32]  [2.04] [4.10] [2.22] [2.78] 
∆ZScr    -0.00115  0.00403 0.00351 -0.0000184 0.00157  -0.00961 -0.00354 0.0136 0.0234 
 
   [-0.15]  [0.53] [0.52] [-0.00] [0.24]  [-0.46] [-0.14] [0.58] [1.01] 
Log(MV)    0.0340  0.0421 0.0509* 0.0586* 0.0520*  -0.0504 -0.661** -0.479** -0.681** 
 
   [0.77]  [1.03] [2.04] [2.47] [2.19]  [-1.00] [-10.34] [-6.48] [-9.52] 
BM    0.0256  0.0746 -0.189** -0.163* -0.266**  -0.165 -0.406* -0.444** -0.952** 
 
   [0.24]  [0.76] [-2.64] [-2.45] [-3.85]  [-0.95] [-2.48] [-2.82] [-5.11] 
NYTurn    -1.838*  -2.374** -1.468* -0.992 -1.259*  1.767 0.868 1.066 -0.235 
 
   [-2.43]  [-3.65] [-2.53] [-1.80] [-2.29]  [1.95] [0.91] [1.08] [-0.22] 
NDTurn    -1.202*  -1.579** -0.801* -0.581 -0.786*  -5.288** -7.310** -5.446** -6.045** 
 
   [-2.09]  [-3.25] [-1.97] [-1.49] [-2.06]  [-6.73] [-8.48] [-5.39] [-5.85] 
Ret2-3    0.406  0.621 0.740* 0.691* 0.756**  0.154 0.633 1.194 0.805 
 
   [1.12]  [1.88] [2.40] [2.44] [2.60]  [0.22] [0.79] [1.48] [0.98] 
Ret4-6    1.408**  1.523** 1.360** 1.220** 1.296**  1.349* 1.399* 1.868** 1.358* 
 
   [4.87]  [5.69] [5.73] [5.80] [5.73]  [2.28] [2.06] [2.88] [1.98] 
Ret7-12    0.712**  0.714** 0.627** 0.526** 0.603**  0.413 0.786 0.976 0.922 
 
   [4.07]  [4.30] [4.13] [3.82] [4.28]  [0.86] [1.46] [1.88] [1.73] 
NDDum    0.204  0.207 0.322** 0.260** 0.306**  -1.742** -1.610** -1.108** -0.961** 
 
   [1.87]  [1.96] [4.61] [3.97] [4.70]  [-11.58] [-13.02] [-7.97] [-6.84] 
Constant 0.666* 0.761* 0.721* 0.612  -0.144 -0.177* -0.0436 -0.152*  0.0687 1.079** 0.938** 1.122** 
 
[2.28] [2.24] [2.36] [1.82]  [-0.93] [-2.57] [-0.72] [-2.33]  [0.40] [8.27] [6.96] [7.81] 
Observations 147,477 236,783 384,260 374,629  374,629 374,629 374,629 374,629  374,629 374,629 374,629 374,629 
2
R  (%) 1.63 0.88 0.98 7.89  6.41 4.09 3.76 3.91 
 




Table 4.4: Dispersion anomaly for residual dispersion 
Using in-sample breakpoints each month stocks are equally sorted in five groups based on the level of market value of the previous month 
end. Stocks in each size group are then equally sorted into five additional groups based on the residual dispersion (ResidDisp) of the previous 
month. Stocks with an average forecast of zero are assigned to the highest dispersion group, and stocks with a price less than or equal 5 
dollars are excluded from the sample. Stocks are held for one month. The table reports average monthly equal-weighted returns. In brackets 
are the t-statistics, adjusted for one lag autocorrelation, (*5%, **1%). The period considered is January 1984 through December 2007. 
 






Small    Large 
S1-S5 t(S1-S5) 
S1 S2 S3 S4 S5 
All stocks 1.08 0.93 1.11 1.16 1.10 1.12 -0.18 [-0.87] 
D1 1.23 1.27 1.26 1.30 1.21 1.06 0.21 [0.79] 
D2 1.18 1.11 1.14 1.17 1.07 1.17 -0.06 [-0.26] 
D3 1.04 0.99 1.12 1.16 1.01 1.09 -0.10 [-0.49] 
D4 1.07 0.88 1.05 1.24 1.18 1.11 -0.23 [-0.88] 
D5 0.90 0.43 0.97 0.97 1.03 1.16 -0.73     [-2.75]** 
D1-D5 0.34 0.84 0.29 0.33 0.18 -0.10   
t(D1-D5) [2.47]* [4.61]** [1.57] [1.60] [0.86] [-0.50]   






Small    Large 
S1-S5 t(S1-S5) 
S1 S2 S3 S4 S5 
All stocks 1.09 0.94 1.07 1.21 1.14 1.10 -0.16 [-0.70] 
D1 1.17 1.04 1.20 1.20 1.21 0.90 0.14 [0.46] 
D2 1.20 1.21 1.10 1.21 1.37 1.05 0.15 [0.60] 
D3 1.06 0.96 1.27 1.20 0.89 1.19 -0.23 [-0.82] 
D4 1.15 1.06 1.17 1.35 1.18 1.12 -0.06 [-0.20] 
D5 0.89 0.46 0.62 1.08 1.05 1.24 -0.78   [-2.24]* 
D1-D5 0.28 0.58 0.57 0.12 0.16 -0.34   
t(D1-D5) [2.27]* [2.60]** [2.56]* [0.53] [0.73] [-1.57]   






Small    Large 
S1-S5 t(S1-S5) 
S1 S2 S3 S4 S5 
All stocks 1.05 0.85 1.11 1.14 1.10 1.05 -0.20 [-0.85] 
D1 1.01 0.84 1.14 1.15 1.03 0.99 -0.15 [-0.46] 
D2 1.08 0.84 1.13 1.20 1.05 0.96 -0.13 [-0.50] 
D3 1.08 0.99 1.13 1.02 1.08 0.99 0.00 [-0.01] 
D4 1.10 0.75 1.16 1.16 1.25 1.11 -0.36 [-1.23] 
D5 0.98 0.83 0.99 1.17 1.07 1.19 -0.36 [-1.14] 
D1-D5 0.03 0.02 0.15 -0.03 -0.04 -0.19   





The chapter investigates whether multi-factor asset pricing model with and without time-
varying beta can explain the negative relationship between forecast dispersion and future 
stock returns. The models considered are (1) CAPM, (2) Fama and French (1993) three factor 
model, (3) Fama and French model augmented by the Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) 
momentum factor, and (4) Fama and French model augmented by the Pastor and Stambaugh 
(2003) liquidity factor. My results show that none of these models captures the forecast 
dispersion effect when the market beta varies with firm’s market value, book-to-market ratio 
and the corporate spread. My analysis further suggests that the dispersion-return relationship 
is related to aggregate liquidity and business-cycle risk factors. In addition, the negative 
relationship between forecast dispersion and stock returns is significantly weaker after 





This dissertation contributes to the literature in an important and active area of financial 
markets research - explaining the relationship between forecast dispersion and stock returns. 
One of the most influential early studies is Diether et al. (2002) showing evidence that stocks 
with lower forecast dispersion earn higher future returns. They explain the negative 
relationship between dispersion and future returns by market frictions and interpret forecast 
dispersion as a proxy for the differences of opinion. They attribute this finding to Miller 
(1977) hypothesis that in the presence of short-sale costs, stock prices are determined by the 
optimistic investors who bid the prices up. This interpretation is however contrary to previous 
thought that forecast dispersion is a proxy for risk; see Malkiel (1982), Farrelly and 
Reichenstein (1984), and Carvell and Strebel (1984), among others. 
A growing number of studies suggest that tests of forecast dispersion that employ stock 
returns face several challenges. Analyst forecast dispersion has long been considered a proxy 
for investor heterogeneity, assuming that the disagreement among analysts reflects 
disagreement among investors. Based on the notion that investor disagreement is one of the 
factors to trigger trade, forecast dispersion is also used to study trading volume around 
information events such as earnings announcements. Over time, investors revise their 
expectations thereby generating transactions. In conjunction with revision in earnings 
forecasts, forecast dispersion explains turnover; see  Ajinkya et al. (1991). Roulstone (2003) 
shows that forecast dispersion is negatively associated with stock liquidity thus conclude that 
analysts reduce information asymmetry by providing public information to market 
participants.  
In Chapter 1, I conduct a thorough review of the literature on the differences of opinion-
return relationship, paying special attention to the use forecast dispersion as a proxy of 
differences of opinion. As reviewed, the literature is split on the relationship between forecast 
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dispersion and stock returns both in terms of the direction of the relationship and in terms of 
the role of forecast dispersion. Therefore, to understand the causes of the relationship between 
forecast dispersion and stock returns, I perform a detail examination of the dispersion 
anomaly. 
This research adds to the existing literature on the role of forecast dispersion on stock 
returns. My results can be summarized as follows. First, I find that the dispersion anomaly 
persists on a longer period from February 1983 to December 2007 that includes the sample 
periods considered in the previous studies. This negative relationship between 
contemporaneous forecast dispersion and future stock returns is also robust to different 
dispersion measures. In addition, I examine the relation with other market anomalies that are 
known to predict low future stock returns. In particular, my results show that forecast 
dispersion anomaly is not due to accruals quality, capital investment growth, asset growth, 
and equity issuance anomalies. 
Second, I add to the literature with a detail analysis of determinants of forecast dispersion. 
My analysis shows that forecast dispersion is simultaneously related to a number of factors 
including firm riskiness, analysts’ herding and conflicts of interest, forecast difficulty, and the 
differences in information impounded in each forecast. The motivation to consider these 
sources of forecast dispersion stems from empirical facts observed between forecast 
dispersion and its determinants. 
Third, using individual stocks, in Chapter 4 I test a risk-based asset pricing models 
applying four different specifications to adjust for risk. Regardless of the method used for 
risk-adjustment, there is a strong negative relation between average returns and forecast 
dispersion. However, accounting for the determinants of forecast dispersion and allowing beta 
to vary with firm’s market value, book-to-market ratio, and business cycle variables, reduces 
the dispersion-return relationship. Further tests show that the determinants of forecast 
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dispersion account for half of the profitability of dispersion strategy, thus substantiating the 
importance of the determinants of forecast dispersion in understanding the dispersion 
anomaly. In sum, my findings corroborate previous results that forecast dispersion is an 




Appendix A: Sample selection 
I/B/E/S provides analysts’ earnings forecasts in the U.S. Detail History and Summary 
History files. Both Summary and Detail files suffer from a rounding problem that makes them 
unsuitable for computing summary statistics. In these files, I/B/E/S adjusts the earnings per 
share for stock splits and stock dividends after the date of the forecast in order to smooth the 
forecast time series. The adjusted number is then rounded to the nearest cent. For firms with 
large numbers of stock splits or stock dividends, earnings-per-share forecasts (and the 
summary statistics associated with earnings) are reported as zero. To avoid this problem, I 
rely on the raw forecasts that are not adjusted for stock splits. I/B/E/S also provides 
Unadjusted Summary Statistics file that contains summary statistics for analyst forecasts, 
including average, median, and standard deviation, as well as information about the number 
of analysts making forecasts and the number of upward and downward revisions. These 
summary statistics are ordinarily calculated on the third Thursday of each month. For each 
stock, the coverage in any given month equals to the number of I/B/E/S analysts who provide 
fiscal year on earnings estimates in that month. From I/B/E/S, I select U.S. stocks that in 
I/B/E/S Unadjusted Summary Statistics file have at least two EPS estimates denominated in 
U.S. dollar (USD). At least two analysts must cover each stock in order to compute forecast 
dispersion. 
Data on stock returns, prices, volume, and shares outstanding are from CRSP. I select 
ordinary common shares (SHRCD = 10 and 11) that are traded in NYSE (EXCHCD = 1), 
AMEX (EXCHCD = 2) and NASDAQ (EXCHCD = 3) and remove financial institutions 
(6000 ≤ SICCD≤ 6999). To reduce the potential effects of outliers on the results and to 
minimize the problem of illiquid stocks and the bid-ask spread, I follow Jegadeesh and 




Appendix B: Measuring accruals quality 
The accruals quality (AQ) metric I use is based on Dechow and Dichev (2002) 
regression model that posits a relation between current period working capital accruals and 
operating cash flows in the prior, current, and future periods. Following McNichols (2002) 
discussion of this model, I also include the change in revenues and property, plant and 
equipment (PPE) as additional explanatory variables. The unexplained portion of the variation 
in working capital accruals is an inverse measure of accruals quality (a greater unexplained 
portion implies poorer quality). I adopt Francis et al. (2005) indirect approach to calculate 
total accruals that uses information from the balance sheet and income statement: 
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is firm j’s total current accruals in year y 
 
, , ,j y j y j y
C FO N IBE TA   is firm j’s cash flow from operations in year y 
,j t
N IBE  is firm j’s net income before extraordinary items in 
year y (#18) 
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is firm j’s total accruals in year y 
 
,j y
C A  is firm j’s change in current assets (#4) between 
year y-1 and year y 
 ,j yC L
 is firm j’s change in current liabilities (#5) between 
year y-1 and year y 
,j y
Cash  is firm j’s change in cash (#1) between year y-1 
and year y 
 
,j t
STD EBT  is firm j’s change in debt in current liabilities (#34) 
between year y-1 and year y 
 ,j yD EPN
 is firm j’s depreciation and amortization expense 







v  is firm j’s change in revenues (#12) between year 
y-1 and year y  
 ,j yP P E
 is firm j’s gross value of PPE (#7) in year y 
  
I require that each firm-year observation has data and estimate the AQ for each of 48 
industry groups with at least 20 firms in year y; see Fama and French (1997). Consistent with 
the prior literature, I winsorize extreme values at 1% and 99% levels, i.e., values less than the 
1% percentile or greater than the 99% percentile are set to be the values of the 1% and 99% 
percentiles, respectively. Annual cross-sectional estimations yield firm- and year-specific 
residuals, that form the basis for the accruals quality metric: , ( )j y j yAQ   is the standard 
deviation of firm j’s residuals, ,j y , calculated over years y-4 through y. Because ( )j y 
is based on five annual residuals, my sample is restricted to firms with at least 7 years of data 
(recall that estimating the AQ requires both lead and lag cash flows). This restriction likely 
biases the sample towards firms that are larger and more successful. The unexplained portion 
of the variation in working capital accruals is an inverse measure of accruals quality (a greater 
unexplained portion implies a poorer quality). Because the AQ metric requires one lead cash 




Appendix C: Definitions of explanatory variables 
 
FDisp Forecast dispersion is the standard deviation of analysts’ current-fiscal-year annual earnings per share forecasts divided by the 
absolute value of the average forecast (with zero-average-forecast observations excluded from the sample). Forecast dispersion 
is computed at the end of six months before fiscal-year end. 
 
Unc The uncertainty index of Anderson et al. (2009) measured as the standard deviation of the aggregate corporate profits (rather 
than earning forecasts of individual firms). 
 
Beta The estimated systematic risk from a market model regression, estimated over previous -1 to -52 weekly returns. 
RV The residual variance over previous -1 to -52 weekly returns, relative when forecast dispersion is computed. I assume a single 
factor return generating process and measure the firm level idiosyncratic risk relative to the traditional Capital Asset Pricing 
Model (CAPM):  
 
, , , , ,
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where ,i tR  is the return on stock i at week t, ,f tR is the risk free rate at week t, and ,m tR  is the market return at week t. The 
risk free rate is the 1-month Treasury bill rate, and market return is the CRSP value-weighted market index. Weekly return is 
the daily compounded return over a given week. 
 
Log(MV) The natural logarithm of market value (in millions) computed as stock price times number of shares outstanding. 
 
BM Book-to-Market ratio is the total assets (#6) minus liabilities (#181) plus deferred taxes and investment tax credit (#35), minus 
book value of preferred stock (in the following order: redemption value (#56) or liquidating value (#10) or carrying value 




FAgeStd The annualized (divided by 365) standard deviation of forecast ages from non-conflicted analysts. Age is the number of 
calendar days between analyst’s last forecast for a given firm and the day when forecast dispersion is computed. If the number 
of non-conflicted analysts is below two, the FAgeStd is set to zero.  
BidAskSpr The average of the daily bid-ask spreads over the previous 50 days relative to the day when forecast dispersion is computed. 
The daily bid-ask spread is the absolute value of the difference between the bid and ask prices, scaled by the middle price. 
Info/Noise 
The Info/Noise measure of Burlacu et al. (2008) computed as 
2 2
ln( / (1 ))R R where 
2
R  is from regressing firm weekly returns 
on its lagged stock price, and four value-weighted industry returns, over previous -1 to -52 weeks as follows: 
 
, 1 4\ , 1 3\4 , 1 2\3 , 1 1\2 , 1, 0 1 2 3 4 5 ,
,
i t SIC i t SIC t SIC t SIC t
N N N N N
i t i t
r P P P P P      
    
        
where  
,i t





     is firm’s normalized stock price 




is calculated using stocks with the same 4-digit SIC code as stock i, but excluding stock i 




is calculated using stocks with the same 3 digit SIC codes but different 4 digit SIC codes 




is calculated using stocks with the same 2 digit SIC codes but different 3 digit SIC codes 




is calculated using stocks with the same 1 digit SIC codes but different 2 digit SIC codes 
At time t, the normalized price equals , ,
1 1
(1 ) / (1 )
t t




   , where ,m kr  is the compounded CRSP value-weighted market 
return over a given week. The cumulative market and stock returns are set to 1 in January 1982. 
 





             0,                 if no change in rating




The entire spectrum of ratings is as follows: AAA=22, AA+=21, AA=20, AA−=19, A+=18, A=17, A−=16, BBB+=15, 
BBB=14, BBB−=13, BB+=12, BB=11, BB−=10, B+=9, B=8, B−=7, CCC+=6, CCC=5, CCC−=4, CC=3, C=2, D=1. 
 
∆ZScr Yearly change in Altman (1968)’s Z-Score computed as 
 
∆ZScr = 1.2∙∆X1 + 1.4∙∆X2 + 3.3∙∆X3 + 0.6∙∆X4 +0.999∙∆X5,  
 
where 
X1 = working capital/total assets =  #179/#6 
X2 = retained earnings/total assets =  #36/#6 
X3 = earnings before interest and taxes/total assets =  #178/#6 
X4 = market value equity/book value of total liabilities = (#199∙#25)/#181 
X5 = sales/total assets = #12/#6 
 
RelFE Previous year’s relative forecast error, computed as the absolute difference between average (consensus) forecast and actual 
earnings divided by actual earnings. Actual earnings are as reported in I/B/E/S Actual Unadjusted file adjusted for stock splits. 
Zero-actual-earnings observations are excluded. 
 
Herd The proportion of herding forecasts where an analyst’s forecast is classified as herding if it is between the prevailing 
consensus and the most recent forecast issued by the same analyst.  
 
ConfInt      1 1 ,ConfInt pLn p p Ln p     where p is the proportion of conflicted analysts. Analyst is marked as conflicted if he works 
for an investment bank that led or co-led any IPO or SEO. 
 





Appendix D: Definitions of control variables 
 
Excess return Excess return is firm’s raw return less risk-free rate, where risk-free rate is the 1-
month Treasury bill rate. 
 
FDisp Forecast dispersion is the standard deviation of analysts’ current-fiscal-year annual 
earnings per share forecasts (unadjusted for stock splits) divided by the absolute 
value of the average earnings forecasts. Zero average-forecast observations are 
excluded. 
 
CorpSpr Corporate spread is Moody’s BAA-AAA corporate bond yield spread. 
 
TermSpr Term spread is Moody’s term yield spread defined as the long-term U.S. 
government bond yield minus the yield on three-month U.S. Treasury bills. 
 
Yield Moody's yield on three-month U.S. Treasury bills. 
 
Turn Turnover is the ratio of trading volume to the number of shares outstanding. 
 
MV Market value (in billions) is the price per share times shares outstanding. 
 
BM Book-to-Market ratio is the total assets (#6) minus liabilities (#181) plus deferred 
taxes and investment tax credit (#35), minus book value of preferred stock (in the 
following order: redemption value (#56) or liquidating value (#10) or carrying 
value (#130) divided by market value. 
 







  where tr  is the stock return in month t. For example, Ret4-6 is the 
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